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SYNOPSIS 
this dissertation I seek to establish, describe and justify the thesis that all educational 
owledge, i.e. curriculum content is ideological. In order to do so, I shall make use of 
)rk in recent and contemporary philosophy, sociology of knowledge and political 
~ory: an examination of the ideas of Marx is central. 
lapter One discusses the claims of the analytical philosophy of education, and 
ncludes that, this approach is not particularly appropriate to the present study. In its 
lce, the methodology of social holism is adopted. 
lapter Two examines the term 'educational knowledge'. It starts from the classical, 
atonic analysis, and by means of an holistic approach to knowledge interprets 
ucational knowledge in its wider societal contexts. 
lapter Three examInes an outline of the theory of ideology. Through a critical 
amination of the evolution of the term and particularly Marx's accounts, a theory of 
~ology in which collective interests playa prominent role is accepted, as most relevant 
the present study. 
lapter Four addresses the issues of cultural relativism, and adopts in the end, a 
)dified theory of cultural relativism. 
lapter Five carefully looks at Marx's accounts of the theory of social determination of 
owledge. It concludes that, the basic claim of this theory, as well as its scattered 
counts, are not sufficient, although they are necessary for any explanatory theory of 
~ ideology of educational knowledge. 
Chapter Six considers Marx's theory of 'the fetishism of the commodity', and argues 
that, it can provide complementary explanations for the ideology of educational 
knowledge. 
Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine each considers the central conditions for Marx's 
fetishism theory as applied to the sociology of knowledge. 
Chapter Ten puts forward a theory that I call 'the fetishism of educational knowledge', 
as an explanatory theory of the ideology of educational knowledge. 
Chapter Eleven carefully considers some of the possible criticisms against the fetishism 
of educational knowledge, and argues that, the theory is a good one. 
Chapter Twelve applies the explanatory theory to the Nigerian context. 
It is concluded that the end of fetishism shall await the end of conflicts between 
collective interests of contending social forces within any society. 
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1 THE PRESENT STUDY 
I seek to examine in this dissertation the particular accounts of the ideological 
nature of what is taught in schools. I intend to examine these and related issues 
with particular reference to socially and politically plural and complex societies 
of Mrica such as Nigeria. Nigeria, is a unity of various pre-colonial independent 
states and societies. As a political, social, and economic entity, Nigeria was a 
colonial creation in the opening years of this century. But it is emphasised that, 
this is not a study of Nigeria; rather it is a search for an explanatory theory of the 
ideology of educational knowledge which I intend to apply to the complex 
Nigerian society and its educational system. 
The basic problem for this study is not one of determining whether or not 
educational knowledge is ideological. I shall provisionally accept the claim that, 
that knowledge which is selected for transmission in schools is ideological. But 
this basic claim is not simply taken for granted. Although my purpose 1S 
explaining the ideological nature of educational knowledge, but I do offer 
arguments (see 2: 35 - 9 and 5: 89 - 115)1 in support of the claim that educational 
knowledge is ideological. The chief concern is not to develop these arguments 
because if the senses in which educational knowledge is taken to be ideological 
are described, then it would have been shown parri passu, that it is indeed 
ideological. It is recognised therefore, that, examining any particular account of 
the ideological nature of what is taught in schools at the same time entails in 
itself, some justifications of that particular account of the ideological nature of 
educational knowledge which is being investigated. What is taught in schools has 
a number of implications: epistemological, social and cultural, political, 
1 I shall be using this style in making cross references to chapters, sections, and page numbers as 
the case may be in this dissertation. 
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economic, and so on. It is widely recognized that curricula policies are caught up 
in the social conflicts and pressures of the wider society. The real issue is not 
whether they are connected to these conflicts and pressures, but how and why. 
There is as such, a debate on how to explain the :deological character of what is 
taught in schools. 
What has happened in the social sciences in this century is a move away from the 
paradigm of the natural sciences. The positivist basis of that paradigm is that 
there are some facts of the social world which exist out there, and that they can 
be studied in a value-free way. There are many sources of the 19th and 20th 
century criticisms of this view. One is that social facts are not independent of 
human agents but are constructed by them. So it follows that social inquiry 
cannot be neutral. Many accounts along this line follow the theory of the social 
construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann: 1979) as the methodology of 
interpretation. 
Prominent in this regard and for the purposes of the present study, are Marx and 
Mannheim. Marx in particular placed emphasis on the human agent as the 
maker of his own history. This view is central to an understanding and analysis of 
the ideological nature of what is transmitted in schools. 
The claims about the ideological nature of educational knowledge raIse a 
number of problems which have some far-reaching implications for education 
and society. Such problems are even more intense in plural societies (such as 
Nigeria) which are characterised by cultural plurality, thereby compounding the 
explanations of the ideological nature of educational knowledge in such 
societies. For example, there are problems pertaining to the relationship 
between social collective's (a group or class) interests and the production of 
worthwhile knowledge for transmission in schools. Selecting and determining 
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educational knowledge by reference to the multiplicity of probable candidates 
may be contentious. The class or group source of the knowledge for transmission 
in schools is not sufficient (though it is necessary) for conceiving it to be 
ideological. Concealment or disguising of the collective's interests are further 
conditions. Interests are concealed in this case when knowledge is presented as 
being for the 'general good', while in actual fact it is not the case that it is. But 
this means that, one should distinguish between deliberate (i.e. concealment) 
and non-deliberate (i.e. disguise) hiding of reality, including geniune errors and 
mistakes. I shall attempt a position about which of these holds for the ideology of 
educational knowledge (see 8: 140 - 2). However there are problems in the 
extent to which one can, at a philosophical level, distinguish (from an 
'Archimedian position'), between false-consciousness which deliberately conceals 
group's or class's interests on the one hand, and that which arises from problems 
of wrong or mistaken perceptions, and interpretations of reality (without any 
biases), on the other. Thus a test of rationality, which is itself non-ideological is 
needed. I shall subsequently address these problems. 
It is the case that, the researches and debates which now dominate research in 
the social sciences, particularly disciplines such as 'Social Epistemology' or the 
'Sociology of Knowledge' are largely conducted within the frameworks of 
advanced capitalism. But it is generally not clear if the conclusions drawn from 
the study of the politics of the production of knowledge in such a form of society 
are appropriate to very different forms of society. For example, it is not 
particularly clear if these can apply to the analysis of the ideology of the content 
of education in societies where varied and conflicting forms of societies co-exist 
or attempt to co-exist. What seems to work in advanced capitalism may not 
necessarily work in the developing countries, such as the African societies. 
However without any prejudice to the universal conclusions that are possible 
from such studies (of the phenomena in question in advanced capitalism), this 
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study will attempt to address the problem in the contexts of developing, not 
developed, capitalist societies. These are hybrid forms of societies in which 
capitalism is in the ascendency consequent upon which other forms of social 
organizations with which it co-exists, but are in decay. Cultural pluralism and 
primordial patterns of identity in such societies, appear to command a measure 
of respect among various social actors, both private and public. It is interesting 
therefore to see the interplay between these, and the capitalist form of society, in 
relation to the politics of the production of curriculum knowledge. The task here 
therefore is to attempt, in the light of the co-existence of the different forms of 
societies, an account of the ideological nature of the official knowledge. 
The premise for discussing and debating the problems of the ideological nature 
of educational knowledge is the proposition that all knowledge is socially 
determined. But the social determinist theory of knowledge has a series of 
weaknesses which will be the subject of inquiries (see 5: 89 - 115). The theory 
and its various formulations (on which there is much emphasis In the 
conventional sociology of knowledge), is insufficient as an account of the 
ideological nature of educational knowledge. The theory of social determination 
of knowledge is vague and presumptuous. It assumes too much because it makes 
apparently generous and sweeping claims. Social determinist theory of 
knowledge is largely taken for granted as obvious whereas it raises more 
difficulties than it apparently resolves. It leaves the appropriate interpretations 
of the relationship between educational knowledge and the social structure open. 
It relies more or less on its Marxist and neo-Marxist formulations. These issues 
will be critically examined (chapter five). The proposed dimension above (of 
cultural pluralism in relation to developing capitalism) provides for richer but 
conflicting grounds for examining issues in the production of knowledge. 
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This research is therefore an attempt to present and defend a thesis in the social 
philosophy of education. Particular reference is given to the application of social 
theory to issues in the politics of the production and dissemination of knowledge. 
It seeks to examine critically what a social determinist approach will understand 
to be the relationship between the content of education and ideology, by specific 
reference to the Nigerian society and educational system. The main task of the 
present study is to attempt to offer specific explanations of the ideological nature 
of what is taught in schools. 
2 SOME LIMITATIONS TO THE PRESENT STUDY 
2.1 IDEOLOGY, THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
To give a particular explanation of the ideological nature of what is selected and 
taught in schools, is to make a fundamental assumption about every subject 
offering in the school. Accordingly the humanities, the social and natural 
sciences are all taken to be ideological. There is a persisting debate about the 
problem of the relationship between science, technology and ideology. Lenin 
(1977), Habermas (1973), Feyerabend (1978) and many others have addressed 
the nature of this relationship. The basic interest here is not in the ideology of 
the Natural Sciences or Technology and allied disciplines. On the contrary the 
intention is to offer an explanatory theory in the light of which the ideology of 
the humanities and the social sciences only may be understood. No claims will be 
made about the status of the natural scientific knowledge taught in schools. 
2.2 THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
This study finally seeks to apply an explanatory theory of the ideology of 
educational knowledge to Nigeria. If, finally, the account of the ideological 
nature of educational knowledge that explains the production and dissemination 
of educational knowledge in Nigeria, is found to be suitable to other contexts, 
that will strengthen the case for the theory. But in view of the concern for 
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pplying this study's finding, there is some emphasis on hybrid societies whose 
)cial structures are complex, thereby making claims to the ideological nature of 
le educational knowledge complex . 
.3 ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED 
)ne of the main approaches in this study, follows Komer's (1969) replacement 
nalysis. Replacement analysis is an attempt to improve and remedy a 
10ught/proposition by illustrating its logical structure. Issues will be raised and 
ritically examined. Positions and arguments will be arrived at through a critical 
urvey of some of the positions and arguments articulated in the literature. But 
ttempts will equally be made to provide some concrete examples to 
omplement and elaborate the abstract arguments I shall be presenting. The 
'rincipal concerns of this dissertation are as follows: 
! A Methodological (theoretical) Framework 
"his study is grounded on a specific theoretical, intellectual perspective. 
~ccordingly I shall attempt to assess critically the dominant theoretical 
lstruments for doing Philosophy of Education in the Anglo-Nigerian tradition, 
) see whether or not they are appropriate for the present study. If they are not, 
n appropriate alternative theoretical framework which is agreeable to this study 
rill have to be worked out. 
:onclusions will be drawn, in relation to the reseach problem, the specific 
ontext in which I intend to apply the findings of the study and the 
lethodological framework to be adopted. By means of these, explanations 
ertaining to the sense in which the production (and dissemination) of 
nowledge in relation to the varied ideological forms in plural societies will be 
ffered. 
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ii) An Interpretation of Educational Knowledge 
I shall, for a number of reasons to be discussed later (1: 22 - 4 and 2: 25 - 31) 
employ the term 'educational knowledge' rather than 'knowledge' per se. While 
the nature of knowledge has been, and still remains hotly disputed, the same is 
not true for the term 'educational knowledge'. The force of educational 
knowledge and its meanings have most often been taken for granted. Hence the 
need for its serious discussion by means of the tools of philosophical analysis. It 
is only after coming to a view of what educational knowledge is, that its 
relationship to other phenomena including ideology, can be assessed. Further 
discussions, for example, regarding the contradictions in the ideology of 
educational knowledge, will then follow. 
iii) An Outline of a Theory of Ideology 
Ideology is central to this work and it is therefore crucial to be clear of the 
particular usage or conceptions to be employed. Accordingly, some of the 
popular theories of ideology will be critically examined to see if any will be of 
relevance to the discussion. But if none is found to be appropriate to the context, 
issues, and, methodology of the study, then a specific conception of ideology 
which need not be universally valid but at least suitable for the present purpose 
will be proposed. 
iv) Cultural Pluralism and Relativism 
The plurality of competing views of reality, interpretations of the world, cultures 
and, in general, measures of rationality, in a given society are the forms in which 
ideology is articulated and expressed. It is interesting for the purposes of the 
present study that some competing cultures and forms of rationality are in 
conflict with each other. These issues are important to this study because of the 
inter-play of cultural forces in the determination of educational knowledge in 
plural societies. 
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I Marx's Social Determinist theory of Knowledge 
he basis of the claims to the ideological nature of the curriculum is to be found 
l Marx's theory of social determination of knowledge. So I shall examine some 
;pects of that theory in detail. It will be carefully examined with a view to seeing 
it provides an explanatory theory of the ideology of educational knowledge. If 
is found to be sufficient to the present research, then attempts will be made to 
~ its central tenets to the analysis of the ideological nature of educational 
tlowledge in the socio-political circumstances of Nigeria. 
~arl Mannheim's theory of 'Wzssensoziologie' and his accounts of the "free-
oating intelligentsia" will be considered in a postscript to the chapter on Marx's 
)cial determinist theory of knowledge (5: 111 - 15). 
shall contend that the social determinist theories of Marx and Mannheim have 
~ficiencies which stand in the way of their providing a convincing account of the 
leology of educational knowledge. Consequently it will be necessary to develop 
1 alternative account which will be grounded in another of Marx's writings. 
) Consequences of the Explanatory Theory 
shall seek to examine critically the limitations and possible criticisms of the 
rplanatory theory of the ideology of educational knowledge I finally offer. But I 
)ld that, the explanatory theory of the ideology of educational knowledge that 
nerges from the present exercise, is only a theory and not the (definitive) 
eory of the ideology of educational knowledge. The interest in examining how 
works in the Nigerian society and educational system does not preclude the 
)ssible universality of its assumptions and claims. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: HOLISTIC APPROACH TO 
KNOWLEDGE 
1 TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY 
The significance of any discourse is conditional upon a reference to the methodology 
that guides it. Any theory presupposes the application of a particular methodology. 
Claims, interpretations, methodologies and conclusions may be assessed by taking into 
consideration the particular theoretical framework which in the first place inform 
these. Having a clear methodology helps to avoid contradictory and inconsistent, 
invalid, generalised and perhaps dangerous claims or interpretations of the world. But 
it is not the case that, the presupposed methodology entails some canons which can be 
applied in their entirety. Methodologies are contestable in terms of the arguments they 
produce. What is implied by any particular methodology is open to disputes. 
Each theoretical background makes its own basic assumptions, presuppositions, tools 
of analysis and mode of intellectual or philosophical practices. However, the 
identification of the appropriate metodological framework (in any discourse) does not 
solve an intellectual or a philosophical problem. The methodology only sets the basic 
parameters of the discussion, delineates the tools to be used, and defines the 
fundamental concerns for the resolution of the particular problem at stake. This holds 
for the philosophy of education as for any other subject of study because of the variety 
of theories that can be appealed to in analysing the problems with which it is 
concerned. 
Certain philosophical and socio-methodological orientations have dominated 
discussions in the philosophy of education, and applied social theory. Amongst these 
are, 'progressivism', and 'conceptual analysis'. The former is usually identified with the 
American philosophical movement of 'pragmatism', ie of John Dewey and others. It 
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attempts to apply social and political philosophy, in addition to ethical and logical 
positions, to educational issues and problems. On the other hand, the Conceptual 
Analysis movement, heavily influenced by the Oxford linguistic philosophy of, for 
example, J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle, seeks to clarify certain conceptual confusions 
that bedevilled education. I intend to make some comments on this latter methodology 
as used in the philosophy of education since it has for the most part replaced the 
former theoretical and methodological assumptions of Anglo-Nigerian philosophy of 
education before 1960. What I shall call the 'analytical philosophy of education' 
following for example, Adelstein (1971) and Matthews (1980) has, it may be noted, 
itself been partly replaced in recent years; a good deal of its influence however 
remains. I shall attempt to examine the extent to which this methodology is relevant to 
the present study. 
2 AN EXAMINATION OF THE ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
The analytical philosophy of education has been most fully developed in the writings 
of philosophers such as Peters and Hirst in the 1960s. Generally the analytical 
philosophy of education developed from that variety of linguistic philosophy (i. e. 
ordinary language philosophy) of Oxford in particular in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
especially the works of Austin and Ryle. Certain assumptions can be identified as 
providing the basic framework of the analytical philosophy of education. It is 
important to understand these basic presuppositions before corning to a VIew 
regarding the methodology's adequacy or otherwise for the purposes of the present 
study. 
2.1 THE MAIN PRESUPPOSITIONS 
Although such premises are not spelt out in detail, they are, as Adelstein (1971) 
argued, identifiable. They are: firstly, a commitment to some kind of 
conceptual/linguistic analysis of educational issues, terms, and problems; secondly, the 
claim that philosophical investigation is essentially a 'second-order' activity, 
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distinguished from 'first order' activities such as science, history, economics and so on; 
thirdly the claim that philosophical analysis is a neutral and objective inquiry. 
i Conceptual/Ordinary Language Analysis 
The main consideration here is that concepts, unless clarified, constitute basic 
philosophical problems. Peters asserted that, 
"we already know too much about human behaviour, albeit in a rather 
uncoordinated manner. Common sense incorporated in the concepts of 
ordinary language has creamed off most of the vital distinctions." (1958: 
155) 
The methods and strategies of linguistic analysis are employed in a bid to resolve 
confusion in the use of concepts. Concepts are first analysed by looking at the 
ordinary, 'normal', usage of words in order to establish what Gellner (1968) refers to 
as "paradigmatic usage". In this regard to ask for a definition of a word or term, is 
indeed to ask how that term or word is or ought to be used. Terminologies are 
explicated and by using the outcome of this exercise, a 'consensus', an 'agreement', 
over the usage of the concept/term, i. e. "the paradigmatic usage", is established. The 
idea of a paradigmatic case is rooted in the activities of the Oxford linguistic 
philosophy. 
Adelstein claimed that, the paradigmatic usage is "highlighted by contrasting the use of 
the concept with the way it might normally be thought to be" (1971: 2). Synonyms are 
therefore offered and justified as explanations of a concept. But terms which, as 
Adelstein said, "are not already inscribed in the concepts of ordinary language" (ibid: 
3), have no place in this methodology. To this end the focus is on the clarification of 
those concepts and terms that we already know, so that we shall have, in the words of 
Hirst and Peters "the ability to discriminate and use words correctly, which is 
observable in the case of others as well as ourselves" (1970: 4). The goal is generally to 
clarify conceptual confusions in the discussions and debates about education. In the 
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vords of Peters philosophical inquiry is basically "the clarification and discussion of 
he concepts used and of how they have meaning" (1966: 16). 
viatthews sums up this presupposition of the analytical philosophy of education. He 
lrgues that what constitutes the basic framework here is, the 
"analysis of concepts in educational discourse, the determination of the 
'logic' of the educational judgement and the justification of varied 
educational practices" (1980: 158). 
[be 'logical truth' that this system of philosophical analysis always seeks, as noted by 
~vers is the truth "in virtue of meaning, where meaning is filled out by considerations 
)f usage" (1980: 14). For many Oxford philosophers of the 1950s and 1960s meaning is 
Ise. 
i Philosophy as A Second-Order Inquiry 
Warnock argued that "the facts, phenomena, cases or events to which .... concepts 
night be applied" (1958: 167), are the main business of philosophical investigation. 
rhe facts, phenomena, cases, and events belong to "first-order" inquiry or 'scientific 
nvestigations. Peters accordingly provided a distinction between the philosophical and 
:he scientific areas of knowledge in order to clarify the purposes of philosophical 
nvestigations when he argued that, 
"a scientific question ...... is one that can, in principle, be answered by 
certain kinds of procedures in which observation and experimentation 
play a crucial part. But the clarification and discussion of concepts and 
how they have meaning, and of the procedures by means of which these 
questions are answered, is a philosophical inquiry." (1966: 15) 
[be former are 'the first order' questions (science, history, and so on), while the latter 
:omprise "the second order" areas of inquiry. Philosophy of Education is a 'second-
)rder discipline' which is limited to conceptual questions and the difficulties that these 
lighlight. These are difficulties which Ryan argued, require "an account of the proper 
hings to say ....... and how we should conceive of them" (1970: 5). So Philosophy of 
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Education has as its concern, concepts and their interrelationships. Peters holds 
accordingly that, 
"to distinguish logically necessary conditions of usage of words from 
other sorts of conditions that may be present ..... is to understand the 
difference between philosophy and doing science". (1966: 5) 
The distinction between what is philosophical and what is not, is therefore basic. 
Accordingly philosophical analysis should deal only with the analysis of concepts and 
such analyses are to be found only in the second order areas of inquiry. Contexts of, 
and relations between the use of concepts are given less consideration in the analytic 
philosophy of education. While social contexts in which words are used, are given little 
attention in the analysis of concepts, considerable emphasis is given on linguistic 
analysis of those concepts under investigation. An inter-disciplinary approach to 
philosophical discourse is not tolerated by the methodology in question. 
iii Claims to neutrality/objectivity 
The claim that philosophy is a neutral and objective inquiry is another presupposition 
of the methodology under consideration. It claims to offer a 'neutral' analysis of 
educational problems, by suggesting that it operates from a detached perspective, 
devoid of any commitment to ethical, political, ideological or any other forms of bias. 
It claims to direct its analysis of education towards nothing else than 'conceptual 
truths' in whatever way these appear, without regard to politics, culture, ideology and 
so on. 
The philosophical framework under discussion implicitly acknowledges that 
philosophical questions do not arise in a vacuum, at least in the sense that its analysis 
lays stress on normal, ordinary usages of concepts and the words which express them. 
The analytical procedures suggest a kind of relationship between concepts and society. 
Nonetheless, it normally does not take as significant the social theory which is implied 
in its presentations of normal and ordinary usage of concepts. 
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The three presuppositions (conceptual analysis, the first/second order distinction, and 
the claim to objectivity) taken together constitute the basic methodological framework 
of the analytical philosophy of education. It is by means of this methodology that 
investigations of educational problems are reduced to the analysis of concepts such as 
'teaching', 'learning', 'education', 'knowledge', and so on. So each concept is treated as 
an independent linguistic unit, the meaning of which can be revealed by analysing its 
internal logical structure. But the relationship between the concepts so analysed (the 
idea of a conceptual framework), is central to Oxford analytic philosophy. 
2.2 SOME PROBLEMS FOR THE ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY 
i Meaning and truth 
There is contained in the analytical philosophy of education, an attempt to relegate 
the task of philosophy from 'the search for truth' to 'the search for meaning' and 
define meaning as use. It is a mistake to conceive of truth in terms of meaning. Though 
analysing and determining meaning is a presupposition of the search for truth, the 
latter is not reducible to the former. Even if the correct meaning of a term is 
identified, the search for truth cannot be said to be satisfied until wider questions to do 
with context and time of usage are asked and answered. 
The analytical philosophy of education does not, in most cases, provide something like 
dictionary meanings. Rather, by means of the analysis of sentences in which terms 
occur, it seeks to provide the logical and necessary conditions for the usage of a term. 
It seeks to determine the conditions for the truth of p (where p is a proposition). It 
seeks to determine the conditions under which the statement 'X knows that p' is true. 
in order to determine the meaning of the word knowledge. But determining the 
meaning of the word 'knowledge' will not of itself, help with the solutions of the 
epistemological problems which have traditionally troubled philosophers, such as the 
the problems of 'memory' and 'perception'. The mistake of the analytic philosophy of 
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education movement was to elevate conceptual analysis to the canonical procedure of 
philosophy in dealing with educational problems. It has, as I have indicated, a 
subsidiary though important role to play. Attaining conceptual clarity is important to 
exploring philosophical problems but it will not take us on the full journey. 
Similarly the world is not reducible to conceptual classifications needing clarification, 
even though concepts are important for categorising human experiences and for 
articulating thoughts about the world. Despite the fact that most, if not all, 
philosophical inquiries involve some conceptual analysis, at one stage or the other, 
there is much more to philosophy than such analysis. The analysis of concepts is 
necessary to the resolution of philosophical problem; it is not, however, sufficient to 
their resolution. 
ii Confusion in the use of concepts 
The analytical philosophy of education justifies itself mainly in terms of the 
clarification of conceptual confusion that afflicts debate in education. But it fails its 
own test by being unclear about 'confusion'. It seems to be itself confused about the 
concept of 'confusion'. It takes the concept for granted by saying nothing about what 
amounts to a 'confusion'. As Korner argues ''we might have suspected confusion where 
there is none", especially since tracing a confusion is possible only "after we have gone 
through the rigours of analysis". (1969: 28) It is sufficient to suggest therefore that the 
analytical philosophy of education's claim that there is confusion in specific cases may 
not necessarily be true. The alleged confusion might just be a product of its adherence 
to a specific linguistic context, and a failure to recognise the socio-linguistic 
dimensions of the use of concepts. 
It is one thing to claim a confusion in the use of concepts but it is another thing to 
demonstrate that certain usages actually amount to confusion. We have got to be clear 
about what it is in the use of a concept which amounts to the claimed confusion. 
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It needs to be stated clearly whose normal usage it accepts as a standard. Deviations 
from the standard can then be judged. This demand is important in the light of the 
relationships between language, culture and other variables like stratification factors 
found even in one linguistic community. The methodology does not demonstrate, it 
only assumes that there is no linkage between language and society. Consensus on 
normal usage, the departure from which will constitute wrong usage or even confusion 
(if properly defined for practical purposes), can only succeed if it is proved that 
language (and its concepts) can be detached from the nature and form of a society. 
Standard uses of conceptual analysis, as a philosophical position rather than a 
philosophical procedure have attempted to universalise English usage and so detect 
confusions thereby reducing the possibility of cross-cultural usage of concepts. Such a 
position involves a disregard of different though related uses of particular concepts 
both within and between societies and sub-groups within a society. 
iii Problems of Analysis 
There are many well - canvassed problems about the analytic procedure and I shall not 
discuss these. In particular the analytic philosophy of education generates problems of 
regression. It seeks to analyse a given concept in terms of its relation to the established 
usage of other concepts. If these concepts are further unanalysed the regression 
continues. If however those concepts are unanalysed the analysis of the original 
concept is without a foundation in the analytic procedure. One analysis entails another 
one similar to the 'initial subject' of investigation, such that no progress is made 
towards understanding the concept being investigated. As a result of this, other 
difficulties than those already mentioned bedevil the search for the meaning of the 
individual terms and the sentences in which they occur. As Quine argued, 
"Analyticity at first seemed most naturally definable by appeal to a 
realm of meanings. On refinement, the appeal to meanings gave way to 
16 
synonymy or definition. But definition ........ and synonymy turned out to 
be best understood only by dint of a prior appeal to analyticity itself." 
(1953: 32) 
This regression is damaging because it 'leaves all the problems as they were -
unresolved'. There is little wonder therefore that the methodology tends to end up in 
even more intractable problems than the ones with which it started, and goes round in 
a circle. 
iv Individual Units of Analysis 
Analytic philosophy treats concepts as individual units which are expressed by the 
words of a sentence. For example, concepts like 'training', are frequently analysed 
without any reference to the properties of the sentence in which they are employed. 
Rather the individual, internal qualities of the concepts are analysed. However words 
and concepts, are basically understood and examined in specific contexts. They are 
contextually definable. Their meanings are obtained in the light of, being part of a 
theoretical system. As Popper (1972) holds, even 'facts' are themselves 'theory-laden' 
i.e. they gain their meaning and significance from the theory in which they are encased. 
There is thus, a 'theory' be it 'primitive' or highly developed behind our observations, 
our statements about the world, and our claims to reality. 
This theory about a set of general ideas is ignored by analytic philosophy of education 
in its preoccupation with individual units of analysis. There is a problem in this 
approach because as both Quine and Popper suggest, in order to be relevant or 
meaningful, the individual units must be seen in their relations to each other within 
the context of their usage. Analytical philosophy of education would therefore do well 
to take seriously Korner's observation that, "every concept is part of a complex 
network of concepts from which it cannot be isolated" (1969: 27). Korner's claim shows 
that the context of the language itself is important in understanding the meaning of its 
individual terms and concepts. 
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V Problems about neutrality and objectivity 
There are serious doubts that the methods of the analytic philosophy of education are 
both objective and neutral. It cannot be accepted that analytic philosophy of education 
can attain the position of objectivity and neutrality without argument, and the 
difficulties of arguing from 'Archimedian position' are well known (for example, 
Winch: 1958). It has to be demonstrated that subjective issues, (i.e. the so-called 
second-order areas of inquiry including philosophy) can be discussed from a socially. 
culturally, and historically detached position. In so far as the Archimedian position is 
not tenable (and I am assuming it is not), it can be argued that, every spectator, is a 
participant because he/she has an interest in whatever is going on even if he/she may 
either not be willing or is unable to say or show it, or even if he/she is constrained in 
such a way that the person hardly becomes aware of that interest. It seems that it is 
this concealed interest which to some extent determines his satisfaction or otherwise 
with the proceedings that, it is claimed, he watches "detachedly". There is nothing 
inherent to analytic philosophy of education from which it follows that, the outcomes 
of its exercise, are other than subjective, i.e. reflections of the preoccupations of 
individual analysts. 
2.3 TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE 
Having examined some of the problems of the analytical philosophy of education, I 
conclude that it is not appropriate to the present study. Hence an alternative 
theoretical framework to guide this work is required. 
The analytical philosophy of education is a reductionist approach to philosophy in 
general, and investigations of educational knowledge in particular. Thus far it has been 
shown that the methodology in question restricts itself to exhibiting the meaning of 
what is already known, or indeed what is taken for granted as known. Therefore by the 
very nature of the presuppositions which define its general framework, the 
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methodology in question appears to have some in-built, inherent limitations in 
analysing 'new' concepts or terms. I suggest that 'educational knowledge' is an example 
of such terms that cannot be fully accounted for by this theoretical framework, because 
of - among other reasons - the exhibitionist character of the methodology in question. 
'Educational knowledge' is a term peculiar to philosophy, and is, I shall claim, thus 
beyond the parameters of the analytical philosophy of education which deals only with 
those concepts already in use. The best that such a methodology can offer in this 
regard is the linguistic analysis of concepts. 
It follows therefore that an explanation is to be sought in an alternative approach to 
knowledge. The elements of the alternative I shall propose have already been hinted 
at in the critique of the methodology in question. For the purposes of understanding 
and discussing the term 'educational knowledge' and this study in general, a 'holistic 
theory of explanation' (mild holism) as an approach to knowledge is hereby proposed. 
3 HOLISTIC THEORY 
3.1 QUINE'S HOLISM 
Quine (1953, 1988) criticises ordinary language philosophy's use of the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements in its search for a theory of meaning. 
Empiricism, according to Quine "cannot have such a distinction". He argued that, 
"synthetic sentences for the most part have empirical content only jointly as inter-
locking systems of sentences" (1988: 3). Quine makes holism the basis of a positivist 
theory of meaning. He claims that, "each term owes its meaning in relation with the 
others, so that they are all more or less closely inter-defined." (ibid: 3) Furthermore, 
holism holds that, "evidence can confirm only a whole theory, not an individual 
sentence" (ibid), unit of a sentence, or a single and isolated term or concept expressed 
by such a term. So contrary to the claims and presuppositions of the analytical 
philosophy of education, explanations and the search for meanings (of terms, concepts, 
and so on) must not be situated in isolated, detached terms and concepts. Holism also 
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entails some recognition of the contexts in which concepts are used, in which the 
radical empiricism of Quine is not necessarily interested. But what is important here is 
that, meaning is necessarily holistic. It seems therefore that holism as a theory of 
meaning and social explanation, should be the framework for the discussion of the 
issues and problems of the present study. But whether or not Quine's holism is to be 
accepted is another issue. 
Quine's holism is, it is noted, held jointly with positivism, a philosophical tradition 
which denies intentionality to human beings, and accordingly holds a positivistic view 
of both the Natural and the Social Sciences. It might seem that adopting a Quinean 
holism would lead straight into a 'Wittgensteinian' and 'Winchian' relativism, and the 
view of the Social Sciences as interpretive. The latter approaches are equally holistic 
for they look for the significance of beliefs in terms of social wholes, for example, 
cultures, societies, historical epochs and so on. They are not, by that token, restricted 
to offering causal explanations and clarifications of meanings as does the positivist 
approach. I shall therefore detach holism from the positivist context in which Quine 
develops and envelops it. 
3.2 SOCIAL HOUSM AS AN EXPLANATORY TOOL 
The theory of holistic explanations described above features in the Social Sciences 
much as it does in philosophical investigations. Holistic explanations are characterised 
by a priori principles, theoretical under-pinnings, and an appeal to the relationships 
between complexities within (and without) phenomena. Holistic explanations are thus 
theory-laden since, in the words of Peacocke (1979), they have a sort of "governing 
ideal". No fact or proposition is located outside the realm of theory. All facts are 
theory-laden since they are inter-defined as Popper (1972) suggested. Observational 
elements are established by theory. Theory determines the selection, ordering and 
meaning of the facts. Facts can only be determined by means of processes of 
identification, perception and interpretation, otherwise they cannot be known. For 
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:xample, in observations, only those things of interest which assist in explaining the 
,asic research questions or hypotheses, and so on, are focused. If a fact can be known 
mtside a context, then it will probably be irrelevant to any rational project. As Harris 
uggested, knowing the world involves a subject (the knower) and an object (the world 
o be known or discovered). The two must interact for knowledge to be generated. So 
)ne cannot have knowledge from some logical position outside that of the world and 
>eople, because "the world is the context for existing and for knowing" (1979: 4). It is 
n this regard that "we select particular 'facts' out of an infinite multitude, and order 
lnd categorise what we select.. .. " (ibid: 32). This also implies the social dimension of 
he search for meanings and explanations of phenomena. The holistic theory holds that 
>hilosophical as well as other investigations are necessarily social. Phenomena in their 
Inal analyses are meaningful only in relation to society. 
~yan (1970), Feyerabend (1978), James (1984), among others, all advocate one form 
)f holism or other as a theory of social explanation. All are united in insisting that 
~xplanations and meanings are understood by reference to the properties of 
~ollectives, and that actions are understood only "in terms of the logic of the situation". 
Waismann (1968) further indicates that, holistic explanations assess or search for 
neanings within a context, and not in isolation. Context therefore is crucial to 
neaning, and offering explanations of social phenomena, general behaviours and 
~onducts of social actors. James sums up this basic quality of holism as 
"the view that social phenomena are to be explained by appealing 
primarily to the properties of social wholes, since the latter are causal 
factors which shape the chacteristics of individual members of a society." 
(1984: 79) 
rhis stands in sharp contrast to "methodological individualism" a theory in the Social 
,ciences of parallel standing with the analytical philosophy of education. Both give 
,riority in their analytical schemes to the units and individual members of the social 
vhole. 
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The Marxist paradigm, in a modified form, will be used as a reference point in this 
study for the reasons that, firstly, it is comprehensive and holistic. though this must not 
be taken to presuppose that it is satisfactory. However, having adopted holism as the 
basic methodology for this study, there is a corresponding demand for the choice of an 
equally holistic paradigm to match. This demand is met much more strongly by the 
Marxist theory than its positivist (functionalist) counterpart. Secondly, holism provides 
stronger grounds for an account of the growth of knowledge than does the positivist 
theory. It has a comparably rich intellectual tradition which it had generated, and 
continues to generate over the last one hundred years. Thirdly, it has dominated the 
debates on ideology in contemporary philosophy and sociology of knowledge such that 
those debates are always considered incomplete without a reference to it. Fourthly, 
Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of history and society have provided the bases for 
theories of 'social epistemology', within which debates over the questions of the nature 
and problems of knowledge, including educational knowledge are often located. Even 
the positivist sociology of knowledge starts off from the Marxist claims to a theory of 
knowledge production. Considerations of the Marxist paradigm are therefore central 
to the methodological and other concerns of this study. 
3.3 SOME ADVANTAGES OF THE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE 
First, the holistic approach to knowledge provides a wider perspective for the 
understanding of human knowledge than does the positivist approach. It will seen that 
it facilitates an understanding not only of the specific internal structure of a 
phenomena (a term, a concept, an issue, or a proposition), but also its background, 
purposes, production, expression, and interpretation. Terms or concepts are analysed 
in relation to their complexities, i.e. their specific contexts and interrelationships by 
means of which they are jointly inter-defined. 
Second, the holistic approach to knowledge, contrary to the analytical philosophy of 
education's project of concentrating on the purely philosophical questions (i.e .. what i~ 
called "second-order" inquiry), draws from the social sciences, social theory. and other 
disciplines relevant to the present study. The distinction between the scientific and the 
philosophical is, for holism, very thin indeed, so that there is no denial of the relevance 
of either, which means that the elements of either or both can be employed in an 
analysis of educational knowledge. 
Third, the holistic methodology has the advantage that it does not stop at the level of 
clarifying meaning or confusion in the use of concepts. It does not only 'talk to' the 
problem, but it attempts to answer the deeper social and philosophical problems 
involved. In its attempt to achieve understanding the holistic methodology extends the 
search from the logical structure of a concept, to its place and function in a social 
whole. Above all it uses the meaning it arrives at, as an introduction to the discussion 
of the problems of the social phenomena in question; meaning is only taken 
provisionally. In so doing it allows for the growth of knowledge because it leaves all 
options and possibilities open. 
Fourth, holism possesses the analytical tools necessary for the consideration of new 
terms and concepts. It therefore transcends the analytical philosophy of education, by 
virtue of being a theory which goes beyond, mere conceptual analysis. An holistic 
approach to knowledge also allows for an analysis of knowledge and knowledge claims 
in relation to the main concerns and purposes of ideological interpretations. Ideas of 
relevance to both educational knowledge and ideology, as well as the relationship 
between them, can then be examined much more deeply than would be possible by a 
reliance on conceptual analysis alone. In the process the social complexities of 
educational knowledge and ideology (or social theory in general) are opened up for 
discussion. The interrelationships between social phenomena are accordingly taken as 
crucial to an understanding of the particular social phenomena in question. The social 
networks on which society thrives are central pillars of the holistic approach to 
educational knowledge. 
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[be analysis of the term 'educational knowledge' and the subsequent study of this 
lissertation are therefore best pursued within a holistic context. The holistic 
nethodology will therefore be employed in this research rather than the methodology 
)f the analytical philosophy of education. Having arrived at such a methodological 
;tance I shall, in the next chapter, specify the use in this study, of the term 'educational 
rnowledge', as distinct from 'knowledge' per se. 
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CHAPTER1WO 
TOWARDS AN INTERPRETATION OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
1 KNOWLEDGE, EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
It is central to the holistic approach to knowledge (1: 9 - 22), that the concept of 
knowledge is incomprehensible unless it is situated in relation to other 
properties of the world. It must be seen within a specific context. Hence, I refer 
here to 'educational knowledge' rather than 'knowledge'. But 'educational 
knowledge' is a fairly new term in the philosophy of education. It is a term which 
has inclinations towards the Sociology of Knowledge rather than Classical 
Epistemology. There is therefore the need to understand what it is and its 
implications. 
But can knowledge be qualified as 'educational'? The main disposition in this 
study is to do more with the 'source' rather than, exclusively, the 'nature' of 
knowledge. But this claim does not dismiss the attempt to understand the nature 
of knowledge. On the contrary, the latter is to be used as a launching-pad, as the 
very first premise for understanding 'educational knowledge'. 
Following the holistic methodology, 'knowledge' and 'knowledge claims' are to 
be considered in the light of 'an educational system', which in turn is located 
within, and expressed by, a larger context. The idea of holism contained in this 
approach to knowledge, is enticing. It allows for the consideration of larger 
issues surrounding knowledge and knowledge claims. For example, paying 
attention to the framework of an 'educational system' implies the presence and 
relevance of public criteria, a standard of rationality, and above all a form of 
society. All of these are required as criteria for assessment of, and discourse 
about, educational knowledge. 
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To qualify knowledge as educational implies at the same time, some 'non-
educational knowledge'. So the adjective 'educational', appears to be an attribute 
of 'knowledge'. Hence the need to search for the force of the term 'educational' 
knowledge understood as a qualifier, identified in what is considered educational 
about knowledge or even knowledge claims. So going by the principles of 
replacement analysis (Introduction: 6), and without prejudice to the holism of 
the present study, it is important, for the purpose of interpreting and 
understanding the idea of 'educational knowledge', to come to a view about the 
nature of knowledge claims. 
2 THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EDUCATIONAL CONTEXTS 
2.1 BASIC QUESTIONS 
Without prejudice to some of the issues raised earlier, an examination of 
standard analyses of 'knowledge' as such, is important in the attempt to identify 
the specific conditions that obtain when we talk of 'knowledge'. It is relevant to 
this study for at least the following reasons:-
i) knowledge (though not knowledge per se) is central to the task in this study; 
ii) there is a need to identify or distinguish 'knowledge' from 'non-knowledge' in 
order to be able to recognise failed claims to knowledge which may on the face-
value appear to us as knowledge. 
iii) I need to justify the basis of claims to knowledge within the specific context 
with which this study is concerned; 
It is worth stressing at this juncture that, the discussion of the various attempts to 
interpret knowledge is only conducted in the interest of u.~derstanding what is 
involved in, and what is special to, the qualification 'educational'. I am interested 
in discussing the problems raised in debates over the nature of knowledge only 
because of its relevance to arriving at a plausible interpretation of the term, 
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'educational knowledge'. So very large areas of traditional interest ill 
epistemology will be left unexamined. 
2.2 THE CLASSICAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE 
Plato's Theatetus, Meno, and Republic, laid the foundation of the dominant 
approach used by generations of philosophers when analysing the nature of 
knowledge. That descriptive tradition has, as its central strand, the attempt to 
discover the necessary and sufficient conditions that hold when somebody claims 
to know 'that p', (where p is a proposition). A proposition is here taken to mean, 
"whatever can be asserted, denied, contended, maintained, 
assumed, supposed, implied or presupposed. In other words, it is 
that which is expressed by a typical indicative sentence". (Flew: 
1984:290) 
Knowledge is one of many propositional attitudes. Others include belief, doubt, 
hope, expectation and certainty. The inquiry about the nature of knowledge has 
been narrowed to the question: what is entailed by the claim that 'X knows that 
p'? So the basic analysandum (Le., the unit of analysis) here is the knowing of a 
proposition. Can knowledge be analysed only in terms of knowing a proposition? 
There are of course, in the attempts to say or determine what amounts to 
knowing a proposition, many difficulties. The main problems are the conditions 
and scope of knowledge, and those of its relation to other epistemic terms such 
as belief, reason, truth, and so on. 
i The Platonic/Classical Analysis 
I 
In the Theatetus Plato's analysis of knowledge is said to imply that, if someone 
knows that p, it is the case that p. The dialogue culminates in the view that 
knowledge is "a true belief with a logos" (an account). This position can be 
represented as follows: 'X knows that p' iff:-
i) p is true, 
ii) X believes that p, 
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iii) X is justified in believing that p. 
The Platonic analysis of the nature of knowledge has greatly influenced 
contemporary philosophers. 
Many queries may however be raised over the Platonic treatment of knowledge 
and knowledge claims. For example the relationship between belief and truth 
(conditions i and ii) has been much discussed; however at this stage it is less 
clear. It is important to have a clear view of the two basic epistemic terms 
contained in the Platonic analysis, belief and truth, as well as the relationship 
between them. 
The third condition presupposes that an account of justification (can be 
provided), i.e. it implies some sort of knowledge of the rationality criterion used 
in assessing whether or not 'X knows that p'. Such a justification entails some a-
priori knowledge of the standards involved in judging knowledge and knowledge 
claims. There is clearly the danger of a regress here. As argued by Walker and 
Evers (1982), an infinite regress occurs: that X requires justification for believing 
p (as a condition of knowledge) itself requires justification. If in an attempt to 
say what knowledge or knowledge claims amount to, we have necessarily to 
employ certain a-priori categories, then it seems that, those categories will 
themselves require some explanation and justification. This means that, for one 
to be able to answer the question or even start the discussion one will need to 
explain the a-priori categories involved in the judgement about the standards of 
rationality which feature in that claim. As a result of such a regression the basic 
problem with which we are most concerned remains unresolved because there 
are always demands on us to make clear those a-priori categories that are 
implied by the third condition of the classical position. 
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Another problem with the classical position is that which is imposed by the 
relationship of historical considerations to the ideas of 'truth', 'belief and 
'justification'. To judge that 'X knows that p', involves knowledge of the 
possibilities of rationality available to X, at time t, and these possibilities have 
every probability of changing at other times, for example at time t 1. The 
standards of rationality on which we rely in our assessment of knowledge and 
knowledge claims, may themselves change over a period of time. That being so, 
when faced with wider possibilities for the interpretation of 'rationality' our 
interpretation of knowledge, and our justifications for such, are equally likely to 
change. But as these changes occur our allegedly true and justified beliefs cannot 
be considered without further examination as 'knowledge' any more. As our 
possibilities widen, our claims to knowledge equally change, because new and 
wider possibilities, and, so, rationality options may negate, and so invalidate X's 
earlier claims to knowledge. That is because the beliefs involved may, as a result 
of such changes be no longer justified. The grounds for knowledge become thus 
defeated and so the standards of rationality employed themselves stand in need 
of modification(s). 
The Platonic position however might be defended by the argument that, though 
some knowledge is presupposed by its analysis, it is not propositional knowledge. 
It is the knowledge of, for example, standards of rationality which are 
presupposed by the justifications which are offered for that particular claim to 
knowledge that p. However this argument is not successful because the central 
argument in the analysis, leads to, as argued earlier, regression and circularity. 
The counter-argument produced here has not however, altered, or resolved these 
issues. The regression that is involved remains: if X believes 'that p', there has to 
be a good reason R, a justification for X's so believing, which itself contains a 
knowledge claim. Unless these problems can be overcome, the classical position 
stands in need of modification. 
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The issues raised in the Platonic analysIs of 'knowledge that' have continued to 
exercise philosophers. No epistemological interest can ignore these. Nonetheless 
it is not the focal point of my discussion partly because of what I have already 
said and my interest will be in only one aspect of the analysis: rationality. And I 
will be discussing this in a context which serves the purposes other than the 
purely analytic approach. The central concern will be with an holistic approach 
which I believe to be most important to an analysis of 'educational knowledge'. 
The epistemological tradition briefly described above has an essentially 
individualistic and analytic interest. Knowledge claims are basically assessed in 
terms of claims to knowing a single proposition, 'p', rather than knowing bodies 
of propositions. It is implicit in the Platonic analysis that it does not matter 
whether or not one sees those necessary and sufficient conditions applying in 
respect to a class of propositions or a single proposition. What applies to 
knowing a single proposition equally works for a body of propositions 
particularly since the latter is, but a collection of the former. This brings out the 
individualistic approach to knowledge: that the whole is best understood by 
examining its constituent units. One implication of my rejection of that method is 
that, as I shall argue, knowledge, and by extension educational knowledge, is best 
understood in an holistic sense, as a body of propositions within a specifiable 
context 
One consequence of the holistic approach to knowledge is that emphasis will be 
placed on the relationship between epistemic terms such as beliefs, reasons, 
evidence, rationality, and so on, on the one hand, and their socio-political 
contexts, on the other hand. 
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The frameworks of the analytical philosophy of education, from which 
perspectives the debates on the nature of knowledge have for the most part 
taken place, are, because of their methodological preoccupation with individual 
propositions, unable to explain and clarify the central, holistic, features of 
educational knowledge. Analysis of individual propositions in the tradition of the 
preoccupations of the Theatatus, is a necesary condition of the clarification of 
educational knowledge, but not however sufficient. 
The idea of knowledge entails, not only epistemic qualities or terms, but 
relationships between them. Fundamentally, the linguistic analysis movement has 
treated knowledge as a 'micro', as opposed to a 'macro' concept. It has been less 
successful in saying what knowledge is, than it has been in exploring the 
conditions under which it is true that 'X knows that p'. So its analyses are 
inadequate to the project of understanding, the socio-epistemological contexts in 
which bodies of (interalia) knowledge claims are legitimated, transmitted, 
acquired, and possessed of a wide socio-political significance. 
I shall now proceed to the interpretation of educational knowledge, in an holistic 
sense, and place greater emphasis upon the sources of, rather than the conditions 
for, knowledge. Certain of the preoccupation of the epistemological 
individualism of the analytic school will remain, only, however, to be considered 
in the changed context of an holistic approach to the nature of educational 
knowledge. 
3 EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
3.1 THE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The holistic approach to knowledge that I employ here, allows for the use of the 
epistemic terms already identified as necessary to the analysis of 'knowledge' 
sans phrase. The chief concern here is the extent to which those epistemic terms 
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are understood jointly, and not independently, i.e., as constituents of a sYstem. So 
one does not understand the term 'knowledge' if the relevant epistemic terms are 
taken singularly, in isolation from the rest. They have to be seen to be working 
within a coherent system of inter-relationships. The meaning of any single term 
depends on a whole body of terms and the propositions in which they are used. 
Accordingly the holistic approach to knowledge is grounded on a macro, not 
micro, account so that knowledge implies a body of propositions with its own 
internal characteristics: coherence and consistency, methodology or 
explanatory /predictive power, which taken together make statements about the 
world. 
3.2 EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE: SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS 
It is fundamental that educational knowledge be seen as a socially organized 
curriculum knowledge as Young (1971) and others did. It has to be understood 
by reference to the properties of the social totality. It is worth stressing in this 
regard that the holistic approach to knowledge gives priority to a context that is 
always determined ahead of discussions about knowledge or education. The 
holistic approach therefore requires that educational knowledge be discussed 
within a specified context: cultural, economic, political or historical or a 
combination of these. 
For the purposes of the present study, the first context to be considered is that of 
an educational system. But a closer look at this context shows an even more 
crucial context, the society within which the educational system itself is located. 
Societies vary with respect to all those features which together constitute a 
culture. The relationship between education and society is thus basically 
relativistic and holistic. Educational knowledge manifests itself in relation to the 
nature of the society in question. In essence therefore the holistic approach 
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suggests different accounts of the forms that educational knowledge takes, even 
though its essential characteristics are universal. 
If knowledge is to be qualified as 'educational', as in the present study, certain 
special criteria are required. 'Educational knowledge' is employed in this study 
to refer to that which is taught in the formal school (classroom) setting within the 
frameworks of the educational system that is in place in a given society, at a 
given time. It may be seen as the content of instruction which is to be located in 
the academic subject-offerings: the syllabii and their specified goals and 
objectives, the topics and the purposes and reasons for teaching them, as well as 
the approved ('authoritative') back-up sources like textbooks and reference 
materials by means of which the import and logic of that which is transmitted is 
reinforced. 
As expressing the officially approved views of reality, educational knowledge 
functions as a codified frame of reference, the essential guide for teaching, 
instruction and learning within the confines of the formal school setting. It 
provides for those specific elements of knowledge considered worthwhile for 
transmission to the up-coming generations in a society. It has a definite 
relationship with the prevailing goals and objectives of a society. As the social 
goals change educational knowledge and its goals respond accordingly. 
Educational knowledge is of its nature dynamic. 
Some of what I shall say In this dissertation about ideology of educational 
knowledge does not apply with equal force to possible non-centralised 
educational systems where there might be considerable school-based curriculum 
development. School-based curriculum development programmes are different 
because the school, for example, in the pre-National Curriculum England have 
some autonomy in this matter. There are, under school-based curriculum 
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development arrangements, no single set of objectives across the board which all 
schools must follow. The inspectors of education only advise schools pertaining 
to curriculum content. There is thus no uniformity. This thesis is concerned only 
with systems in which the curriculum is centrally controlled. 
Within such systems, educational knowledge makes both its transmitters and 
receivers passive agents. The teachers, who are the transmitters, are made 
passive in their role vis-a-vis the teaching of only that which is officially 
approved. They cannot, by law, go beyond that. They have therefore no powers 
of innovation in respect of determining what they deem fit for the pupils to 
know, or be taught. They are essentially passive transmitters of the official views 
of reality expressed and codified into subjects of study and broken down into 
appropriate syllabii, topics, and so on. They are expected to contribute towards 
the achievement of the pre-specified objectives. Similar expectation is placed on 
the pupils although they are supposed to be transformed into active human 
subjects in relation to the realisation of the designed objectives. Thus, they 
passively consume or internalise whatever is taught to them. They have no choice 
over what they teach or are taught. The intention however is that they will, 
through what they learn, actively engage themselves in the attempt to achieve the 
set goals and objectives. The pupils are equipped by means of educational 
knowledge, with the wherewithal for realising the aims of the general package. 
The idea of educational knowledge raises problems of the freedoms that might 
be, but are not open to planners, transmitters and receivers. All of these are 
faced with ideologically significant options. The planners have large areas of 
knowledge and skills within which to discriminate and determine what they 
consider fit for transmission, but always in relation to the overall programmes or 
total curricular packages handed down to them by the state. The transmitters 
have problems with constraints and limitations to their professional skills as well 
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as their political or moral awareness or both. The pupils's interests are either 
disregarded or assumed in advance before they are ever educated. Their 
freedom of choice of what to study is curtailed by the assumption that, they are 
ignorant, and so do not even know the possible range of options from which to 
make a rational choice. 
3.3 SOME CRITERIA FOR THE DEFINITION OF 'EDUCATIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE'. 
i Context: An Educational System Is Within A Society. 
The first minimal demand here is a context. I have already argued that, the 
context for educational knowledge is a formal educational system. What I have in 
mind here is both the formal state bureaucracy that manages and oversees 
education on behalf of the society, and the hierarchically graded schooling 
system from the pre-primary up to the university levels. Institutional structures 
like government departments such as a 'Ministry of Education' and its various 
organs and extra-ministerial bodies are integral to the business of educational 
knowledge production. These play a crucial role in the selection and 
dissemination of educational knowledge. 
The schooling context is another necessary institutional context for the 
production and transmission of educational knowledge. Whatever is designed 
and selected as educational knowledge is, in the final analysis, to be transmitted 
within the school. The school is therefore the most important institution in the 
dissemination of the educational knowledge. This institution is central because of 
the way it is organized and the systematic way in which it executes the tasks of 
the transmission of educational knowledge. It is organized in graded hierarchies 
(for example, classes and streams) which make dissemination both purposeful, 
and therefore goal-directed, and easier of control. Control is exercised by means 
of rules such for example that, promotion and success depends to a large extent 
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on the mastery of what has been taught to the pupils. Accordingly the school 
socializes pupils systematically into the culture of the society and, in particular, 
its cultural knowledge. Because of the vital role which the school plays in the 
dissemination of 'educational knowledge', the term cannot be properly 
understood, except by reference to the school's wider context. 
An educational system does not exist In a social, political, econOffilC and 
historical vacuum. It can only obtain in a society. It is in the process of man's 
attempt to make sense of his social living that knowledge becomes differentiated 
and sorted out on the basis of man's priorities, goals, objectives and aspirations. 
Some knowledge is always presupposed by any particular way of living. It is 
necessary both to have descriptions of the physical and social worlds and to 
generalise these descriptions in order to survive in the world. Society (within 
which an educational system exists and finds meaning) has priority as the most 
basic context for educational knowledge. 
The society is the totality of the complex social relationships among people in 
their attempt at producing and reproducing their life-processes. It is these 
relationships which combine to give each society within history its specific form 
and nature. But the nature and form of each society is relative to its level of 
development. By the 'nature' of society I mean the conceptions of its essence and 
goals, while by 'form' I mean the singular characteristics of each society within 
history. Both the nature and form of each society and its historical variables play 
a crucial role in the production and distribution of knowledge, especially valued 
knowledge. Both determine how common knowledge is transformed into non-
common knowledge, in terms of which educational knowledge is to be preserved, 
promoted and transmitted within its system for the dissemination of ideas, views, 
and claims to reality. Thus interests (which I shall discuss later: 3: 65 - 8) playa 
very prominent role in the task of the production of educational knowledge. This 
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consideration will be seen to be of central relevance in the discussion of the 
production of educational knowledge in pluralistic societies. 
ii Selection and Legitimation 
Valued knowledge for transmission in schools is always selected from a mass of 
possible candidates. It is just not every proposition about the world that is 
officially considered worthy of transmission in schools. There are at least two 
reasons for this: One, it simply is not possible to select and teach all known 
propositions about the world. Two, such a thing is not even desirable, because 
each set of bodies of knowledge must have some role to play in relation to the 
basic goals and aspirations of 'the society' in question. What follows therefore is 
the necessity for criteria for exclusion and inclusion of areas of knowledge in the 
educational knowledge of a society. Only those areas of knowledge which are 
deemed relevant to that society are identified, selected, approved, and 
transmitted in the schools. I elaborate on this aspect later (see 7: 130 - 37 and 8: 
142 - 46). 
The propositions about the world that comprise educational knowledge are so 
selected at the expense of others, and are sanctioned by the state. It is the 
selection by the state which confers some legitimacy on the officially defined 
knowledge, hence educational knowledge comes to be judged as valuable. 
Furthermore, the legitimation of educational knowledge is further supported by 
an authority which has been properly constituted to play that role. In this regard 
the government enforces what it sanctioned for transmission in the schools. So 
in addition to authority it requires compliance. This is done through its 
bureacracy and machineries of the state. It authorises and sanctions, by for 
instance, political or legal instruments, such as legislation, policy directives, and 
so on. Thus the National Curriculum in England and Wales, is legitimated by 
'the Education Reform Act of 1988'. I shall address the role of the state in the 
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production of educational knowledge as one aspect for explaining the ideological 
nature of educational knowledge in due course (7: 130 - 37 and 12: 209 - 17). 
There is, in the efforts at the production of educational knowledge, a distinction 
between the true, justified and relevant, and false but relevant claims to the 
world on the one hand, and the true, justified but irrelevant claims to the world, 
and false and irrelevant on the other hand. The question of truth (as in the 
Platonic approach to knowledge) does not arise for the state as it does to the 
philosopher. Truth and falsity do not necessarily matter as far as the basic goals 
of the state are concerned. Relevance of the propositions so selected, or which 
have the potentials of being selected and transmitted, is not assessed on grounds 
of the truth or falsity of the contents of educational knowledge. Relevance or 
lack of it is measured in this regard by functionality. I shall develop this view 
later. Harris (1979), following Lakatos called the former (i.e. the selected bodies 
of educational knowledge irrespective of their truth content) "the received view" 
of the world. 
The received view has a purpose and a commitment to the 'manifest' interests of 
'the society' in which the process of selection and legitimation takes place. Note 
that, there may be a variety of such interests in a society. But only those which 
are dominant become aggregated and legitimated for the purposes of selection 
and legitimation of valued knowledge. 
There is an important relationship between, the society's power structure (which 
defines both the relevant interests and their corresponding received views) and 
the production and legitimation of educational knowledge. Few, participate in 
the process of selecting valued knowledge. Only those social actors who occupy a 
privileged place in the society's power structure, acting on behalf of the society. 
carry out this task. Selection and legitimation of educational knowledge is 
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accomplished either directly or by means of delegation of responsibility and 
authority under strict rules and conditions. In the former case, the state designs 
the general guiding principles, the general aims and objectives deriving from its 
basic philosophy and fundamental "directive principles of state policy". These are 
to be fully followed in the latter case by the 'experts', 'the specialists', and 
'professionals' under conditions of delegated responsibility, in selecting and 
designing those appropriate bodies of propositions about the world which are 
consistent with, and are deemed relevant to the achievement of the stated aims 
and policy directions of the state. I show later how this process works within the 
Nigerian educational system (see 12: 209 - 17). Hence the structure of power 
relations is indispensable to the determination of what should, and what should 
not count as worthy knowledge for the purposes of instruction. So all educational 
knowledge is officially selected, and sanctioned by the relevant organs in the 
society's power structure in line with what it has taken as entailing the interests 
of the society. 
Exceptions would be school-based curriculum development projects, under 
which schools have some autonomy to select what they deem fit. But then even 
under such arrangements, the schools are institutions which are also located 
within the society's hierrarchy or institutional framework. However apart from 
the school-based curriculum development programmes, states vary in the degree 
of specificity they enact, and of production of detailed texts for courses. 
iii The Syllabii. Topics and Lesson Contents 
Educational knowledge is expressed in terms of distinctive patterns of 
instruction. These entail specified elements and mechanisms for the proper 
dissemination of knowledge for specific tasks and purposes. In concrete terms, 
these include 'lesson contents' which may be generally spelt out in a 'syllabus', or. 
more specifically, 'topics' for each lesson's focus. Textbooks are also relevant at 
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this point because they reinforce both the authority (of the state in the remote 
sense, and the teacher in the immediate sense) and the knowledge that is 
transmitted. They are either produced or selected to tally with the agreed 
syllabii, the full embodiment of educational knowledge. Textbooks are supposed, 
like all other elements of educational knowledge, to conform to the goals and 
objectives as well as the underlying principles which in the first place inform 
decisions about education in general, and educational knowledge in particular. It 
is more important however that, both syllabii and textbooks conform to the set 
standards and guide-lines of the official organs responsible for their design and 
evaluation. For example the certificate awarding bodies seek quality control by 
trying to ensure that there is conformity to the official views of the world as a 
condition for certification. All these elements are internally structured into 
coherent disciplines, usually referred to as 'subjects of study'. Each subject of 
study is centred on its own distinctive presuppositions, procedures and 
knowledge content. 
iv The Specialists 
Specialists or experts are also required for the determination and dissemination 
of educational knowledge. They may be designers or planners of the syllabii, 
topics, textbooks, and so on, or the teachers whose responsibilities come at the 
tail end of the production line. Both are united by their passivity and lack of 
initiative as their educational roles are determined by the enactments of the 
power group(s). They cannot go beyond those basic considerations. Although 
they may appear to be the masters of educational knowledge, they are, at a 
deeper level, alienated subjects, who are reduced to the position of subservience 
to the real masters: those who select, evaluate and enact official educational 
knowledge. This basic consideration is crucial to this research. as I shall argue 
later. 
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v Purposes and Objectives 
Items for inclusion as educational knowledge are deliberately selected to playa 
particular role in the realisation of the guiding principles and specific objectives 
of the state, or regime in power. The acquisition of educational knowledge is 
intended to work towards the achievement of given objectives and purposes. It is 
in regard to its commitment to the form of society in place at any particular time 
that educational knowledge acquires its meaning and relevance. It has a 
functional essence, in that it must be recoverable: i.e. productive in achieving the 
goals of the state, society or regime. In other words educational knowledge is 
central to the state apparatus because it has a potential impact on those who 
have acquired it. It is developed and sytematised to ensure a long-lasting effect 
on the pupils so that they, by necessity not choice, work towards the desirable 
state of affairs taken to be immanent in successful learning. Educational 
knowledge is designed and transmitted in such a way that it is intended to bring 
about specific effects on the pupils. 
The basic assumption thus made by the state in determining aims and objectives 
is that the mind exerts a great deal of influence over action. Hence the 
fashioning of the mind by the desired knowledge is assumed to have a crucial 
influence on human action. This of course raises issues in the philosophy of the 
mind and epistemology that I shall not pursue here. My concern here is only that 
of locating the ideological underpinning of knowledge when it is presented as 
'educational', in terms of its recoverability: its potential for control (in an 
extreme sense) and influence of human action (in less ambitious sense). Not all 
of that which we learn has a large and lasting influence on our thinking and 
actions. Only certain propositions prove systematically dispensable in the sense 
of being recoverable. The recovery of educational knowledge is the means 
whereby learners are able to attain their ends - which are the ends of the state. It 
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is, so to speak, already designed to promote those projects of great value so 
deemed by the relevant society. 
Following the above considerations, I shall for the purposes of this study, take 
educational knowledge to refer to, a body of propositions with its own internal 
characteristics: coherence and consistency, intellectual procedures, explanatory 
or predictive powers, which taken together make statements about the world. 
These are officially selected and sanctioned for transmission in the institutional 
context of an educational system, (specifically in the schools) with a view to 
bringing about certain effects for those who have been made to learn them. 
4 EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE CURRICULUM 
Much of what I shall suggest here is, but a layman's view of the curriculum. 
Educational knowledge is differentiated in the first place, from the curriculum, in 
respect of its specificity as against the wider, general view that the curriculum is 
the totality of educational practice and learning experiences in the school. The 
term 'educational knowledge' therefore, narrows the focus of the curriculum 
from its wider dimensions to its specifics: approved bodies of knowledge about 
the world (with their attendant qualities as identified here), the subject-offerings 
and their specific contents. That view of the curriculum with its emphasis on the 
psychology, and social psychology of learning, is broader in certain senses, than 
the sense of curriculum which is limited to its political, epistemological aspects, 
and with which I am here concerned. Educational knowledge covers the basic 
epistemic contents of both the 'syllabus' and the 'lesson'. So, in Kleinig's view of 
the syllabus: 
"the syllabus is limited to an outline of the structure/content to be 
deliberately communicated within some 'subjects' (a number of 
which occupy an important place in the curriculum). Lessons are 
one means by which ~ syllabus may be imI?lemented: the sy~labus 
material is broken up Into manageable portlons for presentatlon by 
a teacher." (1982: 146) 
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While the term 'curriculum' comprises the totality of learning experiences in the 
school, educational knowledge concentrates on the content of instructions 
(beliefs, practices and so on) found in the syllabii and textbooks, in particular. 
The narrower conception of the methods and contents of teacher includes 
educational knowledge in addition to pedagogy (methodology for transmission of 
the valued knowledge) as well as evaluation of, and innovations in the learning 
experiences in the school. 'Educational knowledge' therefore is more specific 
and more readily identifiable than 'curriculum', which may include the hidden 
dimensions of learning experiences. 
5 CONCLUSION 
It is in line with the holistic approach to knowledge that educational knowledge, 
is best analysed in relation to other epistemic terms or social phenomena. In this 
regard, one of the central features of educational knowledge is that, what counts 
as knowledge is a particular selection and organization from potentially available 
knowledge (Young: 1971). Educational knowledge is therefore a function of the 
social structure of a society. By virtue of being that, it proselytises one set of 
interpretations of the world (that is of course only one amongst many others). By 
extension, there is a close connection between social structure and the 
intentional reinforcement of political and social ideals. Such claims about the 
status of educational knowledge, I shall argue, are to be understood in 
ideological terms. The justification of such claims now requires a detailed 




AN OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 
1 SOME APPROACHES TO A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 
The term 'ideology' is essentially-contested, i.e., it would not be the concept that it is 
were its interpretation not open to systematic dispute. I propose that the term will be 
better understood if it is situated within a given paradigm, i.e., a theoretical and/or a 
political framework. In this way the relevant theory of ideology appropriate to the 
present study may be identified. I recognize however that no such paradigm will be 
sufficient to provide a consensus theory of ideology which is wholly acceptable even 
within its own limits. This means that either none of the competing claims to ideology 
is satisfactory, or each is sufficient and valid but only within its own limited intellectual 
and, or political framework. They can all be contested. 
1.1 MARXISM. POSITIVISM AND DEBATES ABOUT IDEOLOGY 
The Marxist theory is the most discussed frame of reference for determining the 
nature of 'ideology'. But the term 'ideology' within this theory has been subjected to 
heated debate. Rooted in the different approaches of Karl Marx on one hand, and 
Frederick Engels on the other, are 'historicist' and 'structuralist' conceptions of 
ideology. There is not a single theory of ideology that can be called the Marxist theory 
of ideology, just as there is no single positivist theory of the same. Scholars using the 
two paradigms (ie marxism and positivism) are united only to the extent that they 
apply the tools of analysis proposed by the distinctive methodologies of the two 
theories, while yet reaching entirely different and in some instances, conflicting 
conclusions. This means that, there is scope for diversity in the dominant political 
reference points and their corresponding intellectual paradigms. 
The paradigm in which the idea of conflict is central, has its roots in the writing of 
Marx himself. He viewed ideology as a critical, negative concept (as is evident in 
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Theses on Feuerbach and German Ideology). Ideology is seen as a distorted form of 
consciousness which appears in interpretations of the world. The thought systems of 
previous philosophers (particularly the German ones) were themselves considered 
ideological and dismissed as "idealistic". Even those who were acclaimed as 
materialists such as Hobbes had their philosophical systems condemned by Marx as 
being ideological. As a negative, pejorative term 'ideology' suggests biased and 
distorted interpretations of the world. 
Engels (1890, 1969, 1970) for example, saw ideology in a somewhat different way. For 
him ideology was more of a positive term than a negative, (abusive) one. Engels 
emphasised the distinction between theory and practice as the corner-stone for 
understanding ideology. It is along this line that he viewed ideology as a form of 
thought which is basically articulated in line with a particular class's 'objective' 
interests. Whilst Marx provided the background for historicist accounts, Engels laid 
the foundation for structuralist explanations of ideology, within the Marxist theory. 
The latter position was to echo strongly among later generations of Marxist scholars 
and practitioners. Lenin's "class ideology", Lukacs's and Althusser's structuralism, for 
example the theory of 'Ideological State Apparatus' (I. S. A), Gramsci's 'hegemony' 
theory, and so on, testify to the Engelsian influence. Likewise the leading scholars of 
the 'Frankfurt School' such as Adorno follow Engels in taking a positive, as distinct 
from a largely negative, view of ideology. But the latter Marxist scholars insist on a 
psychological approach to discussing ideology. They sought to detect the actual 
'psychic links' between mind and reality. So there is, beyond the basic materialist 
positions about the relationships between 'Being' and 'Consciousness', no single theory 
of ideology that can be labelled, the Marxist theory of ideology. 
The positivist paradigm is open to many interpretations as is the Marxist paradigm. 
There is found in the contributions to the debate on ideology within this paradigm, 
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heavy reliance on the distinction between 'science' and 'ideology'. The positivist 
paradigm rests its claims on functionalist grounds. Its initial premise is a theory of 
society that is built around consensus not conflict, that is, society as a loose kind of co-
operative rather than antagonistic social stratification system. But despite this unity of 
purpose there cannot be said to exist a consensus within the positivist theories of 
ideology. 
Durkheim following Comte built a theory of ideology on the traditions of Francis 
Bacon, in particular with regard to his rejection of subjective forces that interfere with 
the acquisition of knowledge. Talcott Parson's theory of ideology was built around the 
same premise: ideology as subjective opinions which are far removed from scientific 
activity. The idea is that ideology is "the product of fanaticism and of the passions" 
thereby suggesting that ideology is to be seen from the perspective of the rationality, 
irrationality or non-rationality of the beliefs with which it is involved. 
Mannheim's theory takes ideology in a pragmatic sense. An attempt is made to resolve 
the claims of the Marxist conflict paradigm and the positivist claims to consensus in 
social relationships. As such he saw ideology as a weltanschauung, the world-outlook of 
particular social strata in the society. Geertz (1965) made the simplistic but 
nonetheless puzzling claim that ideology is a map which guides one through a complex 
world. 
There is therefore, no single theory or claim to a theory of ideology which appears to 
present a universally acceptable conception even within either of the two dominant 
political and methodological frameworks. There is thus a range of possibilities about 
ideology: one is conflict, one is positivist consensus, one is subjective forces, and so on. 
My concern here is not, however, to determine which claim to a theory of ideology is 
better than which. On the contrary the attempt here is to identify the relevant theory 
of ideology which is likely to prove suitable for the present study. 
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Such a task can be achieved by basing the justification for a particular account on the 
specific methodological framework (a social and philosophical stand-point). 
Furthermore, this move is appropriate because it is by reference to such frameworks 
that analyses are conducted, positions presented, questions raised and problems 
tackled. The choice of the framework is equally difficult because there are many of 
such available. But the two dominant theories of society which were already referred 
to, may be taken as limiting the choice. 
Without prejudice to the points raised earlier, this chapter's discussion of ideology will 
centre on the Marxist claims to the theory of ideology. The debate within that 
paradigm offers an interesting confirmation of the contentious nature of ideology. I 
shall therefore attempt to see if any of the accounts within the Marxist tradition can 
work for this study. In doing this, an attempt will be made to trace the development of 
the term itself and show the tensions it had generated. A position to serve as a working 
guide for my use of ideology within the context of this study will then be offered. 
2 THE ORIGINS OF THE TERM 
2.1 THE ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHES 
The origins of what were to become theories of ideology are to be found in the pre-
Enlightenment and Enlightenment thinkers. Thomas Hobbes, Francis Bacon, 
Condillac, Helvetius, Holbach, and a host of other philosophers advocated positions 
which gave the concept of ideology its foundations. The critique of religion, the 
Hegelian 'Idea', the Feurbachian materialism, however, were the most articulate and 
significant foundation ideas. 
The enlightenment thoughts were rich in providing the connections between theories 
of ideology and some pre-nineteenth century philosophical systems. Worth noting is 
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the maIn position articulated and accepted with almost unanimity among the 
enlightenment thinkers that prejudices and irrational elements enter into cognition 
and affect our knowledge. These are said to be rooted in traditional religious 
representations which distort and misrepresent our understanding of reality. Francis 
Bacon's materialism for instance, was of great influence in this regard. The critique of 
religion occasioned by the enlightenment philosophes was particularly pronounced in 
the thoughts of Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, all of whose theories raise issues in 
epistemology and the sociology of knowledge. It is important to understand these 
issues and their implications for theories of ideology. 
One philosopher who built on Bacon's materialist account of the world, but whose 
materialism was radically different from that of Bacon was Hobbes. His materialism 
served as a foundation for later theories of ideology. The Hobbesian theory of 
knowledge, started from the premise that only material and finite things are 
intelligible to the human mind. So it is not plausible to claim that man can know 
anything about the existence of an immaterial being, God. Hobbes held in the 
Leviathan that the contradiction between the finite and the infinite under which the 
material and immaterial fall makes the ideas of religion unintelligible to man. 
Religion becomes in his writing, an idol, a prejudice that disturbs the cognition of 
reality. In this regard, religion is to be explained by man's fear and ignorance of 
natural causes. Hobbes held that, it is "this fear of things invisible", which "is the 
natural seed of that, which everyone in himself calls religion" (1975: 168). However, 
these critical comments notwithstanding, Hobbes favoured the use of religion in 
society (presumably as an ideology) in order to impose some kind of a control, peace, 
and stability. He believed that, such imposition would prevent a perpetual war of 
everyone against his neighbour and provide for some common happiness. In this 
respect religion is a factor in subduing the nastiness and brutishness of life in the state 
of nature; it reinforces the social contract which is presupposed by an orderly and 
peaceful social life. Thus the need for law and order justifies the use of religion as an 
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ideological form of control in Hobbes' social contract theory. Religion therefore 
becomes, for Hobbes, doubly ideological: on the one hand it is an idol which is 
opposed to proper rational thinking, and so a bundle of distortions; on the other hand, 
it is an instrument for control, an ideological form, thus being a collection of lies that 
promotes a certain desired order in social life. 
The critique of religion was later to play a crucial role in the development of the 
concept of ideology. Helvetius and Holbach for example, used it as a launching-pad for 
their theory of 'priestly deceit', which explained religion by reference to the conspiracy 
of the priests, to acquire certain benefits allowed by power and control. So they held, 
men deliberately employ religion to deceive people, and mislead them. These were 
crucial foundations for the development of the concept of ideology. 
2.2 BACKGROUND: THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754 - 1836) introduced the term 'ideology' to post-
revolutionary French politics and public affairs. It was in 1801 that "the subject matter 
as ideologie .... appeared .... in the title of Destutt's Traite de I ideologie" (Seligar: 1977: 
14). De Tracy used 'ideology' to refer to 'the science of ideas', a new body of 
knowledge which sought to make ideas relevant to politics by consolidating the 
achievements of the enlightenment philosophes. The science of ideas, as advanced by 
de Tracy, was thus essentially parasitic on earlier philosophical systems that laid the 
foundations for the development of science and scientific thought. Ideology, for those 
who pursued the science of ideas (the ideologues), was an attempt to link philosophy 
with the natural sciences, a feature of the persisting tendency at that time, of breaking 
loose from metaphysics and theology. This use went along with the development of 
scientific thought and the subjection of all thought to the canons of reason and 
rationality as opposed to the dogma and authority of religion and metaphysics which 
stand contrary to the then 'new' scientific outlook and its attendant liberalism in the 
economy, politics and society. 
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Destutt de Tracy was influenced by a number of philosophers. Significant to the 
development of his science of ideas were the influences of Locke and Condillac for 
both of whom, all human knowledge was knowledge of ideas. But perhaps a more 
direct influence which echoed in the theory of ideology in both de Tracy and future 
philosophers were the works of Francis Bacon (Novum Organon, 1620) and Rene 
Descartes (Discourse de fa methode, 1637). These were two revolutionary 
methodological writings which proposed a new approach to scientific knowledge based 
on critical rationalism as opposed to the ancient (and mediaeval) view of science as an 
obstacle to the knowledge of reality. 
Both Bacon and Descartes sought to replace Aristotle's philosophy of science which 
was based on deductive formal logic. Bacon conceived of scientific reasoning as 
deductive being based, he claimed, on the observational and experimental method. He 
held that science is possible and capable of producing knowledge only when human 
cognition is rid of certain irrational factors, 'idols', which obstruct proper and true 
cognition of reality thereby preventing it from reaching the truth. For Bacon therefore, 
the observational method and inductive logic can succeed in developing science only 
when these idols, or false notions are eliminated. These were identified as idols of, 
first, the 'tribe': superstitions, passions, emotions; second, the 'cave': the idiosyncrasy 
of each individual as determined by his character, education and general disposition; 
third, of the 'market-place': the linguistic signs and elements of language used in social 
interaction among men; fourth, of the 'theatre': the authoritative and dogmatic forms 
of thought. The first two operate simultaneously and are relevant to the issues of social 
determination of ideas. Larrain observed that, Bacon's theory of idols contain some 
views of ideology "which emphasize its opposition to science rather than its social 
referent" (1979: 22). 
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Bacon's criticisms of the idols was for Condillac, the starting point of that reformation 
of consciousness which was the principal aim of the enlightenment. Helvetius and 
Holbach later echoed Bacon's and Condillac's views on the idols. The point for all 
three following the tradition of Bacon, was that anything that stands contrary to reason 
in the process of cognition constitutes 'idols' or 'prejudices'. Consequently Helvetius in 
his De L'Spirit (1758) formulated a position that was to become central to most 
theories of ideology, and sociology of knowledge. He held, according to Larrain 
though with a degree of vagueness, that "our ideas are the necessary consequences of 
the societies in which we live." (1979: 114). 
A complementary point worth noting is the force which united all of these 
philosophers with particular reference to their views on science, knowledge and ideas. 
They were all at one in their trust in reason. They held that, the idols or the prejudices 
can only be converted by a good education. Helvetius, for example, was outstanding in 
this regard for he believed, according to Lichtiem that, the idols, being "the necessary 
fruit of social constraint and selfish interest", can only "be discredited by reason and 
removed by education" (1977: 9). Helvetius and Holbach, relating this issue to religion, 
believed that the priests manipulate metaphysical ideas of considerable force and yet 
are quite uncertain of their truth. Accordingly man can only be freed and liberated 
from this alleged manipulation, through a correct education. Thus "the cure for 
popular superstition is pedagogy on a national scale" (Lichtiem: 1977: 9). This position 
was to prove an important rallying point for Marx's theory of ideology. It was to this, 
and its echo in Feuerbach, that Marx responded when he argued in the Theses on 
Feuerbach that, "the educator himself needs to be educated". 
2.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENTS ON 'IDEOLOGY' 
Three strands in the enlightenment preoccupations had a powerful influence on the 
development of the concept: the critique of religion, the claim that there is a strong 
opposition between science and the idols or prejudices, and the view that education 
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serves as an instrument for removing the influences of idols or prejudices on cognition. 
From these ideas emerged what may be called positive, and negative conceptions of 
ideology. The positive conception centres, for example, on the use of a 'correct' 
education to rid people of prejudice, and the critique of religion which sees it as an 
instrument of control. 'Ideology' as a term of abuse and derogation is the core of the 
negative conception. 
Ideology or the 'science of ideas' started as a positive undertaking, so that for Destutt 
de Tracy, it is to serve and save men. He was influenced by Francis Bacon's theory of 
the idols which subjectively disturb human cognition, and are thus opposed to science. 
Destutt de Tracy emphasised that ideology "must set aside metaphysical and religious 
prejudices", and that "scientific progress is possible only if false ideas can be avoided." 
(Larrain: 1979: 27). He thought that, it will save men by ridding their minds of 
prejudice, so that reason replaces prejudice. It will also serve them through a system of 
national education which will fashion a rational and desirable mind. The basis for such 
an education is of course, freedom from the idols, the prejudices. 
The positive conception also owed much to the works of Comte the founding father of 
positivism. Even though Cornte did not employ the term 'ideology', he emphasised the 
path for the development of a proper science by getting rid of idols. The foundations 
of human ideas are to be discerned. Education for Comte, was to be rooted in a 
science of facts; more generally 'ideology' itself became, in his hands, a positivistic 
concept. 
The negative conception is rooted in certain developments in French politics and 
society. The ideologues (i.e. members of the Institute) helped Napoleon Bonaparte to 
power. But he broke with them, "for their stubborn adherence to the liberal ideals of 
the enlightenment" (Seligar: op cit: 14). Napoleon, after his defeat in Russia in 1812. 
blamed the ideologues for his troubles: "it is to ideology, that sinister metaphysics, that 
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we must attribute all the misfortune of our beloved France" (Lichtiem: 1967: 5). 
Napoleon was early among those who developed a negative, derogatory, pejorative 
usage of the term 'ideology'. 
In conclusion therefore, the concept of ideology in its modern senses, is a parasitic 
one. Various developments in scientific, religious, economic, political and social 
thoughts in western Europe from the Enlightenment onwards provided the grounds for 
its emergence as a distinctive concept. In particular the tradition of the critique of 
religion and the development of materialist philosophy, culminated in the Marxist 
philosophy. I shall now discuss the major influence upon the development of the 
Marxist account of ideology. 
3 THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY 
The German philosopher Hegel profoundly influenced Marx's theory of man, history 
and society. His influence was particularly strong on the Marxist conceptions of 
ideology. Although the development of the distinct concept of ideology was not one of 
Hegel's preoccupations his thoughts nonetheless had profound effect on Marx's 
thought in this regard. He stands behind the generation of theories of ideology that 
have characterised the Marxist tradition. 
Basic to Hegel's philosophy is the central position given to Mind or Spirit. Man is 
fundamentally a thinking being. The Idea, or Spirit, takes priority in his philosophy. 
But there is a universal agent in man's thinking which unfolds through the histories of 
peoples and civilizations, ie the idea of the 'volksgeist' or 'absolute spirit'. Accordingly, 
Hegel held that subjective human consciousness has a definite relationship to the 
absolute spirit. Individuals, in Hegel's system, are but "instruments of history, 
executors of a process whose meaning is concealed from them" (Lichtiem: 1967: 115). 
The Hegelian influences on Marx's conception of ideology (and the sociology of 
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knowledge) was however more evident in Hegel's theory of the dialectical method, the 
theory that accords centrality to the Mind and History. 
3.1 THE HEGELIAN DIALECTICAL METHOD 
The Hegelian dialectical method entails a philosophy which sees the world, under the 
aspect of its history. The world manifests a process of transformation, of changing and 
becoming. Hegel's theory of 'dialectic' is both a logical doctrine of categories and an 
exhibition of categories in world History. A 'thesis', generates its own opposite 
reaction, its own negating or contradictory qualities: an 'anti-thesis'; from this 
interaction with the initial thesis results a 'synthesis'. A 'thesis' and 'anti-thesis' refer to 
social phenomena (including nature, reason, history, all developments). The world 
(and its transformation in history) is therefore grounded in contradictions, which are 
essential for progress. World history is progressive but not in a unilineal manner; the 
movement is that of contradiction, resolution of contradiction, new contradiction, and 
so on. So history, within which the world is defined involves a fundamental law of 
'negations of negations'. 
Hegel held, that the law of 'negation of negations' involves the alienation 
(Entfremdung) of self-consciousness. He expressed this thought by stating that, 
"by the law of this inverted world, then, the self-same in the first world is 
the unlike of itself, and the unlike in the first is equally unlike to itself 
..... " (The Phenomenolo~ of Mind: 203 - 4) 
Reality is dynamic so that the process of negation makes all identities "transitory" in a 
changing and improving process. Human history for Hegel is that in which the absolute 
Spirit 'Geise' is central. Kontapoulos said of Hegel's system that it 
"depicts the externalization of a primordial substance (Being) and its 
process as Matter, Life, Reason which culminates in a return to itself as 
Absolute Spirit." (1980: 26). 
Thus in the dialectical sense Thought and Being are necessarily connected as aspects 
of the same unity. In the end, they are "identical" qua "Absolute Knowledge". So for 
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Hegel, 'the rational is real and the real is rational'. The Hegelian dialectical method, 
radical in its essence was idealistic and monistic in its content. 
The dialectical method was used by Hegel in studying history, social change, and social 
phenomena generally. Supremacy of the consciousness over being was the basis of 
Hegel's idealism. In his theory of the 'Volksgeist', he argues that the spirit of the 
German, (and by extension any other) nation took a primary explanatory position in 
the analysis of society. It is essential to understand the reigning ideas, the motive 
forces in the historical movement of the nation. In the view of Hegel, such an 
understanding is necessarily dialectical. 
3.2 THE YOUNG HEGELIANS 
The Hegelian philosophy was promoted by the 'Young Hegelians', a group of admirers 
of Hegel who, continued to allot the principal role in history and social change to 
human reason rather than to 'real' factors . Marx was for a time, himself a Hegelian 
until he came under the influence of an important critic of Hegelianism, Ludwig 
Feuerbach (1804 - 1872). 
F euerbach used the Hegelian dialectical method to arnve at his own theory of 
alienation. He employed the theory of alienation to advance a materialist critique of 
religion. Feuerbach conceived the idea of 'God' as "a projection of man's essence, a 
product of objectivization of the human being" ( Larrain: 1979: 31). He held that, 
man merely projected his own being into objectivity, and then created, out of this an 
object of his own projected image, and thus 'converted himself into a subject' (he gave 
it an objective status). God, according to Feuerbach, "is nothing more than man's own 
idealized essence projected into a different being". Feuerbach argued that this 
projected object of man's imagination, the creation of man himself, came to control his 
creator, man. Man is therefore alienated from his own creation, by the very object 
that he created. But Feuerbach employed the dialectical method and observed that, 
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religion was nonetheless the product of a necessary stage in man's process of self-
awareness. 
There is here a distinction between Feuerbach's criticisms of religion and those of the 
pre-revolutionary philosophies. For some philosophers such as Hobbes, Holbach, 
Helvetius and Condillac, religion was a priestly deceit, while for Feuerbach it is the 
result of self-alienation and the objectification of the human essence. Religion is 
therefore considered not an arbitrary creation of wicked priests. It has a real basis, and 
is not a totally irrational set of beliefs. It has moreover, a sensuous basis: the fear of 
natural factors (for example, death) that humanity was not capable of understanding. 
Here-in lies a basic connection to Marxism. 
4 MARX ON IDEOLOGY 
4.1 THE FOUNDATIONS 
Marx had neither written a detailed work on ideology nor had he presented a single 
theory of ideology before his reading of Feuerbach. It was on the basis of Feuerbach's 
critique of religion that Marx's ideological thesis sprang to life. The theory of ideology 
in Marx is grounded in his theory of history, but this can only be understood with 
reference to its Hegelian basis. 
Marx was impressed by Hegel's dialectic, especially the mechanism of contradictions, 
the theory of changing and becoming. But he was disturbed by the idealism of his 
theory. So he sought to retain its essential features but situated the theory in a 
materialistic setting. The Hegelian dialectic was itself dialectical for it contains, at the 
same time, two opposing themes within itself. Firstly it is in its essence critical and 
revolutionary and this is the source of its attraction to Marx. Secondly, it is idealistic, 
clothed in a mystical shell and it was this mysticism that basically led Marx to depart 
from Hegelianism. Accordingly Marx argued that his dialectical method is not only 
different from that of Hegel but is its direct opposite. He continued the argument that, 
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"T.o ~egel, .the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of 
thInkIng, WhICh under the name of 'The Idea' he even transforms into an 
indepe~dent subject, is the demiourgos of the real world, and the real 
world IS external, phenomenal form of 'The Idea'. With me on the 
contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world refl~cted by 
the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." (Capital II: 420). 
So Marx parted ways with Hegelianism because it glorified the existing stage of things. 
In its rational form, Marx held that the Hegelian dialectics includes an affirmative 
recognition of that which exists, hence Hegel's famous phrase: 'the rational is real and 
the real is rational'. This is one important sense in which it is commonly held that 
Hegelianism is reactionary. 
Marx dismissed the Young Hegelians because, 
"it had not occurred to any of these philosophers to inquire into the 
connection of German philosophy with German reality, the connection 
of their criticism with their own material surroundings." (Collected 
Works: 5: 1977:30) 
Marx charged Feuerbach (and other Hegelians), with a failure to realise that religion 
is a social product and its analysis is only possible by seeing it as belonging "to a 
particular form of society". He charges Hegel with introducing an approach to which, 
central is: 
"the separation of a speculative esoteric history. The history of humanity 
becomes the history of the abstract spirit of humanity, a spirit beyond 
the real man". (The Holy Family: 115). 
This approach to the interpretation of the world disregards the real, concrete, material 
factors with, and within which people live; it is as such a form of idealism which, for 
Marx, must be overcome. That was in part what he set out to do in a bid not only to 
'interpret the world', but 'to change it'. 
As a result of his perception of these misgivings, Marx developed an 'improved' theory 
of dialectics, the basis of which is located in the Hegelian theory, his starting point. He 
adopted this position since he affirmed the revolutionary essence of that theory: it 
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recognises that every historically developed social form is in fluid movement. It is this 
which allows a logical space for the inevitability of social change. Marx related this 
revolutionary aspect of Hegelianism to his own materialist interpretation of history in 
order to turn Hegelianism 'right side up again'. 
In turning the Hegelian dialectics 'right side up again', Marx refused the idea that 
human history is to be understood in terms of interrelationships of abstract ideas. 
Instead he used the dialectical method to produce a materialist interpretation of 
history which culminated in his own theory of 'historical and dialectical materialism'. 
This theory articulates the bases of the Marxist epistemology, particularly through its 
accounts of ideology and the sociology of knowledge which are systematically 
interrelated. 
For Marx, thought is necessarily related to social reality, ie, the material conditions of 
existence of men in society. Dialectical materialism provides the context within which 
the Marxist conceptions of ideology are proposed and analysed. Thus Marx treats 
"society as historically determined, as a specific structure of social relationships 
between real men" (Hamilton: 1974: 19). The production of consciousness, is "directly 
interwoven" with the material activity and material intercourse of men. Thought is 
never autonomous, independent of social reality. This is a position which greatly 
influenced the emergence of the sociology of knowledge. In essence it provides the 
Marxist paradigm of the sociology of knowledge, from which, Hamilton observed that, 
"all developments of the social conception of ideology and the relationship between 
knowledge and society proceed ... " (1974: 26). 
The materialist interpretation of the world is dialectical: it approaches phenomena 
historically, and assesses their complexities, their origins, essence, purposes (both 
implicit and explicit), and their general trends, within the contexts of time and space. 
Basic to this approach is the theory of 'contradictions', what Lenin called "the unity of 
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opposites" (Selected Works: 1: 1977) in a struggle within one single process. 
Dialectical materialism identifies the essence of thoughts in concrete human life 
processes. The arena of the social relationships among men is, central to this effort. 
Marx employed dialectical materialism in reading the capitalist social relations of 
production. Social classes as the basic stratification units of capitalist societies, stand in 
antagonistic relationships to each other. The struggle between the social classes is 
always dialectical in the sense that, the resolution of one contradiction leads to a new 
one. 
It is in the light of the law of contradiction that Marx analysed the transition of society 
from its primitive form through the modes of production evident in history 
(communalism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism), in order to argue for the 'scientific' and 
inevitable emergence of socialism and finally a contradiction-free form of society, 
communism. The materialist dimensions in these dialectical analyses of society, are to 
be found in the theory of the 'mode of production' of the material life of men. That 
theory provides an analysis of social phenomena by means of their form and content. It 
relates the interplay of 'forces of production' and 'means of production' on the one 
hand, to the social relations of production of men, on the other. This interplay results 
in a definite and unique form of society, culture, law, education, juridical structure, 
and so on. The logical structure that informs the theory of the dialectic is thus retained 
by Marx. 
The Marxist epistemology, specifically the conception of ideology, moves from this 
complex, logical and holistic pattern of analysis. Basically it states a connection 
between consciousness and the social structure in terms of the mode of production of 
material life. The latter entails many processes interwoven in a complex structure of 
relationships, all of which in the final analysis are social in character. An important 
point in Marx's theory of ideology is the reference to historical contradictions in 
society which he developed from Hegel's historicism and its dialectical method. The 
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historical analysis that is central to Marx's discussion of ideology, replaces the 
psychologism and sensuousness which characterised the philosophies of Bacon, 
Helvetius, Holbach, de Tracy and Feurbach. 
4.2 CENTRAL ASPECTS OF MARXIST THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 
Marx's initial premise for ideology, in addition to the critique of religion and all forms 
of what he took to be distorted consciousness, is that 'being determines consciousness', 
i.e. the contradiction of the Hegelian position. The theory of social determinism, 
contained in the idea of the dialectic and the relationship between being and thought, 
rests on the idea of necessity in nature: this, in tum, rests upon a species of causal 
explanation of the relationship between being and thought. Some of the fundamental 
features which underpin Marx's ideology, include, in addition to the above, the theory 
of class struggle, and the ideas of inversion as implied by his theory of the 'fetishism of 
the commodity'. These features are to be expressed in the analysis of the capitalist 
mode of production and its corresponding form of society. 
Dialectical materialism holds that, "all social life is essentially practical". But men's 
practice produces social conditions which become independent of their will. 
Contradiction which is very crucial in this regard, is construed to be a necessary result 
of practice. However the term 'contradiction' is a slippery one, and Marx did not 
define it carefully. He used it in various contexts and its meaning, for Marx, can only 
be determined from an interpretation of these contexts. One point can however be 
asserted with regards to contradiction. It originated in Hegel's dialectic, where it is 
seen as an opposing tendency within the movement of phenomena which in spite of 
being interdependent, are also distinct and in a condition of struggle with each other. 
For Marx, social reality is characterised by a contradictory relationship. Consciousness 
is explained on the basis of the contradictions of material life and not, as in Hegel, the 
converse. However, at their mature level, contradictions produce distorted solutions in 
the mind before they are resolved in practice. Marx therefore held that ideology is a 
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solution in the mind of contradictions which cannot be solved in practice. Such a 
solution is deemed to be as a result of man's practical inabilities to confront such 
contradictions. So ideology conceals the contradictions of which it purports to propose 
solutions. Ideology in Marx is largely posited in the negative, pejorative sense. This 
explains why he placed much emphasis on practice; it is only practice, and not 
criticism, that can appropriately account for, and overcome ideology. But two forms of 
practice, political and material, are both relevant here. 
When linked to the theory of classes and class struggle, ideology appears to be that 
distorted form of consciousness which deceives the oppressed class while at the same 
time promoting the interests of the oppressing class. Not all distorted forms of 
consciousness are ideological. Whilst there are definite relationships between social 
conditions under which people, as members of particular classes, live, and their 
thoughts, not all such thoughts are constitutive of class-based ideologies. To be 
ideological such thoughts and ideas must contain the seeds of distortions of reality 
which promote a class interest that is in opposition to the interests of another class. 
Ideology becomes the articulation of the ruling class's interpretation of reality. It is a 
'false consciousness'. It is in this light that Marx asserted that, the class which controls 
the means of material life also controls intellectual production in the society. 
4.3 SOME PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OF THE MARXIST THEORY 
Many problems are raised by Marx's epistemological assumptions. There are, for 
example, difficulties to the proposed relationship between classes and ideology. Marx's 
class-based theory of ideology does not seem to enable an account of the ideas and 
thoughts of cultural pluralities, of the conflicting social collectives in societies which 
are neither purely capitalist nor, wholly pre-capitalist, but a mixture of the two, ie, a 
hybrid form of society. The classical theory of ideology in the Marxist epistemology 
avoids the uphill task of trying to provide an account of the ideological character of the 
ideas of those extra-class elements and forces in societies where the class structure is 
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not so distinct as that posited in the classical Marxist theory. The class structure in 
many contemporary African societies still undergoing a process of transformation into 
the world capitalist system, does not reflect the bi-polar fixation of the classical 
Marxist theory. The understanding of the relationship between consciousness and 
social structure may, in that context, appear to demand a consideration of various 
other forms of identity and social solidarity distinct from the classical Marxist social 
stratification that seems to be more strongly characteristic of advanced capitalism than 
it is of developing capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of society. This criticism brings on 
stage the large issue of cultural relativism which I shall examine in the next chapter. 
The idea of false conscIousness notoriously gIves nse to a host of philosophical 
problems. It is odd to attribute truth or falsity to consciousness. Consciousness cannot 
be either true or false though certain intentional objects of consciousness can be 
either. The force of the word 'false' when attributed to consciousness is not clear 
beyond its gesturing towards a kind of distortion of reality, which means that it is the 
account of reality, rather than, the consciousness itself which is false. Thirdly the 
crucial thesis of social determinism may be understood in either a causal or non-causal 
sense (and the latter has many varieties). There is the need to be clear about the 
nature, extent, and context of the social determination of ideas, consciousness; the 
precise form that it takes needs to be discussed. It must be inquired whether Marx 
proposed social determinism in a 'strong' or 'weak' sense; by a weak sense I mean a 
less ambitious, though perhaps more defensible account of the problems at hand. The 
distinction is important since the former would have the consequence that Marx's 
epistemology is fundamentally relativist, while the latter allows for a pragmatic 
reading of Marxist epistemology with all its attendant consequences. 
Two major strands within the Marxist theory bear upon the whole question of the 
social determination of ideas and consciousness. One, is the base/superstructure thesis 
which encourages a structuralist reading of Marxist epistemology. The other is the 
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historicist account which concentrates on the theory of contradictions that characterise 
the social relations among people as members of social classes. It is, at this stage, not 
clear if historicism and structuralism can co-habit in the Marxist epistemology without 
contradiction. I shall address the problems of social determinism of knowledge in due 
course (5: 99 - 111). 
The relationship between science and ideology has been much debated following the 
canonical writings. It is not clear whether or not ideology represents an anti-thesis 
thesis to science as implied by the Baconian theory, or indeed by Lenin's accounts of 
science as being distinct from ideology. If ideology is to be considered an antithesis to 
science, then it follows that all kinds of preconceptions and irrationalities which tend 
to interfere with reason and thereby prevent it from reaching the truth are ideological. 
On the other hand, if ideology is not seen as an anti-thesis to science, then it has to be 
determined which epistemological features it shares with science. It may, for instance, 
be argued that both ideology and science have a common basis in the consciousness of 
the originating class or culture. On the other hand it could be argued that, in either 
case a certain conception of science is required to serve as a working definition of 
ideology. Engels, Lenin and later Marxists modified and extended the basic account of 
ideology. Engels for example, emphasised a structuralist approach by reference to the 
metaphors of the base-superstructure relationship. Lenin put some premium on a 
positive account of ideology in his account of ideology as an instrument for a class in 
the struggle for socialism. These differences notwithstanding, they are united by the 
use of the Marxist paradigm. 
A lot of what has been said earlier in this chapter raises issues that fall within the 
territories of relativism and social determination of consciousness. Both of these are 
basic to the sociology of knowledge. I shall now propose an account of ideology to 
meet the purposes of the present study. 
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5 'IDEOLOGY' FOR AN AFRICAN CONTEXT 
5.1 IDEOLOGY AND SOCIETY 
The context for this study differs from that which is the subject of Marx's analysis. His 
theory of ideology works mainly in the context of the advanced capitalist society, 
although his most basic claims (like the relationship between Thought and Being) are 
if valid, universally so. However, Marx's political economy allowed that, the form of 
society is relative to the level of development of the productive forces within history. It 
follows that there is no straight-jacket within which to fix all capitalist societies at 
different levels of their development. Otherwise the dynamism entailed by the 
historicism of the Marxist theory will be defeated. Hence there is need for an 
appropriate theory of ideology which recognises these apparently relative differences 
in the level of the development of the forces of production, ie, the degrees of 
sophistication of the capitalist form of society in different places and times. I have in 
mind here the developing capitalist societies in Mrica especially Nigeria. 
5.2 BELIEFS. RATIONALITY AND IDEOLOGY 
Boudon (1989) argues that the question of the rationality and irrationality of beliefs is 
relevant to any discussion of ideology irrespective of the paradigm adopted. I follow 
Boudon in this: the criteria of rationality have to be taken into account in examining 
any ideology. There is both an epistemological verdict and an explanation of its mode 
of production inherent in the relationship between rationality and ideology. 
Beliefs, thoughts and other intentional objects of consciousness are expressible in 
sentence forms. Such expressions gain their meaning within their socio-linguistic 
context. It is a particular feature of belief statements as constituents of ideology that 
they interact systematically with notions of interests, motivation, preferences, and so 
on. The study of ideology is intimately related to an examination of examples of such 
interrelated systems. 
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5.3 INTERESTS AND IDEOLOGY 
It has been suggested that one may, 
"talk of i~e~logies in I?lural, as the OPIll10ns, theories, and attitudes 
formed WIthIn a class In order to defend and promote its interests" (Larrain: 1979: 14) . 
Beliefs and belief systems are central to the concept of ideology. It is by means of this 
centrality that the ideological orientation of a social group can be analysed. So Barry 
Barnes correctly maintains that given beliefs are ideological if they are created, 
accepted or sustained, in the particular form that they have only because they are 
related to particular social interests.(1977: 45 - 58) 
Ideology here assumes an explanatory function. The idea of interests as it relates to 
ideology is not that of persons being interested in something (i.e. the notion of 
interests which implies that an individual is prone to pay attention to particular things, 
though this itself might be ideological since it is socially determined). It should be 
added that such interests, be they political, economic, cultural, or religious, are 
necessarily of a group or class and not those of a specific individual. Such interests are 
to be understood holistically and are therefore, historical and relative to forms of 
society. Such holistic interpretations of belief systems and their relationships to 
interest are necessary and sufficient conditions for ideology. As interests are crucial in 
this account of ideology they may be further considered at this point. 
'Interests' have been interpreted in various ways. For Benn (1960) interests are 
synonymous with wants. But what we want may not necessarily be in our interests, and 
vice versa. If wants and interests are identical, it will follow that the conditions under 
which interests are achieved must be specified. These conditions are many and are 
unstable. So it is for this reason that interests are not identical with wants. 
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Interests are defined by Talcott Parsons for example, in terms of wealth and power. 
These are the potential means to any ultimate ends. Interests are thus in this regard, 
"generalized means to any ultimate ends" (1949: 262). Such a consideration of interests 
is predicated on individualist principles whereas, I have argued, the various 
constituents of an ideology can only be understood holistically. The immediate 
relevance of wealth and power qua interests to issues like the ideological character of 
educational knowledge is minimal. 
I follow Barry (1965), in understanding interests as attributes of social collectives. 
Whilst individual persons have interests, their interests stand neither in isolation from 
those of the rest of the people in the society, nor are they located outside the context 
of history. Interests as Polsby (1959) observed, are embodied in the interaction 
between people as members of social groups or classes. By their very nature therefore, 
interests in the context of social and educational discussions, are predicated on holistic 
grounds. This suggest a relational view of interests whereby, the statement 'X is in A's 
interests' indicates a linkage between social action, policy and collective position, on 
the one hand, and a social collective, social class or group on the other hand. The 
notion of 'interest' is here used in the sense of something ('X') being in some one's 
('A's) interest, whereby gaining 'X' leads 'A' to the enhancement of his or her 
wellbeing. Such a conception of interests shows 'A's commitment to 'X'. 'X' is thus 
treated as worthwhile. In this evaluative sense of interests, it can be said, that 'a good 
health care delivery system is in the interests of citizens of a country 'B'. 
Interests then are to be understood in relation to social actions or policies of members 
of given social collectives. Interest is here taken as an explanatory term, as it was by 
Marx, Weber, Parsons and others. The focus here is on an explanatory conception of 
interests of social collectives, not individuals. 
66 
Interests are explanatory. They have an explanatory function in the system described 
above, of beliefs, motives, desires, preferences, and so on. As Hindess holds, they 
provide actors with reasons for actions, and "they are derived from features of the 
social structure" (1986: 116). Interests are the source of motivation for social actions 
and policies. In this case interests operate in similar ways like values, norms, and so 
on. But as sources of motivation, interests differ from values, preferences, wants, fears, 
dislikes, desires, needs and impulses. The question arises then as to what is the 
connection between interests and other forms of motivation? 
Hirschman (1977) argues that, what basically distinguishes interests from other terms 
of motivation is that, questions of benefit to the persons involved are crucial to their 
pursuit. Actions pursued are those deemed to be of most benefit to the group or class. 
Members of other social collectives may gain from the original interested action and 
the policy it is intended to implement but it is likely to be of much benefit to them, or 
is only superficially beneficial to them. For example, when a specific educational 
programme is designed by the state such a programme may benefit all, at least in the 
short term, but it is bound to benefit the ruling class much more in the long term. 
Hindess has argued that, given this conception of interests, "the possibility must be 
considered that actors may not always recognise their own interests" (1986: 116). 
Goldthorpe's (1968) 'affluent worker' thesis provides a clear example. In this case 
there are contradictions between the workers' class position and the corresponding 
pattern of interests on the one hand, and their short term affluence afforded them by a 
system which in the long run is against their real interests on the other. Questions 
about the actors' real interests therefore arise. The idea of 'real interest' is the subject 
of the Marxist notion of 'false consciousness' and is variously debated. That idea also 
features in the debate between Lukes (1976) and Benton (1982) over objective 
interests. It has, further, a certain relationship to the power structure in the society. 
Gramsci's 'hegemony and rule by consent' theory, as well as the 'dominant ideology· 
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thesis, raIse further questions about the idea of who determines a collective's real 
interests. However, interests are relative to time in the sense that, their contents may 
change with the relative changes in time and circumstances (the material and other 
relevant conditions). Collective interests are thus dynamic. Processes and factors such 
as social mobilization, and the acquisition or loss of power may change the interests 
being pursued by a class or social group. 
Each social collective has its own identity. An identity consists In the significant 
features which single out each collective. As people may belong to different social 
collectives at the same time, they possess different, and some times, conflicting 
identities. What is in the members' interests provides the criteria for identity of 
members of a collective. Sometimes the identities and the interests contradict each 
other. This provides an interesting reference point in the issues in the ideology of 
educational knowledge in the sense that, different interests then bear on the activity of 
educational knowledge production. Questions are thus raised about the specific 
accounts or explanations that we then give of such knowledge which is the outcome of 
the interplay between different or conflicting interests at one and the same time, and 
in the same society. These questions will be central to my discussion of the ideology of 
educational knowledge. 
I t follows from the centrality of interests to ideology, that the notion of 'interests' is 
going to be of very considerable importance in the ideology of educational knowledge. 
Since all ideologies can only be specified holistically the question of the identity and 
the explanation of particular ideologies is going to give rise to issues of cultural 
pluralism and the relativism that is often held to be entailed by the existence of such 




1 RELATIVISM IN CONTEXT 
In this chapter I shall examine issues of cultural relativism that arise in the contexts of 
societies that are cultural pluralities: particular reference will be made to African 
societies. I have already argued that the study of educational knowledge should 
proceed holistically (1: 20 - 4, 2: 25 - 6, and 31 - 37; and that ideologies are to be 
understood as interactions of various elements: actions, beliefs, judgements (3: 64 - 8). 
Holistic explanation (i. e. the insistence on understanding individual items such as 
beliefs in terms of a larger structure) is the fundamental methodological axiom of 
cultural relativism. How is cultural relativism to be interpreted and understood? 
Relativism in the view of Feyerabend originated in ancient Greek philosophy. The 
claim by Protagoras that, 'man is the measure of all things' is one of the earliest 
expressions of a relativist position. Man is the judge of all matters not in the sense that 
his/her individual judgements are infallible, but rather in the sense that his/her ideas 
can be the only context for the discussion of the world in which he/she lives and the 
answering of questions that can be asked about it. Wittgenstein (in the Philosophical 
Investigations), famously states that, "the limits of my language are the limits of my 
world". The world is perceived, understood and judged through the conceptual 
frameworks embedded in the language of the social agent. However it seems that 
different people with the same or similar experiences may yet perceive and/or 
interpret reality differently and so make different claims about the world. There are 
many such claims even within a single society which act as rallying points for group 
identity and differentiation. Understanding the status of these different (and in some 
cases conflicting) perceptions, beliefs, and actions undertaken in the light of them. is 
what is at stake in assessing the claims of cultural relativism. Actions, like beliefs and 
judgements only have meaning within particular conceptual schemes, and those 
meanings can only be made explicit by reference to certain rules. As Winch argued. "it 
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is only in terms of a given rule that we can attach a specific sense to ..... words" (1958: 
27). The same is true of actions. Relativism, then, enters on the back of the thought 
that what it is rational to believe or to do in one society or culture, it is, or may be, 
irrational to believe or do in another. 
What is at issue in this claim is the denial of the universality of any particular standard 
of rationality and the assertion that beliefs, actions, values, judgements and so on, are 
all determined by and within the culture of the group. In other words beliefs, actions 
and judgements are only intelligible in the light of the culture (the totality of the 
conceptual framework) in which they are found. Cultural determinism features at the 
very beginning of this discussion. Whether or not the force of 'determination' in the 
statement of this relationship is causal is another issue (see 5: 95 - 103). It is, however, 
pertinent to note that unless one is able to say what determines what the deterministic 
basis of relativism is itself undermined. I intend, at this stage, to speak about relativism 
in a non-causal sense, so that a given set of beliefs, decisions, and so on is intelligible 
only in virtue of a given 'framework'; a holistic frame of reference. It is first necessary, 
then, to outline a view which I should call the traditional theory of cultural relativism. 
2 THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
The nature of cultural relativism and what it entails has been discussed by many 
philosophers and social anthropologists. In particular cultural relativism has been 
analysed with regard to the relativism of beliefs (as in Winch: 1958, Lukes: 1976, and 
Bloor: 1976). Beliefs are taken to be the focus of cultural relativism. An initial feature 
of cultural relativism that gives a central place to beliefs is doubt over the universal 
validity of reality claims. Such doubts are grounded in the social fact of the plurality of 
forms of reasoning, tests of truth and hence, interpretations of the facts of the world. A 
belief or a judgement is held by most relativist theorists to be valid only for those who 
subscribe to, or are members of, a specific social collective within which such a belief 
is held. 
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The starting point of the traditional theory is an empirical (anthropological) one: the 
sheer multiplicity of belief systems. This multiplicity has given rise to a problem of how 
to understand and evaluate new as well as conflicting beliefs with respect to their 
rationality and justification Doubts are raised as to whether such beliefs are to be 
treated as rational or irrational in a universalistic and absolute sense. The traditional 
relativist says that beliefs are situation-specific, i.e. they have a cultural context against 
which background their rationality is to be assessed. Beliefs are irrational in so far as 
they fail the criteria of rationality which are internal to the cultural background against 
which they are understood. Beliefs are, in this sense relative to cultural contexts. All 
other characteristics, of cultural relativism i.e. the rationality of actions and activities, 
are predicated upon this basic premise. 
Winch (1958), Young (1971), and Rorty (1980), go on to argue that there are no 
objective criteria (in the sense of an Archimedian position which is external to any and 
all cultures) for judging the rationality of the full range of human beliefs. Furthermore, 
it is often argued as for example by F. C. White (1983), that it does not even make 
sense to say that some beliefs are true while others are false except within the ambit of 
a given culture. 
Barnes and Bloor (1982) accordingly add that a 'symmetry' condition is necessary in 
judging the rationality of beliefs. This condition stipulates that all cultural beliefs 
(beliefs that are defined by the parameters of given cultures), are to be explained in 
the same way without any discrimination. A belief is true or false in so far as it satisfies 
the internal criteria of a given culture. An evaluation of the belief from outside that 
culture is illegitimate. It is, central to both the empiricist and rationalist traditions that 
beliefs are rational if they are grounded in reason and evidence. 
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The relativist however, denies that the idea of universally good reasons is applicable. 
There can be no logical space for the 'objectivity' required by objectivists (i.e. a 
'realist' epistemology). It is not possible to determine 'good reasons' and 
'relevant/appropriate evidence' without reference to criteria of rationality that are 
constitutive of a given society. Where there is an agreement on what the evidence is, 
this agreement is the product of the internal condition of that particular society. 
The correspondence theory of truth (on which the majority of non-relativist theories 
are based), cannot therefore hold, and something like a 'coherence theory of truth' is 
needed when assessment of beliefs is at stake. It is accordingly required that, whatever 
they happen to be, our good reasons and appropriate evidence depend on the best 
knowledge available to us of our present social structure. Rationality criteria are 
affected by the growth of experience, when new possibilities become open to us, and 
our views of reality are accordingly transformed. The criteria for reason and tests of 
truth are thus relative to time. The growth in and development of experience at any 
time in history, makes the rationality of beliefs dynamic and historical. The expansion 
of our present knowledge involves the emergence of new and increased capacities for 
reasoning about our experiences which we may hitherto have not been able to foresee. 
These claims are supported by the history of science and technology. For example, the 
discovery by Corpernicus in the 16th century, that the sun is the unmoving centre of 
the universe was treated as a blasphemy. It was considered as having been based on 
inappropriate and irrelevant grounds. It was therefore dismissed as irrational (and 
subversive). But the expansion of human experience made possible by, amongst other 
things, the invention of telescope later confirmed Corpernicus's view. 
What is taken to be good evidence rests upon what are taken to be the facts. Such 
facts, as I have previously argued, are the results of contextual interpretation (as in 
Quine's holism). They are not understood 'atomically'. So the determination of what is 
good reason, or evidence, rests upon the thought that facts are not neutral. They are 
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'theory-laden'. Theories, or, even more generally, a priori assumptions always, guide 
people in establishing general conditions of rationality and evidence and the specific 
claims that follow their establishment. They are not interested in every fact they come 
across but only those that are more or less coherent with the conceptions of reason 
and evidence that they already have. Since no facts are neutral in the strict sense, so 
rival claims to reality are incommensurable. 
It follows that, for the relativist, reasons and evidence are encaged in social contexts. 
As Winch argued they "arise out of and are only intelligible in the context of ways of 
living and modes of social life" (1958: 100). It is the contextual understanding of reason 
and evidence that also explains Evans-Pritchard's statement that, he "gained some 
understanding of communist Russia by studying witchcraft among the Azande" (1951: 
129). What therefore count as good reasons for beliefs, are held to be context-
dependent. So all beliefs about man and society are induced by social contexts, and 
have social functions, a point which Hesse (1980) equates with Karl Mannheim's 
theory of "total conception of ideology". 
Non-relativists of different philosophical persuasions reject the thoroughgoing 
relativization of reason and truth. (Though it should be said that non-relativist 
epistemologies themselves take somewhat different forms). They reject the theory of 
the context-dependence of rational beliefs. For example Hacking holds that "there just 
are good and bad reasons for propositions. They are not relative to anything. They do 
not depend on context" (1982: 52). It is not however the case that relativists, despite 
what some of their critics have said, reject the importance of reason and reasons. 
Rather they emphasize the plurality of forms in which rationality is exhibited and so 
hold that, we have no reliable (in the sense of independent, or 'Archimedian'), 
objective criteria, external to the specific culture in question, for assessing beliefs and 
actions. 
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The problem for (the traditional theory of) cultural relativism is whether within a 
single society there is, correspondingly, a single belief system (and consequently a 
single scheme for interpreting actions and rituals) whose validity extends to, but is 
limited by, the boundaries of that society. For it might seem that there is, for example, 
just one, universal, idea of instrumental rationality even though that idea might take a 
number of different forms. White argued that, 
"Our beliefs are all provisional, embedded as they are in a framework 
which is open to piece-meal alteration, adjustment and innovation" 
(1982: 1). 
White's point though concerns the 'particularity' of beliefs in a culture, not 
'provisionality', because this latter is not an in-built characteristic of beliefs. 
Accordingly all cultural beliefs are socially determined and valid only for those who 
hold them. The point is that the question of their validity arises only in the social 
context of their origin. 
The traditional theory appeals to, and rests on, the theory of social determinism which, 
according to Knight, holds that "there is a causal relation between cultural or social 
factors on one hand, and judgements of rationality" (1984: 34) on the other. I intend to 
discuss the theory of social determinism in chapter five. The issue now is whether 
cultural relativism, together with its causal accompaniments can be accepted, at least 
in the form in which it is presented by the traditional theory. 
3 AN APPRAISAL OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF CULTURAL 
RELATMSM 
Cultural relativism (as presented in the traditional theory), has been widely criticised 
by philosophers and sociologists. I shall examine three of these criticisms here. 
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3.1 IS THE THEORY SELF-REFUTING? 
First, it has been attacked as being 'self-refuting' on grounds of some logical problems 
to which it gives rise. Pring (1972), White (1975), Clarke and Freeman (1977), all 
make (some variety of) this criticism of Young's relativist epistemology. The cultural 
relativists are said to produce a reductio argument i.e. one which denies the truth of 
that which it intends to prove. Marshall, et al considered cultural relativism to be self-
refuting because it "calls into question the very criteria by appeal to which its own 
truth is established" (1981: 46). Similarly, Fopp charged that, "what we have in (total) 
cultural relativism is an example of an argument in which the initial premises 
contradict the conclusions reached" (1981: 39). The core of this argument is that, if the 
relativist's contention that all beliefs whatsoever are culture-dependent is itself true, in 
the sense that it holds universally of all belief systems, then that belief is itself both 
non-relative and true. It follows, on the strength of this counter-example, that the 
fundamental tenet is false and so the relativist theory collapses. But this argument 
shows that the premise cannot be accepted as true in a context other than that of 
cultural relativism itself. It can have no force for non-relativists because it is itself 
context-dependent. However if they (the statements, or basic beliefs of the relativists 
that follow from the fundamental premise) are themselves not absolute but relative, 
then they will lack objectivity in the sense of not compelling assent outside the contexts 
of that theory. Relativism can only be of force to the converted, i.e. the relativists 
themselves. In that sense, the claims are not true and can be rejected. There can be no 
firm ground for the relativist and his/her judgement of the limited validity of all 
beliefs, because his own initial claims about the relativity of beliefs are, if he is to be 
taken seriously, unavoidably relative. The relativist is therefore said to be a victim of 
his own propaganda, hoisted by his own petard. 
How far can this criticism of cultural relativism be sustained? The claim that cultural 
relativism is self-refuting is formulated as an objective criticism. However that 
criticism does not correctly capture the relativist's position. It is illegitimate to use such 
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a premise against the relativist. The 'self-refuting' criticism presupposes an objective 
(correspondence) theory of truth, and that is just what relativism questions, so it 
cannot be used against it. Onus of proof rests with the non-relativist. In formulating his 
criticism, the non-relativist cannot rely on his own standards of assessing rationality 
and his own tests of truth because they, of course, beg the argument in his own favour. 
It appears then that an independent, non-partisan standard for evaluating the 
rationality-content of the two contending positions, is required in order to settle the 
question. But the relativist says that such a possibility is ruled out since there can be no 
'Archimedian' position from which the two points of view can be refereed. 
If the relativist is to be convinced of the falsity of his own position, he will rightly 
demand something more than the covert assumption of his critic's position. The 
objectivist could of course, say the same of the relativist: the dilemma centres around 
the difficulty of even stating the conditions of the argument without making use of one 
of the two contending cases. Some of those who insist on the self-refutation charges 
further feel that any attempt by the relativist to resolve the dilemma by denying the 
relativism, and so the lack of validity of his basic claims, leads him, to "a regress" which 
then renders his theory and its claims unintelligible. This regress is generated in the 
view of Putnam (1981) by the fact that the relativist's claims and arguments for the 
relativism of beliefs are not themselves absolute, they are relative. 
McCullagh's (1984) is justified in his claim that this does not make relativism 
unintelligible. Putnam's regress argument does not show what is wrong with such a 
regression. The regression, unless it is shown and proved to be damaging, in fact 
further justifies the relativist's thesis because the logical conclusion of such an 
argument is: every belief about the world is relative including this belief itself. So 
unless Putnam can show what is damaging for relativism with this claimed regression, 
the relativist thesis remains untouched by it. There is nothing in the regression 
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arguments which prevents discussions of the rationality and the validity of beliefs, the 
central task of the traditional theory of cultural relativism. 
J. P. White and M. Young jointly argued in response to the self-refutation arguments 
against relativism that, 
"to recognise that there can be no criteria of truth or rationality outside 
of men is not a denial of the possibility of these criteria but a 
humanising of them, through locating them in 'our actions, not our 
methods" (1975:7). 
The relativist does not hold that his claims are not themselves context-dependent. He 
does not say that his claims are absolute in the sense of being immune from social and 
historical contexts. On the contrary what he argues is that, all beliefs are only properly 
understood from an holistic, relativistic perspective. He insists that claims about the 
world (both social and natural), are assessed and justified, by reference to certain 
standards, which define what is, and what is not rationally acceptable. These standards 
are not themselves justified by the forms of social life; they are given and they are 
vanous. 
3.2 IS THE IDEA OF RELATIVISED RATIONALITY UNINTELLIGIBLE? 
The second criticism I shall look at charges that cultural relativism is unintelligible in 
its references to its criterial or culture-relative conceptions of rationality. Putnam 
argued that there is no criterial conception of rationality because 
"arguing about the nature of rationality is an activity which presupposes 
a notion of rational justification wider than ...... institutionalized criterial 
rationality" (1981: 14). 
To argue about rationality is itself an activity. So it has principles and procedures 
which are not those of a particular culture. "Consensus among grown-ups", argues 
Putnam, "presupposes reason rather than defining it" (1982: 14). I doubt, however. that 
Putnam supposes here that the grown-ups who hold this consensus about reason and 
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rationality, are outside the social and historical contexts, for these are entailed by the 
process of growing-up and acquiring, such a notion of rational justification. 
McCullagh argued that rationality is not 'objective' as is a physical/material object, so 
it is not "as independent of cultures as some physical objects are" (1984: 330). 
Moreover philosophers always confront a culture 'with itself. McCullagh was thus 
justified in arguing that "we do not employ a notion of rationality extrinsic to our 
culture in order to criticize what our culture believes" (1984: 330). Lack of certainty 
does not render (cultural) relativism unintelligible and Putnam does not provide the 
relativist with a good reason for accepting 'non-criterial rationality'. Putnam's 
argument does not render the idea of 'cultural relativism' unintelligible. 
3.3 ARE SOME UNIVERSAL CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY UNIVERSAL? 
The third criticism is similar to the second. Total cultural relativism ought to be 
rejected since it claims all beliefs are context-dependent. Lukes, for example, argues 
contrary to relativism, that "there are some good reasons for supposing that some 
criteria for truth are not context-dependent", they are universal and "fundamental" 
(1973: 238), and that those which are context-dependent are parasitic on them. It is, he 
suggested, "only by assuming" rational criteria applicable to all contexts that one can 
fully explain why some beliefs (religious, magical, scientific paradigms, official myths), 
are accepted or rejected. The grounds on which Lukes based his arguments are those 
of 'language and logic'. He held that if a group has 
"language in which it expresses its beliefs, it must, minimally, possess 
certain criteria of truth ...... and logic which are not, and cannot be 
context-dependent" (ibid: 238). 
These minimal criteria, Lukes argues, are the basic adaptive human mechanisms for 
any human society, by means of which "verification is likely to provide the basic 
paradigm against which other criteria of truth gain their sense" (ibid: 241). His answer 
to the dilemma of cultural relativism therefore, is found in critical application of the 
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assumed universal and fundamental criteria of truth and logic. So he argued that. "the 
sociology of belief need not prohibit a critical cognitive and logical stance vis-a-vis the 
beliefs it studies" (ibid: 234). 
Lukes is not here attacking cultural relativism sans phrase. He only attacks its extreme 
form, and attempts to modify it so that it allows for the relativization of 'some' beliefs, 
while yet holding that some criteria of rationality are universal and so hold irrespective 
of any context, social or historical. He therefore seeks a compromise, a middle 
position between that of the total cultural relativist and that of its proto-critic who 
rejects the theory of cultural relativism. 
There is much to be said for this line of argument, though I do not think Lukes' 
version is successful. His concession - some criteria of rationality are fundamental -
only confirms the strengths of cultural relativism. Exactly which these 'some' are and 
how they are to be identified is not made clear. The fact that they are assumed, further 
complicates these problems. The bases of the assumed fundamental non-criterial 
rationality are those of language and logic. But "the limit of my language is the limit of 
my world" because there are wider conditions that determine thought and language. So 
what I cannot think or conceive I cannot say. The language and logic I employ must 
then be legitimated by what I can think and say i.e. my conceptual frameworks, more 
generally, my culture. So the strengths of this criticism are at the same time its 
weakness. 
There are many versions of cultural relativism, and there is some consensus that there 
are certain limits to the relativist thesis. There is a point, for example, at which the 
words 'to me' and 'to you' cease to make sense when so and so is true for me, but it is 
not true for you. However, such limits or boundaries of relativism need to be properly 
delineated and clearly worked out. Unless that clear dividing line is known, there does 
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not seem to be, an alternative to some form of cultural relativism, no matter to what 
degree. 
41WO PROBLEMS FOR CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
There are, however, two problems with the traditional theory of cultural relativism of 
relevance to this thesis. 
4.1 THE SUBJECTS OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
Firstly there is a tendency in the traditional theory of cultural relativism, to see people 
as passive objects at the mercy of the given cultures which wholly determine what they 
can believe and do. This view is highly questionable since capacities of people (for 
example, their judgement of their own and other actions, their ability to deal with 
complex situations, and so on) with which we are most concerned are not regarded in 
discussing rationality. Abstractions are but aids to such an effort. Central to cultural 
relativism is the idea of a human society. In such a society some - perhaps many - are 
critically active in challenging and changing its rules, regulations and mores. It is 
people who, in a very obvious sense, make society through their activities: the picture 
of a fixed society determining everything that takes place within it by means of its 
canons of rationality is a misleading one. 
4.2 THE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM AND HOLISM 
Secondly there are, in some relativist writings, a concentration on individual epistemic 
categories, for example belief, which is often given a primary status as the subject of 
relativism, even though beliefs tend to be seen in terms of cultural wholes. So belief is 
sometimes analysed qua individual epistemic term detached from its network of 
relationships with other epistemic terms and other such socially significant items as 
emotions and interests. The confusion arises out of employing inconsistent 
methodological instruments in discussing a single epistemic phenomenon whilst at the 
same time, treating the framework of the discussion as 'context-dependence'. So the 
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traditional theory of cultural relativism, treats beliefs and so on, as the subjects rather 
than the complementary objects of study in a positivistic/methodological-
individualistic sense. The result is that belief is given a primary position at the expense 
of other epistemic/ cognitive terms that enter our explanations and descriptions of 
rationality in an holistic way. 
Beliefs are necessary for the understanding of a person's actions or behaviours. But 
they are not sufficient. There are other epistemic items, for example motives, desires, 
emotions and interests and so on, which interact with beliefs to make human actions 
intelligible and, if indeed they are, rational (or irrational). Such, therefore, must be 
considered by any serious social/anthropological theory. A recognition of this implies 
that the appropriate methodology is necessarily holistic, so that the focus, becomes, an 
epistemological structure, including but not restricted to beliefs 'behind' all human 
actions. 
5 SOME MODIFICATIONS TO THE TRADITIONAL THEORY 
A modified theory of cultural relativism is here proposed. It rests on two interrelated 
views of rationality and a structure that can be employed to explain the rationality or 
irrationality of human beliefs and social actions. 
5.1 LIMITED AND EXTENDED RATIONALITY 
Following Brown (1990: 183 - 197), two senses of rationality may be identified for my 
present purpose: limited and extended rationality. Limited rationality is that which 
marks the validity and consistency of our beliefs in relation to other beliefs. This sense 
of 'rationality' rests on a wide-ranging logical structure whose function resides in its 
provision of assessment procedures. Thus beliefs which are proved to be inconsistent 
with our basic beliefs and basic beliefs which are mutually inconsistent, and in general 
cannot stand the scrutiny of our tests of reasoning, are deemed to be rational or 
irrational or arational. But this sense of rationality lacks certain ingredients which are 
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necessary for it to function within an holistic framework that cultural relativism. as of 
necessity, requires. So a second sense of rationality is proposed as, 'extended 
rationality'. This extends to the properties of the social wholes. 
Extended rationality is a feature of the assessment and explanation of the beliefs and 
actions of people as members of cultural collectives. Similar explanations or 
assessments may not be possible in terms of limited rationality since that is a 
characteristic of individual beliefs, judgements and actions. Limited rationality is not 
central to the present discussion just because its concern is with particular beliefs and 
actions. Individuals can, of course, give reasons for their beliefs and actions, and these 
can be accepted (or not) as rational without any regard to the belief structure of a 
social collective. Individuals may hold and dispose of beliefs (such as: 'there is a dog 
outside my window') provided they can individually, irrespective of any collective 
efforts or considerations, justify them as well-grounded. But the extended theory of 
rationality disallows justification of beliefs or actions without reference to one kind or 
another of collective consideration. Evidence for beliefs or actions must in this case, 
be related to the rationality criteria and hence belief structure of a given cultural or 
social collective. Thus what an individual holds as rational is not necessarily rational 
for a whole social group. 
In sum: limited rationality is the disposition of individuals to offer reasons for their 
particular beliefs. (It is in this sense that man is a rational animal). Extended 
rationality on the other hand, is a structure that extends to a whole complex of beliefs, 
actions, motives, interests, emotions, goals, values, and so on. It is a structure whose 
constituents, such as consistency are criterial for a social whole. Indeed a culture 
would not be such if it did not exhibit a consistency of elements, criteria of relevance, 
verification procedures, agreements on what is to count as 'moral' and so on. 
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'Extended rationality' is, of its essence, an holistic concept: its application is uniquely 
to what i! :~ rational for all members of a group or culture to think, believe, judge and 
do. It is essential to the discussion therefore, of educational knowledge as ideological. 
5.2 AN HOLISTIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL STRUCTURE 
Since in the theory of extended rationality I am employing here, rules of conduct are 
public, they need a reference framework. This reference framework is, I suggest, an 
epistemological structure which underlines and defines each collective's standards of 
rationality. It is in terms of this structure that my modified form of cultural relativism 
is to be understood. The epistemological structure determines the rationality of 
conduct, by reference to its complex, interlocking components such as beliefs, desires, 
actions, values, motives, feelings, emotions, and so on. Beliefs are held, and specific 
actions are undertaken because they are relevant to achieving certain socially and 
publically sanctioned and identified goals. The structure also contains means of 
determining the propriety of the goals, by means of values and theories (especially 
ethical). There is implied here a connection between intention and reason on one 
hand, and social action on the other. 
The epistemological structure outlined here, is one that makes instrumental rationality 
central. But I am interested in instrumental rationality because of its significance for 
the production of educational knowledge in most societies. I am aware that, there may 
be other interests in the beliefs, emotions, and actions of members of a society which 
would need an extended rationality, perhaps even different rationality. But I am not 
discussing these here. 
Human activities (i.e. social actions) become the main concern, of cultural relativism, 
rather than beliefs considered atomistically, because they are central to human 
existence. It is the intentional activity which produces material and social life. and is 
crucial to cultures at all times. Rational social action entails the making of judgements 
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by human subjects, in the context of their cultural collective's interest structure as 
defined by its cognitive structure (not in terms of their unique and individual 
capacities), regarding their conviction that a certain course of action will achieve or 
lead to the achievement of a given desire/preferences or meet some specific values, or 
goals or even will express what they feel. Rational social action is accordingly goal-
directed, and the goals are public not private. The difference is the social direction of 
the goals of the particular action. Under the theory of cultural relativism I propose 
here, there is no avoiding the social content of human practice since we are here 
discussing man in society and his own recognition of 'the social'. Moreover giving 
reasons for one's beliefs (i.e. limited rationality) is itself a social activity at least in the 
sense that, one is, by that activity, relating to other person or persons and within the 
context of time and specific situations. 
It is the desire to achieve or meet public goals, to act in accordance with specific 
values, which propels members of a cultural collective to discriminate amongst beliefs 
(hold some and reject others), and to act or conduct themselves in a specific manner. 
It is the recognition of the social aspect of holding beliefs, acting upon them, defending 
a policy and so on, which further confers social status upon man, who is essentially a 
social, active being, with the capacity to subject various forces to his circumstances. 
The cognitive structure has to reflect this capacity. Hence rationality takes a specific 
social form. It is positively related to the best criteria of reasoning, tests of truth and 
judging between beliefs, and courses of action which are taken to be the best available 
to a given cultural collective at a specific period in history. So standards of rationality 
are social and are dynamic as cultures are; they are neither outside history nor 
unassailable by it. 
5,3 THE MODIFIED THEORY OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
This structure of rationality is internal to the idea of the cultural collective and so the 
beliefs and actions of its members cannot be faulted externally, from other stand-
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points. A specific extended rationality determines the identity of an individual as a 
member of a collective. Changes in the epistemological structure produce changes in 
the criteria of social identity, for example, a closed monastery uses radically different 
criteria of identity than those that determine for example individual workers on a 
conveyer belt in a large industrial undertaking. 
But there is a limit to the internality of the extended rationality within cultural groups. 
Judgements of the rationality of beliefs and actions are never in respect of all beliefs 
and human practices. Only those which one way or the other are considered functional 
to the specific desires, goals and interests of the cultural collective in question count 
for purposes of relativism. However everything else may come into the discussion of 
being functionally relevant to a collective's interests, since it is difficult to draw a 
boundary between those things which affect or are connected to such interests and 
those which at anyone time are not. Only those publically recognised claims to reality 
that promote the interests of the collective, are of any meaning and relevance for 
cultural relativism. Thus it is limited only to the interest structure of social collectives, 
and does not therefore include other rationality structures or interpretations of the 
world. But the notion of 'interests' used here is one which is generative, i.e. it sanctions 
the several cognitive items mentioned above. 
The modified theory of cultural relativism, for the purposes of the present study. has 
the following features. Firstly: judgement by the human subject about the rationality-
content of new and/or conflicting beliefs within the specific contexts of their 
production and generation. Secondly: judgement is in regards to human practices or 
activities (for example, sport or charity) the social actions which necessarily entail 
beliefs but not indi\;dual beliefs per se. What is basic is the epistemological structure, 
a complex and inter-locking set of relationships amongst the epistemic terms that 
severallv constitute it (for example. desire/goals, values/interests, heliefs. and 
actions), such that none is inte lIigible v.ithout due consideration to the others. nzird(v: 
s~ l _ 
it is contextual by reference to the social structure of the particular collective in 
question, but does not, so to speak, stop there as the traditional theory does. It holds 
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further that the context is also necessarily historical since the social structure is hardly 
intelligible in isolation from its own history. Fourthly: its subject is standards of 
rationality (reference to the theory of extended rationality as against that of limited 
rationality) and not just rationality as such. Fifthly: as with Lukes's (1982) relativism, it 
is not a relativism applied to all human beliefs, actions and practices. It holds that not 
all beliefs, or claims about the world are relative to cultural contexts. But unlike 
Lukes's relativism it provides for a boundary between those which are, and those 
which are not relative to the interest structure of the given social collective. So what 
distinguishes two cultures are their respective interest and epistemological structures 
mutually interactive and so only capable of being understood holistically. But conflict 
of interests between different cultural collectives and even within one society, may 
occur. This theory of cultural relativism also rests on the further consideration that 
there are conflicting views of the world. Sixthly: cultural relativism is of theoretical 
relevance to policy matters mainly because it entails, within pluralities, conflicting 
cultural tendencies each of which demands a measure of official respect and 
recognition. 
5.4 CULTURAL PLURALISM AND DOMINANT STANDARDS OF 
RATIONALITY 
This modified theory of cultural relativism therefore holds that where conflicting 
interests co-exist within one single state, the political parent of all the cultural 
collectives, a dominant standard of rationality takes priority over all the other 
standards of rationality in any given historical period. It is mainly, but not exclusively, 
by means of the dominant standard of rationality that conflicts are addressed if not 
resolved, thereby giving rise to new conflicts or the re-emergence of the old, 
presumably resolved ones, in new, and perhaps sharper forms. So in plural societies 
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resolutions are only temporarily permanent and conflicts among contending cultures 
persist in new forms. 
In societies where a modern mode of production (for example capitalism) has not 
matured to its classical form, different interest/cultural groups of ideological 
significance often strive to subsist side by side with each other. In contemporary Africa 
for instance, a number of cultural categories and tendencies, ranging from religious to 
political and ethnic to economic, often co-exist in conflict. The dominant standard of 
rationality is, in many cases, class based. Social classes in such cases are included 
among the social collectives as are sub-cultures like the primordial structures found in 
societies in transition like that of contemporary Nigeria. Friction between these 
conflicting forms is of central interest to cultural relativism. I examine this kind of 
interplay between different ideological forces representing different forms of society in 
contemporary Nigeria (12: 205 - 9). 
In such a situation, the relationship between the different ideological forms is 
dialectical: some prosper and develop at the expense of others which decay and 
atrophy. The nature of their relationship is that of the ascendency of one (or a few) 
forms. This ascendency has a direct consequence: the decadance of the others. In the 
process of struggle therefore, some become dominant over others. The result is the 
(gradual) dissolution of the sub-ordinated forms of society and their respective 
ideological expressions. Hence the standard of rationality of the dominant form and its 
ideological expressions prevail and become dominant. State policies, including the 
definition of educational aims and objectives, as well as the selection of the 
appropriate educational knowledge are the means by which the dominant standards of 
rationality persist. I shall address these issues in chapter eleven of this study, bv 
reference to the production of educational knowledge. 
87 
I shall argue that the ideology of educational knowledge should be understood in the 
light of the theory of extended rationality when applied to the various cultural 
collectives within a given society, and in particular to their respective interest 
structures. However the account of the ideology of educational knowledge that I shall 
propose proceeds from an examination of the basic, central claims of the traditional or 
classical sociology of knowledge (i.e., the accounts of knowledge production in Marx). 
The relationship between the socio-economic-cultural structure and educational 
knowledge, now to be understood in terms of the theory of extended rationality is 
central to this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE MARXIST THEORY OF SOCIAL DETERMINATION OF Ki'iO\VLEDGE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
I shall in this chapter examine certain classical accounts of the view that all knowledge 
is socially determined. It is necessary to look at these arguments before an account of 
the ideological character of educational knowledge is attempted. The view that 
knowledge is socially determined, has been the concern of the Sociology of 
Knowledge. Some precursors of views which are standard in the sociology of 
knowledge, are to be found in the classical world, for example the position held by 
Protogras that 'man is the measure of all things'. However it is not to the classical 
world that one turns to in search of the theories of social detemination of knowledge. 
The thesis has been variously developed, famously by Marx and his various successors 
in the Neo-Marxist tradition. The accounts have been numerous and it is difficult to 
determine whether Marx had one particular view of the theory that he developed 
(Kontapoulos: 1980: 6). I shall examine some of the central social determinist aspects 
of Marx's writings. 
2 THE BASIC SOCIAL DETERMINIST ARGUMENTS 
The first statement of the Marxist sociology of knowledge is to be found in The 
German Ideology in which Marx said, in disagreeing with what he called his "former 
philosophical conscience", that, 
"Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc, that is real, 
active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their 
productive forces and of their intercourse corresponding to these, up to 
Its furthest forms." (Collected Works: 1976: 5: 36) 
Here is posited a relationship between knowledge and the production of material life 
which has two interrelated strands. Men are 'conditioned' by productive forces and 
man's production of ideas, is thus conditioned by the development of these forces. The 
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term 'determine' is crucial here. Marx further argued that, the production of 
consCIousness sets out, 
"from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of 
this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, 
necessarily sublimates of their material life-process .... " (ibid: 36) 
Furthermore the nature of ideas and consciousness cannot be explained independently 
of the mode and forces of production; their form and content is owed to social, 
material forces. Forms of consciousness, ideas, knowledge, for Marx, 
"have no history, no development, but men, developing their material 
production and their matenal intercourse, alter, along with this, their 
real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is 
not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life." (ibid: 37) 
There can be no clearer statement of the determinist thesis. However, the very 
boldness of this statement raises the question of what the relevance of ideas could 
possibly be to the determining material conditions of men. Does it follow that ideas 
are irrelevant to man's struggle to produce his life-processes, or indeed to the class 
struggle and its outcome? In other words, is the relationship between ideas and life-
processes asymmetrical or symmetrical? 
I t might be suggested that Marx did not, in the above statement entirely dismiss the 
possibility of a role for ideas in influencing social material conditions and processes. 
Had he done so, his own theories of history and society would have been politically 
emasculated from the begining. For his ideas could then make no difference to real, 
objective, material conditions under which people live. So his claim can best be 
represented as a starting point of his analysis: the rejection of the Hegelian 'Idea' is 
basic. Only the material, objective conditions of existence are the basic, determining 
factors of the generation of consciousness and knowledge. The issue here is not that of 
the significance of knowledge in human affairs, but that of understanding it in terms of 
its primary determination or causation. This much, Marx continued to assert and argue 
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in most of his works especially The German Ideology and The Theses on Feueurbach. 
So, in the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy, he argued that: 
"the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, 
and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness". (SW: 1: 1977: 503) 
Furthermore, the Manifesto, in which is set out the Marxist agenda, raised the same 
issue when it asked (rhetorically): 
"Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that men's ideas, views 
and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every 
change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relation, 
and in his social life?" (CW: 6: 1976: 503) 
Marx's basic contention is thus not in doubt but what is not clear is the nature of the 
'determination' involved here. Is it a causal relationship (in either the strong or weak 
sense), or one of correspondence or even conditionini? One point that is clear 
however is that consciousness is a dependent variable and can only be explained and 
understood in the light of "material conditions", which are the determining, 
independent (or may be interdependent) variables. I shall attempt a position on this 
problem after I examine the often taken-for-granted meaning of the phrases: "material 
conditions" and "social being". I shall do this in the light of an examination of the 
context of the social determination of consciousness. 
3 SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF THE SOCIAL DETERMINATION OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Marx proposed two basic features for his theory of knowledge generation: the mode of 
production and social class interests. The former appears comprehensive; but it is 
because of this comprehensiveness that it may be open to criticism. The latter is rather 
more specific, and generally attracts more attention in the discussions of the Marxist 
theory of knowledge. The first point of reference in this regard is the Manifesto'S 
famous clarion cry that, "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
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struggles" (CW: 6: 1976: 482). It was on the basis of this principle that ~larx and 
Engels argued that, 
':the id~as of the rulin~ cla~s are in ~very epoch the ruling 
Ideas: l.e. a class WhICh IS the rulIng material force of 
society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force ..... 
so that the ideas of those who lack the means of material 
production are on the whole subject to it." (CW: 5: 59) 
Thus "the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas" (ibid: 60) and such 
domination only comes to an end "as soon as class rule in general ceases to be the 
form in which society is organised" (ibid: 61). 
Ideas, forms of consciousness, are then to be assessed in the light of their place in the 
class struggle the concept of which is central to understanding and overthrowing 
capitalism. So not all ideas and forms of consciousness are of interest or concern to 
Marxist epistemology. Only the ruling ideas of an epoch in a society constitute the 
subject of concern: the investigation, criticism and replacement along dialectical lines. 
But this concern logically extends to all other 'class' ideas both in the generative and 
descriptive senses. In other words, Marxist epistemology is mainly an account of what 
has been called the "dominant ideology". We have to assess ideas in terms of the class 
interests that they express and from which they are generated in the first place. This 
argument is supported by a similar contention that, 
"it is the mode of production of material life which conditions the 
process of social, polItical and intellectual life in general" (Capital Vol 1: 
1948 ed: 93 note). 
Social classes, however are themselves situated within the context of the relgrung 
mode of production. The class structure is an expression of a mode of production. We 
cannot make sense of social classes or their struggles except in the light of the mode of 
production from which they spring. The distinction made by Abercrombie (1980) 
between what he called 'the mode-theoretical', and the 'class-theoretical' accounts of 
the determination of knowledge is unacceptable. The modes of production and the 
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class structure are inseparable both in analytic and practical terms. The determination 
of knowledge relates to the collective interests of a dominant class within a specified 
mode of production. The dominant ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. 
Workers suffer from 'false consciousness' imposed by the ruling class through the 
latter's control of material and intellectual production, eg, publishing, the educational 
establishment and the media. Each class has its own ideology which expresses its own 
interests which will potentially be in conflict with those of other classes. It is therefore 
in accordance with the material interests of the classes that their ideals are to be 
understood. Marx argued that, 
" .... consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of 
material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive 
forces and the relations of production." (SW: op cit: 504) 
This is a clear claim that consciousness is explained by class struggle within a definite 
mode of production, so on Marx's view there is no separating the two. 
Knowledge, in the Marxist epistemology, is determined within the context of the 
reigning mode of production in general, and its corresponding class structure and 
interests in particular. Under capitalism this means that the bourgeois form of 
consciousness reigns because it dominates and rules. Therbom (1979) justly argued 
that, depending on the level of development of the productive forces, the prevailing 
form of consciousness is essentially that which is articulated, or at least held as 
relevant, by the ruling class. The ruling class controls the means of determining and 
disseminating the forms of consciousness supportive of, and supported by, its form of 
society. The bourgeois form of consciousness rules because the bourgeois mode of 
production dominates. 
However, the position articulated above has certain implications which are 
poblematic. It follows that no other claims to an understanding of the world are 
produced and disseminated by the ruling class except either those that support it or are 
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functional to its class interests. But as I shall argue in this chapter, this is mistaken. It 
suggests that the workers' ideology is distinct because it cannot, owing to its 
subordinated status, express its own distinctive proletarian interests which have been 
determined by their class position within the context of the reigning mode of 
production. There are also problems for the doctrine of false consciousness here for 
that doctrine seems to allow that both the bourgeoisie and the workers might be 
mistaken about their real interests. Yet Marx allowed that some elements of a class 
structure can, and in fact do rise above their class interests and hence mode of 
production. He argued that, 
"the communist consciousness .... may, of course, arise among the other 
classes too through contemplation of the situation of this (proletarian) 
class (C W: 5: 52) 
Thus through contemplation, such bourgeois elements may possess the forms of 
consciousness that better fit the interest structure of the opposing class. So there is no 
one-to-one, direct, causal connection between class position and the production of 
knowledge. 
Again, Marx argued (in the Manifesto and other places) that, at a certain point in 
history, the bourgeoisie can articulate positions on behalf of the proletariat, for the 
whole of the society. For example, when the bourgeoisie fought the feudal lords, it not 
only articulated forms of consciousness appropriate to its interests but to the interests 
of the other classes in society as well. This is also true, Marx argued, of the proletariat 
at certain times in its struggle against the bourgeois form of society. But it must be 
emphasized that this is only true at some, not at all times. Which times these are, will 
be brought out later in this discussion. What these arguments show is that, even the 
connection between mental productions and class interest is not as rigid as it is often 
held Marx, and some of his followers thought them to be. 
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4 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THOUGHT AND SOCIAL REALITY 
4.1 THREE SENSES OF SOCIAL DETERMINISM 
The nature of the social determination of knowledge is chiefly explained in terms of 
the relationship between 'Being' and 'Consciousness' or 'Thought'. The term 'Being' is 
central to an understanding of the nature of the social determinist thesis. Marx 
employed the term to denote the actual process of the production of social reality. 
'Being', Marx argued consistently, 'determines consciousness'; what we need to know is 
the nature of that relationship, what is the exact mode of operation of that 
'determination'? 
Marx employed the concept of 'social determinism' - an abstract noun derived from 
the verb 'to determine' - in three senses and each of these is the basis of a different 
account of the relationship between being and consciousness or knowledge. First, in 
the causal sense (as implied in his theory of class interests and ideology), each class 
has different interests which cause (or bring about) a different view of reality. This 
sense of social determinism is crucial to the doctrine of class consciousness: the real, 
objective conditions which give rise to, and define class interests, produce a different 
account of the world, from that which emerges from different conditions. In the second 
place it was employed in the sense of conditioning, for example, the famous statement 
that, " .... the mode of production of material life conditions ..... intellectual life process" 
(SW: op cit: 503). This sense of the social determinist theory suggests that the 
ideological character of any set of ideas or knowledge cannot be understood without 
due reference to the social structure. This sense of social determinism is often thought 
of as accounting for consciousness in general. In the third place it also was used in the 
sense of co"espondence. For example, Marx argued in the The Preface to A Critique 
of Political Economy that, "with the change of the economic foundations the entire ... 
superstructure is .... transformed" and also 
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" ... the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises 
a .... superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness" (ibid: 503). 
This sense of social determinism explains the production of knowledge by reference to 
a structural analysis of base - superstructure relationship. While it is suggested that 
each form of consciousness corresponds to the material reality, the force of this 
correspondence is less clear. A similar lack of precision characterises both the 
conditioning, and causal accounts of determinism. In whichever sense one sees the 
force of 'social determination' of knowledge, it the case that some explanations of 
these relationships are required. 
The first sense of social determinism (i. e. the causal sense), and the third (i. e. the 
correspondence sense) have a number of different implications for the ideology of 
educational knowledge, and these will be examined later. But the second sense of 
social determinism of knowledge (i. e. the conditioning sense) is too generous and 
sweeping. It only provides the general framework for understanding the relationship 
between knowledge and the prevailing social structure. The conditioning sense of 
social determinism only makes obvious claims. I shall, in this chapter only examine the 
causal and the correspondences senses, since the whole project of the search for an 
explanatory theory of the ideology of educational knowledge takes off from the 
general, obvious claims of the conditioning sense of the social determinist theory of 
knowledge. 
4.2 THE CAUSAL SENSE OF SOCIAL DETERMINISM 
If, in the Marxist theory, the social determination of knowledge is conceived, quite 
literally, in the causal sense, then that thesis is a strong one. If the theory is to be 
interpreted in the strong, causal. sense then it will undoubtedly hold that, every form 
of consciousness is socially determined. It will then not be possible for Marxist 
determinism and Marxist theory in general to be accepted as 'science' rather than as 
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'ideology'. For if Marxist determinism is itself an ideology, and not a SCIence the 
resulting relativist consequences will damage Marxist claims to universality of 
explanation. The question then is: could Marx, have intended the strong, causal, thesis 
when he employed the social determinist theory of knowledge? Kontapoulos argued 
that, "Marx obviously repudiates the strong deterministic thesis and accepts a more 
moderate one" (1980: 46). Marx is here understood by Kontapoulos as not using social 
determinism as the strong thesis that all human activities and thoughts are 
predetermined by the material conditions - in Marx's case - the socio-material 
conditions of human life. One causal interpretation of Marx might of course be that all 
theories are ideological (in the sense of being socially determined) including his own. 
The specific determinants are the interests of the classes, in particular the interests of 
the proletariat. The workers are, on this theory, the harbingers of a classless society: 
non-ideological knowledge will only be possible in a classless society, in which 
Marxism itself will cease to be relevant (CW: 5: 60). For in that society, all individual 
interests disappear; all interests are shared by all members of the society. This suggests 
an interpretation that takes Marxist ideology to be basically pragmatic. Although it is 
true that there are problems with this interpretation, I am only concerned here with 
the possibility for a pragmatic reading of the Marxist epistemology, which such an 
interpretation allows. 
The problem therefore is to attempt to deconstruct social determinism in the 
pragmatic direction, such being allowed by the reading of Marx's account of the 
theory, as above. This pragmatic interpretation of the force of Marx's social 
determinist theory can provide a clearer explanation of the ideology of educational 
knowledge. It is particularly important to attempt this if one is to work out the 
implications of the theory for the Marxist epistemology and his general theory of 
society. 
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One of the basic ideas that is given by the Marxist account of determinism is that the 
production of knowledge is influenced by a particular mode of production and the 
social classes appropriate to it. Each mode of production, or more precisely, level of 
development of its productive forces, has a class structure which is distinctively 
appropriate to it. The Marxist epistemology therefore, is not reducible to, though it 
springs from, an analysis of, the classical capitalist society. From this it follows that 
societies that are in some sense 'hybrid' i.e. they have a mixture of different modes of 
production, some of which may be decaying whilst others are developing, have a 
radically different class structure from that which obtains in the classical capitalist 
society. Developing societies of Africa, such as Nigeria provide some examples here. 
This point is central to the present study. Developing capitalist societies have class 
structures different from those which obtain in classical capitalist societies, although 
their prevailing social relations are of a common capitalist nature. The class structures, 
and so structures of interests, and forms of thought of such hybrid societies still allow 
for undeveloped and underdeveloped pre-capitalist forms of consciousness, such as 
ethnicity, regionalism, religion, and so on. Therefore, the influences that the social 
structure exerts on the process of the production of knowledge are those of its hybrid 
modes of production. 
Irrespective however, of the nature of society and the level of the development of its 
productive forces, which in fact account for the differences, Marx's social determinism 
does not seek to explain all forms of consciousness. It is concerned with those that are 
in contest within a society, especially the dominant and potentially dominant, ruling 
ideas. However Marx was not exclusively concerned with these ruling ideas. For one 
reason they, according to the principles of the dialectic, generate in part. their anti-
thesis, i.e. contradictory ideological versions. For example the proletarian idea of 'the 
necessity of fundamental revolution' is in part generated as response to the ruling 
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ideas of the ruling class of a capitalist society. In this study only those interests and 
ideas that are in contest in hybrid societies will be examined. 
Marx argued that, "the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas" (CW: 5: 
60) because such ideas are those of the class that dominates and governs. The ruling 
class controls both material, cultural and mental productions. If that class is to be 
overthrown then an analysis of the ideas it uses in ruling, inevitably occupies a central 
position in the revolutionary project of the proletariat. 
Under the causal thesis of determinism, forms of consciousness anse from the 
different parts of the social structure, and are based on different (and conflicting) 
interest structures. (Hence a common social structure can support differing structures 
of interests). Forms of consciousness generated in this way (and it is implied that all 
forms are so generated) are inalienably functional; they support and promote only 
those interests which generated them. They are subject to the demands and nature of 
that social structure and no other. Such ideas and forms of consciousness have a 
limited validity and legitimacy; they hold mainly within the frameworks of their 
respective interest structure(s). Thus, forms of consciousness have a subjective 
character, since the social structure from which they are generated, is, in a dialectical 
sense, transitory, and dynamic. 
4.3 A CRITIQUE OF MARX'S CAUSAL THESIS OF SOCIAL DETERMINATION 
Marx's arguments are, then, limited to the ruling ideas of a society: this itself suggests 
that he did not subscribe to the strong thesis of social determination of knowledge. He 
was clear about the specific forms of consciousness which attracted his principal 
concerns. If he had failed to determine the form of consciousness with which his 
epistemology is concerned, or if he had implied that all forms of consciousness are 
socially determined as did Mannheim (postscript to this chapter: 111 - 115), his 
position might have been judged as, at the very least, entirely consistent with the 
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strong, causal thesis of social determinism. But Marx had stated the primacy of "the 
ruling ideas of an epoch", so these constitute the subject of his analysis. He emphasised 
the "ruling class ideas", " ... the ruling ideas of the epoch .... the dominant ideas" (CW: 
ibid: 59). Marx accordingly argued that, we cannot, "in the course of history .... detach 
the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself." (ibid: 60) 
If we cannot detach a class and its corresponding ideas then an analysis of the former 
entails the analysis of the latter, ie there can be no analysis of their relationship that 
makes use of the idea of social determinism. It is within the framework of this 
interpretation that one may appreciate Gramsci's reading of Marxist epistemology in 
terms of the theory of hegemony (1975: passim) and also Abercrombie's dominant 
ideology thesis. Marxist social epistemology is concerned with the ideas that shape or 
influence class struggles and are relevant to either maintaining or overthrowing the 
capitalist form of society. This particular set of ideas, and not just every idea or form of 
consciousness, constitutes the focus of its epistemology, as can be seen in his 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and The Civil War in France. 
A further ground for the judgement that Marx did not work with the causal thesis of 
social determinism can be seen in his willingness to allow that certain sections of the 
society can, and do, in the process of generating ideas, or forms of consciousness, "rise 
above" their objective material class positions. The example of the "bourgeois 
ideologists", supports this claim. He argued as stated earlier (p 94) that, 
" .... the communist consciousness .... may, of course, arise among the 
other classes too through contemplation (my emphasis) of the situation 
of this (the proletarian) class" (CW: op cit: 52) 
Clearly then some elements of the bourgeois class can, irrespective of their objective, 
material class conditions, rise above their class consciousness. Through contemplation 
(and not only through the material conditions) they can identify with the yearnings of 
the proletariat. 
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But this possibility of detachment does not, I suggest, necessarily imply sacrificing the 
materialist interpretation of the connection between Being and Thought, rather it 
makes the connection more flexible less rigid. It may be argued that the flexibility that 
this reading enables does not satisfactorily explain the contradiction that is involved 
here. This is because contemplation belongs to the idealistic (metaphysical) sphere. 
The question then is whether allowing the possibility of the generation of certain forms 
of consciousness at certain times through contemplation, produces a contradiction in 
the materialist philosophical basis of the Marxist theory. 
The answer may be read from the details that Marx provides in his description of the 
disintegration of a capitalist society. He argued that, this contradiction can be seen "in 
times when the struggle nears the decisive hour", whereby 
"the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within 
the range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a 
small section (my emphasis) of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and doins 
the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands." CW: 
6:495) 
Thus, forced by the circumstances of the struggle, some elements contemplate 
proletarian thoughts. The contemplation is related to the objective conditions of the 
intensity of the revolutionary struggle. It is imposed by these, and is not as .)uch, born 
of rational contemplation and choice. However Marx did not explain why one 
bourgeoisie accepts a proletarian ideology whilst another does not. Obviously this 
cannot be explained by means of class position, for in terms of that no distinctions are 
possible. Nevertheless, the fact that some allowance is made for an escape from the 
influences of the class structure, even though only at certain, specific times, counts 
against the causal sense of social determinism. An account of what is special about 
these special terms would be needed to serve the Marxist epistemology as a whole. 
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Marx did hold in the Manifesto, that, some bourgeois ideologists "have raised 
themselves to the levels of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a 
whole" (CW: 6: 494). Furthermore, Kontopoulos holds that Marx concedes that 'the 
single individual' is not bound by the limits of the nation (op cit: 45) thereby suggesting 
that the relationship between 'Being' and 'Thought' is not a causal one. Marx further 
states, in "Moralizing criticism and critical morality" against Karl Heinzein that, "it is 
'possible' that particular individuals are not always influenced in their attitude by the 
class to which they belong ... " (McLellan: 1977: 216). All these statements suggest that 
there are aspects of mental productions that are not determined by the influences of 
the class structure and class interests. They all strongly suggest that Marx's determinist 
theory of knowledge is not a causal one. 
Marx did not however think that a whole class can escape (in the process of 
consciousness generation), from its objective conditions, and its corresponding interest 
structure. That the classes cannot break away from their real relations is one of the 
central messages of his critique of Heinzein. Only individuals can do so: that is why he 
made a clear reference to "a small section of the ruling class", but even for them there 
are some qualifications, as already argued. So Marx does not attach primacy, in his 
analysis, to individual action - though he does allow it a place that is not fully 
consistent with the monolithic claims of, for example, the Manifesto. 
Marx, it can be concluded, did not adopt, in his epistemology, the strong thesis which 
holds that there is a causal connection between consciousness and material life-
processes. Such a thesis is a version of the 'reductive materialism' that Marx rejected. 
The causal, reductive relationship between consciousness and the social structure is 
not held - at least in the canonical writings of Marx himself. 
The analysis of those Marxist philosophers who lay stress more on the 
"base/superstructure" relationship, may offer a way out of these difficulties. I shall now 
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briefly examine the theory of the base - superstructure relationship as a variant of the 
correspondence sense of social determinism, to determine whether it can show that 
educational knowledge is ideological, and if so, the senses in which it is. 
4.4 THE CORRESPONDENCE SENSE OF SOCIAL DETERMINSM IN THE 
THEORY OF THE BASE-SUPERSTRUCTURE 
i The General Account 
What is left in Marx's account once the causal/deterministic element has been 
rejected, the conditioning account put to one side is the idea that the production of 
thought or more generally consciousness - can be understood as a superstructure that 
is supported by a base: 'the house of knowledge must have foundations'. This 
architectural metaphor has long been in favour in epistemology - its origins are in the 
works of Aristotle and in recent times can be found interalig, in the writings of Carnap, 
Ayer and early Wittgenstein. Marx argued in The Preface of 1859 that, 
"In the social production of their life men enter into definite relations 
that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correpond to a definite stage of development of their 
material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which a legal and political superstructure to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness." (SW: op cit: 503) 
This account of the base-superstructure relationship, is another version of the 
determinist theory. In this account the 'base' is taken to refer to the material 
foundation, usually viewed in both Marxist and neo-Marxist writings as the economic 
structure of the society. The superstructure on the other hand, is understood to be 
those structures that correspond to the base. They consist of the political, social, 
cultural, religious, and may be other, forms of consciousness. This account constitutes 
a structural interpretation of the Marxist epistemology. Engels discussed this structural 
reading of social phenomena including the production of consciousness, at much 
greater length than Marx. He it was, who disowned the 'mistaken' economic reductivist 
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interpretations of Marx's social determinism and who defended the theory after Y1arx's 
death. 
The concept of 'correspondence' is theoretically underdetermined. The implication for 
correspodence is compliance, so that whatever does not comply with the basic 
structure of the society, is then ruled out by it. Correspondence between the basic 
structure of society and forms of consciousness as seen in terms of compliance suggests 
some definite relationships to the level of the development of the forces of production. 
Any particular thought or (educational) knowledge seen from the perspective of its 
correspondence to the basic structure of society, is therefore best understood in the 
context of its place in the prevailing society and the definite stage of the society within 
history. 
But correspondence only gives a loose indication of the force of the social determinist 
theory of knowledge production. Taken to its logical conclusions, correspondence 
merely states the obvious point that each society generates that knowledge which is 
appropriate to its basic form and level of development. However this is too slight for 
social determinism. Correspondence does not clearly allow one to isolate those 
conditions which do, and those which do not explain specific ideas. We have no way of 
accounting for any knowledge in the society except to say that it complies with the 
basic structure of that society, which in the final analysis is vague. The force of the 
'correspondence' involved in the base - superstructure relationship is not clearly 
explained by Marx, nor is the nature of the distinction between them. But the account 
of the social determinist theory of knowledge production in terms of correspondence, 
vague as it is, is nonetheless of some relevance to the project of examining the 
ideology of educational knowledge. It does emphasise the significance of the wide 
social context in which such knowledge is produced. The correspondence thesis 
suggests that educational knowledge has a functional relevance to the dominant 
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collective within which it is generated. This view of the social determinist theory 
promotes a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge production in Marx. 
Despite this however, it must be asked whether the correspondence thesis presupposes 
a causal relationship between the base and the superstructure. What room, if any, is 
provided by the theory for a non-reductive relationship between the base and the 
superstructure? Does the correspondence theory in the final analysis blur the very 
distinction it makes between the base and the superstructure? How does it assist in 
working out accounts of the ideology of educational knowledge? 
While the superstructure is influenced and determined by the base, Marx and Engels 
nevertheless hold that it in turn influences the base (see for example Marx's critique of 
Heinzein and Engels letter to Bloch). That is, the superstructure enjoys a degree of 
relative autonomy, so that the relationship is not one-way. Althusser (1969) argued 
that there is a need to re-think the specific connections between the two, so that we 
can, in the words of Hall, 
"grasp, simultaneously, the determination by the economic in the last 
instance and the relative autonomy or effectivity of the superstructures". 
(1977 : 54) 
The specific effectivity for Althusser, is to be understood, in terms of the role of the 
superstructure "in the reproduction of the social relations of production", what he 
called, the 'ideological state apparatus' (ISAs) and the 'repressive state apparatus' 
(RSAs). The former was used by Althusser to account for education as an element in 
the superstructure. 
ii Two Perspectives on the Base Superstructure Relationship 
The difficult issues surrounding the base-superstructure relationship can be 
approached from the perspectives of two different views: "the mechanistic" and "the 
interactionist", as did Carter( 1988). To these Smith (1984), however added a third, 
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namely Althusser's 'overdetermination' thesis. But I shall look at the first two 
perspectives since the third is derived from them. 
a) The Mechanistic Thesis 
The mechanistic thesis of the base superstructure relationship holds that, the base, and 
nothing else actually causes the superstructure. This thesis rests on three main 
presuppositions (Smith: 1984). One: the division of social formations in terms of 
'forces of production', 'relations of production' or 'the economic structure', and 'the 
legal, political superstructures, and forms of consciousness'. Two: a direct causal 
dependence by all the other relations of the forces of production. And three: the 
unidirectional dependence of superstructures on the base. The base is constantly 
subject to change as new productive techniques arise, while the superstructure is 
incapable of change except as the effect of changes in the base. The mechanistic thesis 
is thus a limiting case of the broader causal thesis. 
There are however problems with the mechanistic thesis. It is inconsistent with the 
holistic nature of the Marxist epistemology. The mechanistic thesis implies that the 
whole of social life is to be understood primarily from the perspective of economics. It 
is often argued that, Marxism, by emphasising the primacy of the modes of production 
(and the corresponding relationship between the base and the superstructure), holds 
that the economy is the only determining factor as far as the generation and 
production of knowledge is concerned. Some philosophers had therefore critiqued the 
base-superstructure relationship on the grounds that it reduces everything to the 
economy, i.e. the reductivism mentioned earlier. Engels, rejected this claim although 
he, in a letter to J. Bloch, 21-22/9/1890, conceded that, 
"Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that 
...... people sometimes lay stress on the economic side than 
is due to it. We had to emphasize the main principle ...... 
to give ..... due to other elements involved in the 
interaction" (SC: 1975: 394). 
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Bu t as Jones (1984) argues the precise structural mechanism connecting the two is left 
unclear. However Engels developed an account of the base superstructure relationship 
even further, when he argued in the letter to J. Bloch (1890) that, 
"according to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately 
de.ter~ning element in history is the production of real life. More than 
thIS neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this 
into saying that the economic is the only determining one, he transforms 
that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. " (SC: op 
cit: 498) 
So analyses must be complex and holistic by taking into consideration all the other 
elements of the structure, i.e. considering the complex inter-relationships of various 
variables, and locating all of them within a specific context. That way there cannot be a 
one-to-one relationship between being and consciousness. It follows that the holism of 
dialectical materialism is to be brought to bear on the base-superstructure relationship 
just as it must inform any other analysis within the Marxist theory. 
Engels (1890), argued accordingly that those who toe the reductive line, simply lack 
dialectics. This reductivist reading of the base - superstructure relationship considers 
the base and the superstructure to be distinct and separate - the former determining 
the latter - i.e. the superstructure is reduced to the base. This reading has been 
contrasted to the dialectical reading of the relationship between them which insists on 
the superstructure as returning in Marx's own words to "itself in influence" (a gnomic 
comment it must be said). 
It is difficult to explain the base in terms of the mechanistic account since the latter 
treats it as a primary and independent explanatory factor, which stands in isolation 
from the totality of the socio-economic relationships. The productive forces cannot be 
understood in isolation from their total relationships because they do not exist outside 
of specific social relations and in reality the two overlap. They interact with other 
regions of man's productive activity such as the activities of consumption, distribution, 
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exchange, social co-operation, and even the production and reproduction of forms of 
consciousness including cultural productions. 
It is not clear on the axioms of the mechanistic thesis which aspects of the society 
belong to the base and which to the superstructure. For instance, Cohen (1978) 
believes that, the phenomenon of, knowledge can characterise both the base and the 
superstructure and so, by extension politics and science can as well belong to both. It is 
hardly disputable that, politics (an aspect of the superstructure of all societies) 
determines production in for example, international trade, even though that may even 
more fundamentally be explained by the economic structure and relations. If the 
demands of world capitalism determined the events of 'the Gulf War', such demands 
had their political aspects, for example, the need for stability in the Middle East. 
Economic, political and scientific activities do not fall neatly into just one of the 
base / superstructure categories. 
Similarly the place of science in human societies cannot be confined to either the base 
or the superstructure. Science, it is argued, generates development. Advanced and 
productive capacities are largely grounded in, scientific knowledge, and the application 
of this knowledge to production. So development efforts (particularly in the third 
world countries) are almost always complemented by heavy investment in science and 
technical education. As indicated earlier, Cohen holds that knowledge is a constituent 
of both the base and the superstructure because of its relationship to the productive 
powers. But science is normally taken to be an aspect of the superstructure, not the 
base. If it generates economic development by means of new techniques of production 
and new discoveries then the mechanistic thesis, especially if it is read as having a 
unidirectional influence, is false. 
The mechanistic thesis then, cannot be sustained. So what non - mechanistic account 
can be given of the determination of the superstructure by the base? Engels believed 
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that the influence of the economic base is fundamental but only "in the last instance". 
In The Funeral Speech he claimed that Marx's work only shows that "mankind must 
first of all eat, drink, ... before it can pursue politics, ... If So the base plays a 
determining role but only "in the last instance". Even this much more limited account 
can itself be challenged; questions still remain concerning the actual effects and 
influences of the base on the superstructure. The relationship despite Engel's attempts 
to clarify it is still not clear. There cannot, I conclude, be a convincing account of the 
base - superstructure relationship that treats that relationship either mechanistically or 
causally. 
b) The Interactionist Holistic Thesis 
This account, as it implies, claims that base and superstructure interact. This 
interaction is one aspect of the internal relatedness of all the elements within a social 
totality. It has its origins in Marx's discussion of methodology in his introduction to 
The Grundrisse, where he argued against those political economists who treat 
elements of the economy and society in isolation. He said: 
"The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, exchange 
and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a 
totality, distInctions within a unity." (1973: 99) 
In an earlier work Marx provided the basis of this interpretation of the 
relationship between the base and the superstructure. He considered the 
internal complexities and interrelations within a single social phenomenon by 
reference to the organic nature of the sun. It is argued that the sun is a 
necessary and life-assuring object, for plants, just as the plants are objects of the 
sun: they are considered as the expressions of the sun's life-giving power and 
objective powers. 
The relationship between the sun and the plant is that of mutuality, not cause - effect. 
When interpreted this metaphor is intended to suggest that the superstructure, through 
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the prevailing social relations, influences, non-causally, the base, which 'in the last 
instance' determines it. Both have some degree of independence from the other. The 
superstructure has its own effectivity, so it cannot just be reduced to the effects of the 
basal causation. 
The interactionist thesis therefore, avoids the problems of causality that beset the 
mechanistic thesis. All elements within a society are internally related so that the 
division between the primary explanatory factor (the base) and other factors which are 
generated by the former (i.e. the superstructure) is not one of necessity. The 
superstructure co-exists with the base, in a relationship of interdependence, Such 
interdependence is fully compatible with there being some areas of social life in which 
one has the more extensive and profound effects and some areas in which this is true 
of the other. 
The interactionist thesis is sufficiently holistic for the purposes of determining an 
explanation of the ideology of educational knowledge. An holistic approach to 
knowledge such as the one with which this work started can thus accommodate the 
interactionist thesis of the base-superstructure theory. The interactionist thesis 
however needs further interpretation: the relationship between the base (Le. the basic 
social structure) and the superstructure (in this instance 'educational knowledge') is 
not causal but is one of internal interrelatedness; it allows of various interpretations of 
the ideology of educational knowledge. 
Both the causal and correspondence senses of social determinism are unacceptable 
except when their respective claims are analysed pragmatically. But a pragmatic 
reading of both the causal and the correspondence accounts puts these two senses of 
Marx's social determinist theory of knowledge in the same category as the conditioning 
sense - which I argued earlier only sets the parameters for understanding the ideology 
of educational knowledge. Hence an attempt will now be made (see chapter 6) by 
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reference to the pragmatic reading allowed by the interactionist thesis of the base-
superstructure relationship, to propose a theory which will provide an explanation of 
the ideology of educational knowledge. Marx's theory of the fetishism of the 
commodity is in this connection enticing and promising. 
POST-SCRIPT: MANNHEIM ON IDEOLOGY 
Although Marx's ideas are the focus of this study, there are other thoughts on social 
determination of knowledge which have profound influences in the debate for example 
those of Karl Mannheim. His general theory of the relationship between knowledge 
and the social structure centres upon a study of the social and existential 
determination of actual thinking. He argued that, 
"On the one hand, it (the sociology of knowledge) aims at discovering 
workable criteria for determining the interrelation between thought and 
action. On the other hand, by thinking this problem out from beginning 
to end in a radical, unprejudiced manner, it hopes to develop a theory, 
...... concerning the slgrnficance of the non-theoretical conditioning 
factors in knowledge." (1929: 264) 
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was motivated by the need for knowledge in the 
scientific guidance of politics. Social structure is his leading theoretical notion; all 
other things else in the discussion support it. Mannheim defined the social structure in 
terms of 'social classes' and 'social groups'. But social class membership is not defined 
by relationship to the means of production, as is the case in Marxist theory. On the 
contrary social classes are defined in terms of 'power relations' (including economic 
and political power), prestige, and social status. As for social groups, Mannheim stated 
that: 
"by these groups we mean not merely classes, as a dogmatic type of 
Marxism would have it, but also generations, status groups, sects, 
occupational groups, schools, etc." (1929: 248) 
Mental productions correspond to the social structure. But not all knowledge is, for 
Mannheim ideological; only the non-natural sciences in their qualitative or 
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interpretive senses are so. These include, the social sciences. historical kno\vledge. and 
weltanschauungen (the total world outlook of a social group or social class). 
Mannheim conceived ideology in two senses: the 'particular', and the 'to tar . The 
former comprises, all those utterances the falsity of which "is due to ...... deluding of 
self or of others". The particular conception of ideology refers to specific assertions 
which may be regarded as concealments, falsifications, or lies. The total conception of 
ideology on the other hand, is a 'Weltanschauung', a total world-outlook of a social 
class or social group. Mannheim claimed that "the use of the term ideology in the 
sociology of knowledge is completely free from any moral connotation. The total 
conception of ideology is the subject-matter of the sociology of knowledge. 
Consequently, he replaced ideology with the term 'perspective'. For Mannheim, a 
perspective is a person's or group's general or whole mode of conceiving things as 
determined by their historical as well as the social setting. Mannheim hoped, through 
his sociology of knowledge, to realise the best perspective for understanding the world. 
A further basic distinction is that between an 'ideology' and a 'utopia'. 'Ideology' 
appears as thoughts or mental productions of those social classes and groups that have 
an interest in preserving the present form of society and their power position in it. A 
utopia on the other hand, is of its nature idealistic. It is any mental production which is 
produced by those classes and groups who are marginalised from power, and so suffer 
frustrations from the existing form of society. Utopian ideas are in essence anti status-
quo, and they constitute an ideal picture of a form of society appropriate to the 
interests of the marginalised social classes and groups. 
Mannheim claimed that his ideas are not utopian. His theory attempts "to overcome 
the vague, ill-considered, and sterile form of relativism with regard to scientific 
knowledge which is increasingly prevalent today" (1929: 237). He believes that his 
sociology of knowledge escapes relativism because it is relationist. 'Relationism' holds 
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that all knowledge is socially conditioned and its validity is linked to the social 
structure through the notion of its instrumentality within a given social entity. 
'Relationism' however, does not avoid the pitfalls and problems of relativism discussed 
earlier (4: 74 - 81). Criteria will still be needed to determine, for example, which 
knowledge is 'most relevant for the scientific guidance of politics'. Mannheim's social 
epistemology, for all its attempts to avoid vulgar relativism, still embodies a yearning 
for the Archimedian position. 
One significant aspect of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is his espousal of the 
idea of a free floating intelligentsia. It is possible he believes, to achieve 'undistorted' 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge which is unaffected by the social conditions of its producers. 
He suggested that, by means of a 'synthesis' of different perspectives, and 'determining 
the best perspective' by a relational analysis, undistorted knowledge will emerge. 
Mannheim had no hesitation in assigning the role of discovering this undistorted 
knowledge to what he saw as the "free-floating intelligentsia". The intellectuals are 
best disposed to attain unbiased knowledge because, unlike any other social category, 
they do not have a distinctive social class position. This lack of attachment to 
particular group interests is explained by their own mode of education and procedures 
of recruitment and by their professional qualities, especially their capacity for rational 
criticism of all views including the ones they themselves hold. This lack of attachment 
to any social interest group is what makes the intellectuals free-floating. 
Not withstanding the influence that Mannheim had on the sociology of knowledge his 
ideas are in need of appraisal. Mannheim's account cannot escape relativism: so his 
idea of the 'free-floating intelligentsia' is far from compelling. Intellectuals do not rise, 
Phoenix-like, from the given structures of a society; they too have an education which, 
ex-hypothesi embodies such social conflicts. Mannheim fails to follow up the arguments 
that can pn"ma facie be brought against a theory that allows a socially detached class of 
intellectuals and yet insists on the fundamental connection between social structure 
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and the production of knowledge. Mannheim is, himself a good example of a nonfree-
floating intellectual, since his sociology of knowledge is grounded in a concern for the 
guidance of specific forms of society, for example the Weimer Republic. It is the 
strong, not weak attachment to that form of society, which he felt was being threatened 
by conflicting political tendencies, that motivated him to theorise about the sociology 
of knowledge. In developing his own theory of the intellectuals, Mannheim is misled 
by these interests into creating a space for the production of knowledge outside the 
context of society and history. 
Science and scientific knowledge, are dependent on society in, at least, the generative 
sense. For example, the economic, political, and social demands of a technological 
society provide the motivation for the specific pieces of scientific research. Research 
into the origins of the universe (for example, big-bang theory) is a mark of an 
economically-advanced society willing to await an economic pay-off from the activities 
of its scientists. Its wealth may be such that it is willing to accept a gap between 
research and the determination of a functional role for the results of that research, but 
such it will anticipate and expect for example, in future technological advances. 
Mannheim's reference to the capacity of the intellectuals to produce different 
arguments in support of different perspectives, may be justified if this is restricted to a 
point about their critical powers. It does not support the claim that they (necessarily) 
have weak social attachments. They are not free-floating in the sense of being 
disinterested philosophical spectators of all time and eternity; they are not Platonic 
guardians. For his sociology of knowledge allows no logical space for such 
guardianship. 
Mannheim's thesis offers a range of possibilities for the examination of the ideology of 
educational knowledge that are more specific than Marxist categories. For example 
the concept of 'social groups'. These are of particular relevance to explaining the 
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ideological nature of educational knowledge in certain societies in which cultural 
pluralism is an inescapable part of the definition of the social structure. But the 
internal structure and the weaknesses that I have schematically mapped out are 
sufficient to show that, Mannheim's ideas have but a limited contribution to make to 
the understanding of the ideology of educational knowledge as such. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MARX'S THEORY OF FETISHISM OF THE COMl\;IODITY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
I have argued that Marx's and Mannheim's accounts of social determination of 
knowledge are not, of themselves, sufficient for an explanatory theory of the 
ideology of educational knowledge. That educational knowledge is ideological in 
virture of its relationship to the social structure is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of the ideology of educational knowledge. But the Marxist theory does 
provide the general framework from which to analyse and develop specific 
accounts of the ideological nature of educational knowledge. Since the Marxist 
theory of the social determination of knowledge does not give an adequate 
explanatory theory of the ideology educational knowledge, I shall, examine 
another of Marx's theories: the theory of the 'fetishism a/the commodity', to see if 
it can do the work. Marx's theory of the fetishism of the commodity is however 
parasitic on other conceptions of that term. It is best understood therefore by 
means of reference to the pre-Marxist conception of 'fetishism'. 
2 THE TERM 'FETISHISM' 
The term 'fetishism' is both an anthropological (Cohen: 1978) and a 
psychological one (Carver: 1987). It is derived "from discourse about religion" 
(Taussig: 1980). A fetish religious or cultural object is vested with some -
apparent - powers that it, in fact, lacks. But the fetish object is perceived as being 
inherently endowed with those powers. Nevertheless they are mistakenly 
attributed to the object. The appearance of the fetish object is thought to be 
different from its essence. In its appearance the fetish object does seem to have 
such magical powers even though, in its essence, it lacks them. Whether or not 
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this relationship between the essential and the apparent characteristics of the 
fetish object is in some sense contradictory is an issue I shall address later. 
The power of the fetish object is seen in the precedence its appearance takes 
over its 'internal' or essential basis. Appearance takes precedence, in our 
superficial judgement(s) about the fetish object, over essence: the internal and 
fundamental qualities of the object without which it cannot be what it is - or 
indeed what it is claimed to be. It is important therefore that the fetish object is 
for all intents and purposes, presented and understood in terms of its appearance 
not its essence. Consequently the essence is hidden, supposedly concealed by the 
appearance. There is much more to the fetish object than that which appears on 
the surface. 
This idea of fetishism was employed by a number of philosophers, including 
Feuerbach (1957), when they criticised religion. For them, religion, which they 
considered as a perfected form of alienation, resides in fetishism. God, according 
to this critical tradition, was thought to be an invention of men, who assign 
powers to Him. But these powers are 'false' in the sense of being empty, non-
existent or mistakenly attributed since they are lacking in the religious object. 
The appearance of omnipotence and omniscience, is thought to conceal the 
essence of religion: a fear born of man's incapacity to properly grasp the laws of 
nature, social control, and so on. Religion, qua fetishism, is presented as non-
alienating; even though it is a creation of men, the religious object transforms 
itself into the master, and hence controls men, thereby alienating them from 
their own product or potentialities. 
I am concerned here with some conditions of fetishism. These are: concealment 
or hiding something with a view to deceive; disguising: hiding something but 
without the intent to deceive: and distortion: capacity for transforming the 
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essential character of an object by adversely affecting it in some manner. I am 
interested in these ideas as they are manifested in the production of educational 
knowledge. I shall not examine them in the contexts in which they are most 
commonly discussed, for example, religious, totemic and art objects. 
At their root anthropological and psychological fetishisms are activities in which 
men engage when seeking to explain their experiences of the world in which they 
live. An understanding of such activities requires theories of fetishising which 
place them within a social context; they have a special significance when seen in 
the context of the many activities in which men make use of, or attach a special 
importance to, objects. The theory of fetishism must be both social and holistic. 
Marx's theory - laden usage of the 'fetishism' concept meets these requirements. 
He uses the term in the context of the commodity-producing society which 
capitalism best exemplifies. Accordingly it is with regard to the social framework 
that Marx described the force of fetishism in the commodity i.e. he understood 
the concept holistically. 
Fetishism is then, essentially, a social notion. It is to be noted that my rejection 
of social determinist theory rests on grounds other than those I shall discuss in 
this chapter. One of the advantages of social determinism is that, it provides a 
social framework for ideology. The social relations of a commodity's production 
appear as objective characteristics stamped upon the product of their labour. A 
commodity is fetish since it is essentially a bundle of social relationships. So I 
take the theory of the fetishism of the commodity to be a form of social 
determinism, and so a plausible candidate for an account of the ideology of 
educational knowledge. The anthropological account of fetishism regarding the 
magical powers of a fetish object is not sufficient, though it is necessary for a 
theory of ideology. The anthropological use of fetishism is individualistic not 
holistic. It is not grounded in social theory. But the 'magical' powers of a fetish 
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object are not given. They derive their meanings by reference to a social context, 
and for this reason 'fetishism' must be located within a wider social and/or 
theoretical framework. 
Carver (1975) believed that Marx was concerned with laying "bare the anatomy 
of bourgeois society". Marx grounds his analysis into the social context within 
which people produce commodities and exchange them. So Marx's use of the 
theory of fetishism is holistic. Commodity production, can only be understood by 
taking into consideration the forms of society in which it is practised. The social 
context provides a sufficient condition for the proper understanding and 
application of the ideas entailed by fetishism. That is, the use of the doctrines of 
fetishism in explanation of social practices, or the ascription of non-existent 
powers to entities which do not possess them, is intimately related to the idea of 
a social structure. 
3 MARX'S QUALIFIED USE OF FETISHISM 
Carver (op cit) believes that, Marx used fetishism in the sense of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century anthropological conception of fetishism. The German 
translation (1842) of Charles de Brosses's (1785) work on fetishism had a strong 
influence on Marx. By employing Brosses's ideas of fetishism Marx sought to find 
an 'analogy' by taking a flight into the misty realm of religion. But he 
appropriated fetishism to his theory of history, and society, thereby locating it 
within his general theory. He held that in the realm of religion, 
"the products of the hum~ brain appear as a':ltonomo~s figu~es 
endowed with a life of theIr own, whIch enter Into relatIOns WIth 
each other and with the human race." (Capital: 1: 165) 
I understand the 'autonomous figures' to which reference is made here to mean 
inanimate objects. So Carver states that, for Marx, 
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"a fetish is an inanimate object worshipped on account of its 
alleg~q inherent magical powers, an object supposedly animated by 
a spint or god. Fetishism is thus the practice of worshipping such 
an idol." (1987: 81) (My emphasis) 
In the view of Marx, something very similar happens "with the products of men's 
hand", i.e., with commodities. Marx held that commodities are fetish because 
they are worshipped on account of their alleged magical powers. Like all fetish 
objects, commodities disguise their essence. I shall distinguish between A's 
disguising B, i.e. A's hiding B in the absence of any intention on the part of an 
agent to deceive, and A's concealing B in which case an intention to deceive is 
involved. 
Marx argued for the primacy of the commodity in his analysis of capitalism. 
Mandel (1986) in an introduction to Capital Vol 1 argued that, 
"Just as surplus-value and capital emerge logically 
from an analysis of value and exchange-value, so too 
does the capitalist mode of production emerge 
historically from the growth of commodity 
production: without production no capitalism can 
come into existence" (1986: 14) 
Marx held that both 'use-value' (the use to which an object is put) and 'exchange-
value' (its capacities for generating capital) are necessary to the understanding 
the role of a commodity in a capitalist society, since in such a society, 
commodities are produced as economic and social units. Commodities are the 
elementary forms of the wealth of capitalist societies (Dobb: 1973: 27); 
commodity production and distribution, are at the heart of the capitalist form of 
society. 
A Marxist commodity is defined as "an object outside us that by its properties 
satisfies human wants of some sort or another" (Fischer: 1970: 53). Accordingly 
Marx chose to speak of the fetishism of the commodity (Capital 1: 1: 4: 163 -77). 
As he puts it, 
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"thi~ fetishism of the world of commodities arises from the peculiar 
SOCIal character of the labour which produces them." (ibid: 165) 
It is axiomatic for Marx that a commodity has both a 'use' and 'exchange' value, 
i.e. its value resides in its satisfying human needs and (in a capitalist society) its 
having a value in a market. The commodity, said Marx, 
"appears, at first sight, an extremely obvious, trivial thing. But its 
analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." (ibid: 163) 
This suggests that there are secrets beneath a commodity's appearance. In this 
case, a commodity for exchange, is offered in such a way that it conceals its real 
or essential qualities. I shall comment in due course on whether or not the 
attribution of this quality to a commodity is intelligible. 
Marx claimed that under capitalism, commodities are fetish objects. His aim is to 
demystify the fetishism of the commodities, the attribution of fetish powers to 
commodities. A commodity in a capitalist society is made to distort social 
realities by changing the form of things: i.e. the social relations of production 
hidden in the commodity. The commodity's appearance differs from its social 
essence so much so that what is readily visible in the commodity is its immediate 
appearance rather than the actual essence. The social relations necessary for its 
production and the central aspect in the light of which its production is justified, 
i.e. generation of surplus-value are hidden. Only the immediate appearance of 
the commodity is visible, and it is so in an innocent way. 
A commodity is, for Marx, a mysterious object and so it has to be demystified. 
Each commodity has a "use-value": a utility. But Marx cautioned that, "the 
mystical character of the commodity does not ..... arise from its use-value" (ibid: 
164). "Exchange-value" is the necessary requirement for commodity fetishism by 
reference to which its mystical and mysterious characters are to be understood. 
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A commodity is significant in a capitalist economy mainly owing to its exchange-
value: it is a source of capital generation. It is, according to Marx, the exchange-
value of the commodity which gives it a central place in capitalist economy and 
society. Commodities as exchange-values create the possibility of a commercial 
relationship between the producer (the supplier), the distributor and the 
consumer. These capitalist agents are bound together by the laws of exchange, 
which leads to capital generation for the producer and the distributor, and some 
satisfaction, use-value, for the consumer. So the idea of 'exhange-value' 
presupposes that of 'use-value'. In the commodity-producing societies, the act of 
exchange is at the heart of the economy. 
A commodity for exchange in a market is however a product of labour. It is 
central to Marx's economic thought that, "as soon as men start to work for one 
other in any way, their labour assumes a social form" (ibid: 164). Articles of 
utility become commodities mainly because they are products of labour. But a 
commodity does not portray, in its appearance, the social conditions of its 
production or, more specifically, the contradictory relationships between labour 
and capital or wages and surplus-value (for example profit). These relationships 
are however, central and in fact indispensable to its production (and 
distribution), i.e. its exchange-value. Accordingly Marx argued that, 
"The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists 
therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social 
characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of 
the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties 
of these things" (ibid: 165-6). 
Even though a commodity is the product of labour which is basically social in 
character, it is able, when supplied to the market, for exchange. to transform 
those social relationships which are necessary and indispensable for its creation, 
into relations between one object and another. The physical appearance of the 
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commodity though, unassuming nevertheless disguises the social relations of its 
production. The commodity, as an exchange-value, thus 
"appears as the quantitative relation, .... in which use-values of one 
sort are exchanged for use-values of another sort, a relation which 
changes continually with time and place. Hence exchange-value 
seems something accidental and purely relative; an exchange-value 
immanent and in, inside the commodi!), .... seems therefore, a 
contradictio in adjecto". (Carver: op cit: 43) 
That is, a commodity qua exchange-value is a contradiction between a thing and 
what is attributed to it. The commodity nonetheless disguises the social 
relationships between men by assuming, according to Marx, "in their eyes, the 
fantastic form of a relations between things" (Capital: op cit: 165), between two 
objects in the process of exchange. 
The commodity remains, in its appearance, an unambiguous object. But even 
though its value is 'basically' (though not exclusively) a creation of labour, it does 
not reveal this in its appearance. Its external qualities of satisfying given wants, 
as well as generating surplus-value, are projected at the expense of an 
understanding the alienating conditions, under which it is produced and 
distributed, guided by the demands of the market (by, for example, profit). As an 
exchange-value, the commodity states an arbitrary relation for when 
commodities are exchanged, the assumption is that some interchangeable 
exchange-values of equal quantities are being traded. But this is not the case 
because the exchange process disguises the amounts of social labour invested in 
the production of the commodity as being equal. So, in so far as the commodities 
have exchange-values, they are not themselves exchange-values and presenting 
them as such is giving a false and disguising picture. 
The commodity is presented in such a way that its physical appearance indicates 
or shows only half of the true picture. Value, Marx held, can only be created by 
human labour. (This view has often been criticised by for example Elster, 1986). 
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But the commodity in exchange 'disguises' the contradictions in the social 
relationship between labour (the workers) and the product on one hand, and 
labour and capital (the so-called producers and distributors) on the other hand. 
This antagonistic relationship is disguised to such effect that not even workers, 
whose exploitation is so disguised, can discern that it is so. Marx goes on to 
claim: 
"It is nothing but the definite social relation between men 
themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things" (Capital: ibid: 165). 
By means of this transformation of its essence into a seemingly subjective social 
reality, the commodity is made to appear as being primarily a relation between 
objects "which exist apart from and outside the producers", a member of 'alien 
world of objects'. Those relations, which are man's own products, come to rule 
over him, to "take a life of their own." 
As an object for exchange subject to the laws of the market, the commodity 
appears as an innocent means of realising surplus-value on the one hand, and 
use-value on the other. For the producer who supplies it to the market it is 
important in so far as it remains a source of surplus-value i.e. profit or capital. 
The producer and the distributor supply the commodity to the market essentially 
as an object of exchange-value, with its potential for raising capital and surplus-
value. For the consumer it is crucial only because it is of use-value. He accepts it 
for what he believes its capacity for satisfying his wants is worth. Neither of the 
two agents brought together by the commodity in a transaction (the producer 
and the consumer) see in it any other quality or characteristic beyond these. 
In sum: the commodity is made to appear to have certain powers - those of 
presenting its possible use-values - as a result of which it is produced and 
exchanged. But its production and exchange are necessarily social in character, 
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i.e. some social relations of production and exchange are indispensable to its 
being. So the conditions of exchange take priority, in the doctrine of the fetishism 
of the commodity, over use-values. Nevertheless 'use-value' is integral to the 
theory of commodity fetishism even if its import is less significant than that of 
exchange-value. The latter is central to the capitalist form of society the analysis 
and overthrowing of which was Marx's chief concern. The theory of commodity 
fetishism focuses upon the powers and appearance of the fetish object; the 
identification and analysis of these presuppose a reference to value judgements. 
This is because people and their beliefs (i.e. their belief about what is in their 
interests) rather than the commodity itself, are the subject of the theory. In the 
production of educational knowledge, the subjects of analysis are the beliefs and 
interests of people as social actors rather than educational knowledge as such. 
The essential features of commodity fetishism that I intend to employ in the 
course of this discussion (especially 8: 138 - 46 and 9: 147 - 59) are as follows. 
First: the claim to the 'magical powers' of the fetish object; it is in virtue of these 
powers that its appearance disguises its essence. There is a contradiction in a 
fetish object between its essence and its appearance. Second: the social character 
of the human labour which characterises the production of the fetish object is 
central in this regard. Third: the idea of the capacity of the fetish object to 
transcend a use-value and become, in addition to that, an exchange-value. This is 
of significance since the secrets of a fetish object can best be appraised in the 
light of its being an exchange-value. Every object may have a use-value, but not 
all objects have exchange-values. Fetish objects always combine the two features 
in themselves. Fourth: the distinction between appearance and reality which is 
immanent in the fetish object; I shall argue however, that this distinction is not to 
be understood as deliberate deception. 
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As Carver claimed, Marx's arguments for commodity fetishism "are philosophical 
and logical in character, and are most effectively interpreted and challenged as 
such" (1975: 39). I follow him in this. I shall now attempt to assess the values of 
the theory of commodity fetishism for this study. I suggest that its relevance to 
the production of educational knowledge may have to be assessed in the light of 
its key characteristics of alienation and distortion. What now is required is an 
examination of the linkage between commodity fetishism and ideology, in the 
light of which the respects in which the theory makes space for ideological 
explanation, may be assessed. 
4 FETISHISM OF THE COMMODI1Y AND IDEOLOGY 
An anthropological fetish object has an idealistic shell, the quality of a spirit. Its 
physical appearance is different from its essence. As Cohen says "to make 
something fetish is to invest it with a power it does not in itself have" (1978: 115). 
By means of the power invested into it, a fetish object is made to distort its real 
essence in favour of a projected appearance which is, for all practical purposes, a 
false attribute. The powers of a fetish object are therefore illusory. 
Carver (1987) and Larrain (1979) believe that ideology can be explained in terms 
of its fetish character. Ideologies and fetishism both misrepresent, though not 
intentionally, the world, and so undermine our understanding of it. A fetish 
object necessarily distorts and disguises reality (though not, as I have indicated, 
deliberately). On this account, therefore, the fetish account of religion and 
ideology does not depend on the ideas of a "priestly deceit" ( viz Bacon's "idols") 
or "a princely deceit" (viz Machiavelli's "Prince"). Fetishism is the attribution of a 
quality to an object which it does not possess. Those who make this attribution 
do not, or at least need not, intend to deceive. Ideology, in the view of Law 
(1986), both "distorts and conceals" but unintentionally. On this account fetishism 
is but one expression of the ideological phenomenon. 
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One way of making a case for fetishism as ideology is by means of the thought 
that both misrepresent the world but in different ways. Whilst ideology does this 
by both concealment and distortion, only disguise characterises fetishism. 
Ideology - or at least some accounts of ideology - makes some place for 
conspiracy theory and deceit: the concealment of social essence through a view 
of what is in the interests of a given population. Ideology certainly misrepresents 
reality; this is however not plain deception. So not all misrepresentations are 
ideological: deceit, mistaken beliefs, lies are not necessarily so. There may be of 
course, a conspiracy to deceive as when a dicatator seeks to promote false beliefs 
concerning the actual military build up in a country. A conspiracy which involves 
X's deliberately acting against Y's interests is not a feature of commodity 
fetishism; it is the presentation of the object which characterises fetishism and 
the outcome of ideology to which I claim it is central. An object of fetishism such 
as a commodity in exchange cannot itself possess the feature of intentionally 
setting out to deceive in a bid to promote one view of the world at the expense of 
others with which it is in contest. Fetishising is to be identified in the presentation 
of the object by social agents and an intent to deceive is not necessarily an 
element of that. So the intent to misrepresent reality is to be attributed, not to 
the object itself but to the mode of its presentation, or projection, (i.e. its 
appearance) by human agents. In other words it is attributable to the 
intentionality of agents who make and offer the object to the market. The 
knowledge produced in an educational system may be attributed with powers 
which it, in reality lacks. But the fetishism of that knowledge consists in its 
manner of production and presentation by, for example, those who hold position 
of power in the state. Thus in cases where knowledge is used to conceal the 
essence in its appearance, individual parties to its production and dissemination 
but not the fetish object in question, carry the responsibility for the concealment. 
(Objects as such, including knowledge, being unpossessed of intentionality are 
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ipso facto unpossessed of the intentions to distort, deceive, etc.) The account of 
ideology as entailing the misrepresentation of the world by reference to biases 
for, or against the interests of some specific collectives (see chapter 3: 85 - 91), is 
consistent with the main features of this modified account of the theory of 
commodity fetishism. 
So the theory of the fetishism of the commodity will be employed in preference 
to the thesis that sees ideology of educational knowledge in terms of social 
determination alone. The account of the fetishism of educational knowledge will 
be seen not to strictly conform to the account of the nature of commodity (and 
capital) fetishism. Educational knowledge, I shall argue, is ideological by being 
fetish in that different curricular proposals represent certain favoured views of 
what is in the interest of for example, a state, or a party within it. They disguise 
other interests of other, rival parties. So the theory of the ideology of educational 
knowledge to be developed here will make some modifications of the Marxist 
original. Only then can a less ambitious, as opposed to a strong theory of the 
ideology of educational knowledge, be offered. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EDUCATIONAL K1~OWLEDGE AND THE ~IARXIST COMMODITY 
1 THREE CONDITIONS OF FETISHISM OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The conditions required by the theory of the fetishism of the commodity may be 
summed up as follows. First: the commodity as a fetish object characteristically 
possesses both use-value and exchange-value. Educational knowledge, I shall 
argue, is similar to a Marxist commodity, i.e. a commodity as described in Marx's 
theory of fetishism. I shall call this 'the commodity condition' for the fetishism of 
educational knowledge. 
Second: there is a distinction to be made between the essence and appearance of 
a commodity. I shall argue that the appearance of educational knowledge 
disguises its essence. Educational knowledge is an object whose appearance 
disguises the social relationships and so the social essence which is necessary for 
its production and dissemination. This I shall refer to as 'the disguise condition' of 
the fetishism of educational knowledge. 
Third: certain 'magical powers' are attributed to the fetish object. These are 
illusory; the object possesses no such powers. Alleged parallel powers in the case 
of educational knowledge are located in the connection between the acquisition 
of knowledge and action. In reality, I shall argue, educational knowledge either 
lacks these powers, or if present, they are limited and cannot independently 
account for the actions of those who have acquired such knowledge. I shall refer 
to the third claim as the 'alleged powers condition' of the fetishism of educational 
knowledge. 
The three conditions taken collectively gtve the theory of the fetishism of 
educational knowledge. I shall elaborate on the extent to which each of them 
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holds in this and the following two chapters. But I shall in this chapter pay 
particular attention to the commodity condition. 
2 THE COMMODIIT CONDITION 
Educational knowledge is in two senses - those of generation and dissemination -
an object which is similar to a commodity. This view does not entail that 
educational knowledge is itself a material commodity such as is manufactured in 
a factory. 
2.1 THE GENERATIVE SENSE 
There are social bases which are central to the production of educational 
knowledge and in the light of which its fetishism will be first considered. Social 
conditions and social relationships are fundamental and indispensable in the 
course of the production of educational knowledge. The social conditions include 
the shared values and beliefs, the economic and political structures, insututional 
arrangements and the class structure. I argued elsewhere (Indabawa: 1988) that, 
there is no education without society, for the basic reason that any society seeks 
to survive and reproduce itself in the next generation and education is one of the 
most potent of social activities for accomplishing this (Bourdeiu: 1977, Apple: 
1982). 
In so far as educational knowledge plays a supporting, mediating, or even 
revolu tionary role in relation to the form of a society at a particular time and 
place, it cannot but take a social form. That is because it is defined, designed and 
transmitted on the basis of the demands of the institutions, sub-structures and 
processes of the prevailing society. There is a widespread, basic agreement 
amongst researchers of various political leanings over this basic claim. For 
example, Young (1971). Bowles and Gintis (1976), Harris (1979), Giroux (1981, 
1983, 1988) etc. have, in various ways. put forward this familiar argument. 
130 
Both a (Marxist) commodity and educational knowledge therefore. share a 
common feature: both are generated by the prevailing society. The nature of the 
interaction between the two is both controversial and contestable. Much depends 
for example, on the way in which 'educational knowledge' is defined. The 
commodities that Marx describes are produced by a capitalist form of society. 
Educational knowledge is produced by all societies that have formal or informal 
educational arrangements. However a clearer understanding of the fetishism of 
educational knowledge emerges when a form of society is specified. 
2.2 THE DISSEMINATION SENSE 
The force of the claim that educational knowledge is a commodity is given more 
clearly by the dissemination than the generative sense. The knowledge that is 
transmitted in schools, has both a use-value, and an exchange-value; such, in a 
capitalist society are determined by the kind of exchanges that I shall describe in 
this chapter. I wish to emphasise, however, that I am only concerned with these 
aspects of the Marxist economic theory, for a limited purpose: to consider the 
bases for a just comparison between a Marxist commodity and educational 
knowledge, as a means to understanding the sense(s) in which educational 
knowledge is ideological. 
i Educational Knowledie as a Use-value 
Bowles and Gintis (1976) and Sharp (1980) among others, have argued that 
education, in a capitalist society, is a commodity. They had in mind that 
education, in all societies, is an institutional object to be understood within an 
institutional context. The basic purpose of all educational systems, in all forms of 
society is the teaching and learning of particular values, attitudes, beliefs, skills, 
and so on. As these all have use-values, so does the educational knowledge they. 
severally constitute. 
131 
Educational knowledge has personal and social returns for individuals and for 
the state. Knowledge, attitudes and values must be continuously reproduced; the 
first aim of any society is to survive in the next generation. It is fundamentally for 
this reason that educational knowledge, in general has a use-value. 
ii Exchange. Exchange-value and Educational Knowledge 
The state officially defines and sanctions educational objectives as well as the 
educational knowledge deemed necessary for their attainment. The fundamental 
and directive principles of the state are expressed in the educational objectives, 
which in turn bear on the selection of the relevant items of knowledge for 
transmission to pupils. Educational knowledge is disseminated in the schools 
with a view to shaping the attitudes and outlooks of pupils as members of the 
next generation. The state thus seeks to recover (2: 41 - 2) its aims and objectives 
in the promotion of its interests which, of course, it will represent as the interests 
of all its citizens. 
The claims made above suggest a form of exchange. There is here presupposed, 
a market, some economic agents (producers, distributors, consumers), and 
articles of exchange, products like commodities. The market may be specified by 
reference to the institutional frameworks of the educational system; so I shall 
call it, the educational market. The producers in this market are dominated by 
the state, which is an instrument for the rule of a dominant social collective and 
its corresponding interest structure. The definitions of the fundamental 
principles, ideals and objectives of state policy, including education, are derived 
from these perceived interests. The producers also include the educational policy 
makers, whose chief task is to draw up guidelines for curricula design. There are 
also 'experts': subject specialists and academics and professional researchers in 
government (or related) institutions. The experts, on the basis of the given 
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guidelines, select, organize, and codify the specific items deemed necessary to 
the attainment of the directive principles and their consequent objectives. The 
teachers distribute educational knowledge. The consumers are mainly the pupils. 
The chief articles of trade in the educational market are beliefs, social values, 
attitudes, skills, all of which constitute educational knowledge. These are all, as I 
hope to show, grounds for believing that educational knowledge is a fetish 
commodity and thus ideological. 
Also operating in this market are instruments of exchange. Monetary tools are 
amongst these, but they are neither the only, nor are they the main instruments 
of exchange. Public finance (taxation, different types of levies, public revenue, 
etc) and/ or private investment are necessary for the production and 
dissemination of educational knowledge. Not only will the educational market be 
a feature of a capitalist society, it will also characterise socialist states and even 
command economies. The objectives of the educational enterprise and the 
educational knowledge by means of which such objectives are attained, are 
consumed and recovered through the distributive networks of the educational 
market. So the process of exchange takes place over the long-term and must be 
contrasted with exchanges of a material commodity (including capital). In this 
kind of exchange the purchase is paid not necessarily in kind but also attitudes, 
i.e. by promoting in the long term, the desired form of society and all it entails. 
Educational knowledge is produced and exchanged for the chief purpose that its 
recipients shall play one functional role or another in the promotion of the basic 
principles, aims and objectives of the dominant social collective (i.e. class or 
group). The directive principles and fundamental objectives enshrined in the 
educational knowledge are meant to be recovered in exchange for opportunities 
for personal enhancement, e.g. good job placement, particularly in the elitist 
non-manual sector which attracts higher income and prestige. To obtain 
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commodities of a higher exchange-value it is necessary to subscribe to the 
dominant view of what is in the collective interest. 
In such an educational exchange the students are rewarded with diplomas 
(degrees, certificates, testimonials, etc), that may qualify them both for higher 
educational tasks and better social and economic opportunities. So in the long-
run such a market is supposed to improve the quality of lives of individuals and 
existing society. Underlying all these transactions in the educational market are 
powerful assumptions made about liberalism, meritocracy and equality of 
opportunity, that are alleged to characterise the educational, as well as, the 
larger market in liberal, capitalist societies. 
Various assumptions are made within such a long-term educational exchange. 
One is that, educational knowledge is capable of bringing about certain states of 
affairs, which would not otherwise be achieved. Another is that, some of the 
consumers (who indicate a capacity to re-pay the state in the future, i.e. those 
who pass the required examinations) are automatically rewarded, through their 
diplomas, with varied opportunities for self-enhancement, such as upward social 
mobility. Of course the presuppositions can be contested at theoretical and 
empirical levels. Here I am concerned with the educational market and its form 
of commodity exchange. 
Educational knowledge in many cases may provide, and be the repository of, the 
skills, know-how, values and so on: necessary qualities for the functioning and 
survival of a particular society and economy. This claim is particularly true of a 
commodity producing capitalist form of society. Educational knowledge can be 
seen as a commodity, in the simple sense of generating surplus-value. But what is 
most crucial is that educational knowledge is a productive power which serves 
further social ends, and these are ends which are fundamental constituents of the 
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prevailing society. It may be offered to the market for exchange, for example in 
private fee-paying schools. It serves a dual purpose: it both plays a role in the 
creation of surplus-value for the proprietors of fee-paying schools and works as a 
long-term exchange of values, attitudes, skills etc, required for the perpetuation 
of the form of society favoured by the state. 
On such a system of exchange the pay-off or the returns of educational 
knowledge resides in the furtherance of the dominant national interests. The 
state sets out to promote whatever it conceives of as being in the national 
interests by means of its specification of educational knowledge. Hence it places 
a premium upon education as the specific context and instrument for the 
dissemination of those interests. Recoverability of these fundamental goals is the 
raison d' etre of the production and dissemination (or exchange) of educational 
knowledge. In this process resides the exchange-value of educational knowledge. 
Without it, the state would have scant concern for the education of its citizens. A 
point of caution is necessary here: the proprietors of private schools are clearly 
not themselves the direct producers of educational knowledge, as are 
manufacturers of material objects. Nonetheless, most proprietors of private 
schools belong to the dominant social collective on the basis of whose interest 
structure educational knowledge is selected. This may not be true in some cases, 
as in the case of the proprietors of private religious schools such as the Islamic 
schools or their Christian counterparts in Nigeria. Such schools operate under 
the specific guidance of the state. But even in such a situation, the teaching of 
non-sanctioned (so technically non-educational) knowledge which threatens 
those of the dominant interest structure can be controlled. The censorship of the 
curriculum and administration of private (especially religious) private schools 
introduced in Kano State of Nigeria, illustrates the point being made here. 
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All political states incorporate the dominant interests they represent but 
frequently, nevertheless appeal to other interests in formulating and legitimating 
their educational policies. States take some account of significant, though 
literally non-dominant interest groups in determining the educational knowledge 
to be designed and taught. For example the emergence of state schooling from 
the system of factory training and apprenticeship in the advanced capitalist 
societies coincided with the growth and sophistication of capitalism, and its 
corresponding political agenda. These, in turn, stimulated futher democratic 
demands such as universal adult suffrage and more generally, increased 
participation in the institutions of liberal-democratic societies. 
Similarly the use of education in general, and educational knowledge in 
particular, for instrumental purposes in developing third world societies 
coincided with demands for the expansion of the capitalist mode of production 
which is superceding its pre-capitalist varieties. The emphasis by the state on 
training scientists and technologists, for example, as the corner-stone of Nigeria's 
national policy on education (1981) supports this claim. It should here be 
emphasised that this general point i.e. those who acquire the educational 
knowledge should accept the dominant values of the given society, is true of 
capitalism as for other forms of society. So for example, in a theocratic society 
such as Iran or Ireland, the basic idea being argued here still holds. 
The theory of the exchange-value of educational knowledge has, then, general 
application. Irrespective of the prevailing form of society within which the state 
exercises the instruments of government the state itself is still a fetish object 
because it is an institution that uses, in carrying out the tasks of education, the 
members of a particular interest structure. The state's policies and actions are 
not those of the whole society in whose name, they are conducted. They are 
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essentially policies that are favourable to the ruling or dominant interest 
structure. 
In sum: educational knowledge is an important article for exchange in many 
societies. But it is, in the strict sense, different from material commodities of 
exchange, such as are found in the classic examples of capitalist societies. This 
kind of exchange is significantly different from the one which characterises the 
commodity markets. 
Unlike a material commodity the goals and objectives of educational knowledge 
are not limited to the generation of surplus-value (in the short-term) and the 
realisation of a use-value for the individual alone. In reality the actual goals of 
educational knowledge transcend the normal exchange-value. Capitalist 
societies, for example, use the production and distribution of educational 
knowledge to create a submissive work force (Althusser: 1969). In non- or part-
capitalist societies the exchange- value of educational knowledge consists in the 
socialisation of young people into the dominant interest structures and so its 
survival in the next generation. In both individual and social cases educational 
knowledge is fetish. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE: APPEARANCE DISGUISES ESSENCE 
1 DISGUISING THE ESSENCE OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
I follow Marx in holding that 'essence' refers to the necessary (social) conditions 
of the existence of an object, while the 'appearance' is determined by the basic 
conditions of an object's use. I shall argue that educational knowledge, by the 
processes of its production and presentation, tends to disguise its social essence. 
It is the appearance more than any thing else which accounts for the confidence 
that the state, and people in general, repose in educational knowledge i.e. its 
totality. 
Educational knowledge IS, through its production and dissemination, 
transformed and its resulting appearance therefore disguises the basic conditions 
under which it is produced. Yet, in line with the proposed modification of Marx's 
doctrine (see 6: 119 - 26), educational knowledge does not, of its nature 
transform anything because it is itself an object, not an agent or an aspect of 
agency. The process by which its essence is transformed into appearance is 
important in this regard. There are two different interpretations of this theory of 
transformation. The first is that the essence contradicts the reality. The second is 
that the essence appears as, and therefore is, different from the reality. I claim 
that the relationship is one of difference (i.e. contrariety) and not contradiction, 
i.e., it is not a logical one such as was used by Marxists in addressing material 
commodities. I shall therefore argue that educational knowledge is presented in 
such a way that the appearance is different from, and not contradictory to, its 
essence. Issues in the dissemination of educational knowledge will be important 
here. 
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I shall argue that the aspects of the use - and exchange-values of educational 
knowledge provide the general conditions for its fetishism. The basic proposition 
here is that, educational knowledge has both values but, as I argued earlier, in 
different ways from the respects in which material commodity has both. 
It is by considering the network of social relationships at the levels of the 
production and dissemination of educational knowledge, that its ideology (or 
even the different forms that that ideology takes in different societies) may be 
located. Those networks of relationships are disguised by the appearance (i.e. the 
features) of educational knowledge. The appearance conveys the message that 
the essence of educational knowledge is to be located in the relationships 
between objects. So, for example, the essence of what we teach in schools is to be 
located, inter alia, in the relationship between educational knowledge and 
certification; the certificate is taken to be a reliable indicator of capabilities and 
performances, both of which are understood in terms of the acquisition of 
educational knowledge. Passing examinations then appears as the essence of 
educational knowledge. Such appears, by virtue of the presentation of 
educational knowledge in schools, to take priority over any other process, 
activity, or end. It is in this regard, for example, to the relationship between 
educational knowledge as one about certification and another, that the 
appearance of educational knowledge disguises its social essence. Beneath such a 
disguise however, lay the basic goals and objectives of educational knowledge as 
conceived, designed and articulated by the state or its representatives. 
That disguise is similar to the ways in which the social essence of a material 
commodity is said by Marx to be transformed into a relationship between 
objects: a commodity or capital for example. 
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2 DISGUISE OR CONCEAL~tE~l 
The relationship between educational knowledge as a commodity (one object) 
and a certificate (another object) is often emphasised. So its essence appears as a 
certificate or certification). I have argued that its essence is social and goes far 
beyond the acquisition of one or more diplomas. This social essence is 
manifested in the holder's economic role and so more generally his or her social 
roles in the society. The appearance nonetheless takes priority in the public mind 
over the social relationships which are necessary for the very existence of 
educational knowledge. The social essence behind the production and 
dissemination of educational knowledge is thus hidden. Whether or not this 
hiding is 'deceptive', i.e. intentional, will be argued in due course. I here 
emphasise that the immediate form or appearance of educational knowledge 
hides its social and political essence. Such appearance plays a role in stabilising 
and promoting the particular form of society that is agreeable to, and is in 
consonance with, the prevailing dominant structure of interests. However, 
because of the fetishism involved here, contradictions begin to emerge. Such 
contradictions for example, created education in the colonial states of Africa and 
led to the emergence of agitations against the colonial states. This was so in the 
Gold Coast (Ghana) and Nigeria when disenchanted elites supported and indeed 
promoted Nkrumah's and Azikiwe's decolonisation struggles. It has been 
suggested that the role of these colonial elites in the post-colonial states of 
Ghana and Nigeria, was more in line with the maintenance of the fundamental 
elements of the state. (But this suggestion is consistent with the view that those 
fundamental elements were parties to the disguise). 
It is the network of social relationships which is transformed into a relationship 
between educational knowledge as an object, and various educational practices 
such as testing or examining or (corresponding) objects such as certificates. For 
example, the supposed mastery of educational knowledge is taken to be 
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evidenced by passes or failures in examinations and tests. Educational knowledge 
is accordingly made to disguise the relationships within which context its social 
essence, and so its ideology are to be uncovered. In Nigeria for example, passing 
the General Certificate of Education is considered to be the main immediate 
goal of all those engaged in secondary school education. A fundamental link is 
presumed to exist between passing the GCE and the achievement of the 
educational objectives which themselves fetishise the social contradictions 
among the conflicting collectives in Nigeria. The transformed relationships 
constitute a diversion from focussing on the social relationships involved in the 
production and dissemination of educational knowledge, issues which are crucial 
to understanding its essence in that state. 
When the Conservative government in Britain insists on testing seven year olds 
in the interest of quality production such testing is 'unconsciously' disguising the 
essence of educational knowledge. That is, the social network that determines 
educational knowledge is here transformed into a relationship between the 
testing and the grades. All efforts are then geared towards passing the tests and 
obtaining good grades. In this process the aim which appears on the surface takes 
priority over the social ends of KeyStage 1 testing. It in fact disguises the latter 
because emphasis on testing and examination fetishise the social contradictions 
hidden by educational knowledge. So the actual essence of educational 
knowledge is fetishised. By uncovering the fetishism involved here, the disguised 
relations become clear, the social essence of the fetish object is laid bare. 
Though tests are intended to measure the pupils' attainments, this cannot be 
done without due consideration of the social relations between the social and 
like-conditions of pupils and teachers, as well as the relationships between the 
state and schooling in terms of the provision of conditions and facilities which 
are necessary for high attainment. Without this the tests end up by fetishising 
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educational knowledge. Tests in relation to educational knowledge are fetish. 
They are neither ends in themselves nor do they necessarily indicate the quality 
of the instruction received by the pupils. Realising that this is the case also 
implies that, the ends are social and relative to the defined educational 
objectives, as conceived by the governing party and the structure of interests that 
constitute it. 
It is important to stress that, there is here, no conspiracy to deceive. The 
disguising is the product of a belief, genuinely held, that then is a positive 
correlation between passing tests and educational quality held by, both the 
Conservative party and its government. 
3 CONSPIRACY, DISGUISE AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO FETISHISM 
Harris argued that, an educational system "transmits as knowledge, structured, 
distorted, misrepresentations of the world" (1979: 2). The phenomenon of 
educational knowledge is presented in such a way that it disguises the truth of its 
own essential reality. But I claim that it is not a matter of choice, let alone 
conspiracy, that educational knowledge disguises and thus becomes fetishised. It 
does not therefore conceal the social contradictions, within which it is defined, by 
means of a structure of deliberate deception or by conspiracy, or indeed by a 
conscious distortion of reality as Harris holds. Educational knowledge is not a 
deliberate distortion, but it is a kind of distortion (a disguise that is) all the same. 
In all forms of society, in all states the dominant power relationships (within 
social groups or social classes) determine what is selected and transmitted on the 
basis of their interest structures. That is to say, each state works with whatever it 
believes is the correct view of the social world. Deliberate deception or 
conspiracy is not involved here. 
142 
I here argue that that which is accepted as the correct VIew of reality is, 
structurally disguised by the dialectics of the power relationships involved. So the 
disguise is not deliberate. The essence of the officially accepted, and so 
legitimated claims about the world, is transformed into a misleading 
misrepresentation of that world. Fetishism of educational knowledge persists so 
long as there are conflicting interest structures, some of which become dominant 
over others, so that their interpretation of the world prevails and is transmitted 
as educational knowledge, but without actually acknowledging its preferred 
judgements and value positions. 
The disguise is built into the processes of production and dissemination of 
educational knowledge. It appears in the structure of the presentation itself: the 
purported, overt, functional relevance of educational knowledge and the 
underlying interests that it promotes deceive the policy maker, the teacher, the 
pupil, the parents, etc, into glorifying the dominant forms of knowledge. 
Educational knowledge, in its production and presentation is made to appear as 
given, transparent and unproblematic. 
Policy makers, because of their confidence that educational knowledge has the 
capacity to realise the guiding goals for its production, see in it, no other social 
quality than its functional or instrumental relevance. They therefore promote 
educational knowledge as being non-ideological, as bodies of true propositions 
that have no sources other than those publically available to disinterested 
enquirers. They are guided by genuine concerns for national interests and the 
general good that can be realised for all sections of the society as a result of the 
officially sanctioned educational knowledge. 
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4 FETISHISM AND THE STATE'S GLORIFICATIO:"J OF EDUCATIO~AL 
KNOWLEDGE 
The transmission of educational knowledge is for the state, the means of 
attaining and maintaining the prestige of the state in the eyes of its citizens. By 
means of such knowledge the next generation becomes attached to, and in effect 
gives assent to, the particular (dominant) interest structure of the state. All its 
educational institutions are inevitably in a position to accord the highest prestige 
to what is taught in schools. Educational knowledge is therefore taken to be a 
sine qua non for all other things else (as indeed is the case in Nigeria's national 
policy on education, 1981). It is therefore one of the suppositions here that what 
is taught in schools is presented as being objective (objectively true) in the sense 
that rational people could not but acknowledge it as such once they have seen 
the evidence (or more generally, the reasons). 
Since such knowledge embodies the skills, and dispositions which are important 
for the survival and development of the society it acquires a high prestige, indeed 
it is glorified. It is not, therefore, presented as being open to criticism, 
falsification and so rejection. That glorification of educational knowledge is one 
form that the fetishism of educational knowledge takes. 
It is revealed through the consideration that the preferred educational 
knowledge is on the side of the dominant interests. So it cannot be 'objective' in 
the required sense. There is no Archimedian position from which to judge and 
compare the contents of different and national curricula. The appearance 
therefore disguises the social essence of educational knowledge. 
There are various consequences of the fetishism of educational knowledge that I 
shall mention briefly. First, large-scale generalisations about the worth of areas 
of knowledge, desired skills. moral values and so on cannot stand upon grounds 
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that are unshakeable. Judgements about what is in the citizens' interests are 
always contestable. Second: there has been a marked tendency in the study of 
Education to treat educational knowledge as presuppositionless, itself a 
production of the distortion of a fetish object. Third: educational goals, aims and 
objectives tend either to be ignored, not taken seriously, or just taken for 
granted. In many capitalist societies, for example, the aim of preparation for the 
experiences of the adult work community is not examined in the perspective of 
its ideological foundation. These consequences of the glorification of educational 
knowledge are of the essence of fetishism. 
5 FETISHISM AND INSTRUMENTALITY 
Educational knowledge as it is presented, is in fact deemed to be instrumental to 
the preservation and the survival of the state and its prevailing social order. The 
claimed instrumental essence is usually presented as being non-political even 
though it is manifestly both political and non-objectively determined. The 
appearance of educational knowledge comes with the view that it possesses 
qualities for enriching not only productive capacities, but also, life-chances of 
people. It hides the fact that instrumentality is a preoccupation, a basic 
assumption of captalist and perhaps other - societies - central to their dominant 
interest structures. 
The instrumentalist assumptions are open to criticism. The expressed goals of 
improving life-chances (via certification for example), disguise the inner, 
motivating goals which concern the promotion and, defence, of the dominant 
interests of the state. Such is the case when certification and the rewards it brings 
are construed as being the chief ends of education. This conception of the 
ultimate ends of education is however far from universal; it is to be found 
particularly in societies in which the ideas of meritocracy and social mobility are 
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central to the dominant interest structure. Certificates prepare one for a 
'rewarding' place within the existing form of society, but they are themselves 
fetish in the sense that they disguise the essence of educational knowledge and 
the misrepresentation of the world which is contained in the claims made on 
behalf of meritocracy and equality of opportunity since these are but avenues for 
maintaining the prevailing social inequalities in the society. 
The claims about meritocracy and social mobility under capitalism disguise the 
social contradictions between classes. Such assumptions render difficult the 
identification of the social conditions under which educational knowledge is 
produced; they produce false consciousness. They have the further consequence 
that, educational knowledge is judged to be objective, in a quite unqualified 
sense, and that the dominant interest structure of the social class or group 
responsible for the production of that knowledge, has, as its concern, the general 
good of all members of the society. This view disguises the social essence of its 
production. In capitalist, as in all other forms of society, educational knowledge 
is a fetish object, its appearance disguises its reality. So educational knowledge is 
'genuinely' taken as objective, and the dominant interest structure from which its 
content aims originate stands for the general good of all members of the society. 
In other words, the claim that educational knowledge is objective, and consists of 
unbiased claims about the world, is fetish. Such a claim disguises the actual 
essence of educational knowledge. The latter is transformed into a 'false', 
disguising, not deceptive appearance. 
I conclude that the second condition of the theory of the fetishism of educational 
knowledge, i.e. 'the disguise condition', is met. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE POWERS OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Most of the claims I shall assess here do not directly make reference to 
educational knowledge sans phrase. The chief reference is to education, 
knowledge, and schooling. Behind all these in the theory of fetishism I am 
examining here, is an assumption about the process of teaching and learning with 
specific reference to what is taught in the schools. Generally it is assumed that, 
through exposure to educational knowledge through schooling, pupils 
automatically acquire the necessary and sufficient beliefs and other capacities 
which lead to individual enrichment. Implicit in this assumption is that there is a 
causal link between what is taught to the pupils and their social actions; the 
conduct of schooling has or is intended to have, desirable social outcomes. I 
suggest that, theories about education and its relationship to development start 
off from this basic premise. 
The huge investments in education by governments the world over, is a particular 
example of the assumed powers of (educational) knowledge. So is the emphasis 
on education and its training outcomes by political parties (especially those of 
left of centre tendencies) such as the Labour Party in Britain, and the Social 
Democratic Party in Nigeria. The political forces in question believe that, 
education/knowledge leads to the realisation of certain desirable political, 
economic, social and other goals. Educational knowledge is fetish because what 
in fact is taught in schools is not, in itself, a sufficient condition for the 
attainment of these goals. 
147 
2 SOME FORMS TAKEN BYTHECLUM 
2.1 THE HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 
Governments in the developing world, have, especially since the 1960s, been 
influenced by theories of education as a human capital machine. Shultz (1964), 
and, Harbison and Myers (1964), refer to such theories as 'the human capital 
theory'. The theory is grounded in the utilitarian philosophy and its emphasis on 
instrumentality and consequentialism. It hypothesises knowledge in terms of 
economic development; it provides the necessary training for the skills and 
expertise required by the economy. It is central to the theory that knowledge has 
the power to expand productive frontiers by opening up new possibilities, 
through for example, scientific and technological discoveries. The theory can be 
taken further to claim that human beings are to be understood as capital units. 
That is, their skills and capacities are available for investment through training. 
2.2 EDUCATION AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
A further source of claims to the powers of educational knowledge is implicit in 
James Coleman's (1965) theory of political socialisation and recruitment through 
education/knowledge. Subjects of study such as Government, Civics, and Social 
Studies are said to have a causal link to political behaviour. Although all these 
claims depend, among other things, on the effectiveness of the teaching, in 
general they tend to attribute powers to educational knowledge. 
Likewise a number of philosophers of education, in particular Freire (1972), who 
is chiefly concerned with adult literacy, are convinced that educational 
knowledge empowers people politically and economically and so provides the 
conditions for the enrichment and liberation of their cultural practices and 
political awareness. Empowerment, in the view of Freire rests on what he calls 
'conscientization' or consciousness-raising, which is a political objective achieved 
by people-oriented mass literacy schemes. If correctly designed, a literacy 
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programme, raises the consciousness of the masses. These then are deemed to be 
genuine, and not illusory, powers of educational knowledge. 
But the relationship between consciousness and educational programmes is not 
transparent. It is not clear whether the relationship is causal and if not, the 
nature of that which it is supposed to be is also not clear. It is odd that Freire a 
philosopher much influenced by Marxism, holds that educational knowledge, 
which in the Marxist tradition would normally be held to be a superstructure 
derived from a base, will itself have an independent determining effect on yet 
some further form of (political) consciousness. The Marxist proposition, the basis 
for all sociology of knowledge, is here turned on its head and appears as its own 
very antithesis. The degree of influence or determination of the one on the other 
is not clearly stated. What needs to be substantiated therefore is the view that 
education, which I take to be one form of consciousness, generates other levels 
of consciousness. Freire will then need to show, which of the two levels of 
consciousness involved here is primary and why. This seems to be a dilemma 
particularly if education is cautiously taken to be an activity in which pupils are 
taught to attach meanings to the world: just what is the relationship between 
learning and consciousness? Freire pays insufficient regard to the complex social 
and epistemological questions that enter into the calculations for the production 
of some required form of consciousness. His view runs contrary to a theory of the 
holistic nature of knowledge production. 
Freire's problem is epistemological. As Habermas noted, the dilemma here is 
that, 
"the investigati~n of ~he faculty of ~o~led~e is itself kno~ledge, 
and cannot arnve at Its goal because It IS thIS goal already. (1972: 
7) 
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3 ACCOUNTS OF THE POWERS OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
3.1 CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN BELIEFS AND ACTIONS 
One theoretical basis of the claim that educational knowledge possesses powers 
is the principle of recoverability of the dominant interpretations of reality which 
have been vested in educational knowledge. Recoverability, or the demand for 
the fulfilment of the educational goals that influence selection of educational 
knowledge, is central to the fetishism of educational knowledge. It is assumed 
that, once the mind has been fashioned in a desired way, the likely result is 
behaviour or action which is consonant with the goals of the teaching that makes 
up a student's schooling. 
What must now be examined is the strength of the claim that knowledge has 
powers. There are two issues: the nature of the connection between the beliefs 
acquired as a result of teaching and the actions of those who have acquired these 
beliefs; are the beliefs so acquired sufficient to produce the social actions whose 
desirability is built into the fundamental educational objectives? I shall first 
address the issue of the relationship between 'power' and 'knowledge'. 
3.2 RELATIONSIDPS BETWEEN POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 
There are two possible accounts of the relationship between power and 
educational knowledge within a society. It can be held that the political structure 
determines both the educational system and so what is taught. On the other hand 
it may be thought that the acquisition of educational knowledge itself produces 
(or more strongly causes) political, moral social actions. It is this latter 
relationship which is basic to the view that powers inhere in educational 
knowledge. 
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The claim that educational knowledge has specific powers has implications that 
must be examined. First, it is essential to centre on the idea of 'power'. ·Pov.:er' is 
a relational term; its holders have power(s) to affect the lives of others. The idea 
of power in the social - though not the natural sciences arises only in the context 
of social relationships. Social or political power is a relationship between three 
social forces. Agents of power, exercise power over subjects; they have 
requirements of the subject's actions and the means to have these requirements 
enforced. Subjects of power are those over whom power is exercised - more 
precisely their actions, beliefs and interests. Objects of power are the states of 
affairs whose realisation is sought by agents through their power over subjects. 
Such objects of power relate the activities of agents to those of subjects. The 
object of power may, for example, be a policy enactment. The enforcing party, 
the agent of power, might be the state, for example, the legislative and executive 
arms of government, while the subjects of power are the citizens (including, of 
course young people) on whose shoulders falls the burden of compliance with the 
requirements of the policy enactment. Teachers as enforcers and implementors 
of directives (pertaining to educational knowledge) are both agents (in relation 
to pupils) and subjects (in relation to the state). 
Many other relationships characterise social groups e.g. influence over, care for, 
friendship and so on - though these may have certain power characteristics, 
power is not of their essence. The social relationships within which power is 
expressed, are of a special kind. The agents of power are necessarily related to 
the subjects through the objects of power. The enforcing agents 'cause' the 
subjects to relate to the objects e.g. by bringing it about that they have to ignore 
their own interests. The agents of power stand in a position of advantage relative 
to the subjects of power, so that, the former systematically affect the actions, 
dispositions, thoughts and preferences of the latter. So the subjects of power are 
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disposed to act in a particular way given their relationship to the enforcing 
agents of power. 
On the fetish account, the nature of the social relationship involved here is not 
one of an agent's exercising an influence upon a subject. On the contrary it is a 
causal one; it is not a determinism in the sense that is opposed to freewill (i.e. 
the subject could not do otherwise). The subject's freedom of action is 
constrained given the relative position of advantage possessed by the agent. 
Under the deterministic regime involved in the relationship between the three 
forces, the object of power defines the relationship between the enforcing agent 
of power and the subject of power. As a result, the relationship becomes one of 
control on one hand, and submission on the other. The subject of power, (vide 
Lukes 1976) acts in compliance with the objects of power and according to the 
standards they put in place. The subject's freedom of action and autonomy is 
negated by reference to the constraints imposed on him by the agent of power, so 
much so that, in so far as the objects of power are concerned, the subject's choice 
of actions are not even thought of as constrained. Given the subject's relation to 
the powers of the agents, he/she cannot escape from the designed path, he/she 
just does what the agent requires. Power implies this kind of a strong causal 
relationship. 
The control of the subject of power by the agent of power is not one which is 
rooted in the deliberate use of force or coercion. Such control is expressed in the 
nature of the social relationships between the two social forces. It is such that, 
given the agent - subject relationship and the particular conditions as arranged, 
or made possible the subject of power is just disposed to act in terms of the 
object of power. So: being coerced is one possible instantiation of the ways in 
which people act in response to the agents and their objects of power. If the 
subject is coerced or forced to do something the force comes from the 
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(structural) limitations imposed on him/her by the former forces to which 
he/she stands in a relationship. 
4 THE ALLEGED POWERS OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Following these considerations, the powers of educational knowledge are located 
in the perspective of power to, rather than power over. Power, as employed in the 
discussions of fetishism implies the following: an object has the power to, bring it 
about that the (related) subject comes to hold certain beliefs, value positions, 
etc. It is the potential or the capacity of the object (or commodity in the case of 
educational knowledge) to cause the direct achievement or the realization of 
some given objectives, ideals, goals, targets, and so on. As argued by Fardon, 
"seen from the perspective of power, the problem of ... knowledge 
revolves around its capacity to achieve results, especially through 
forms of ideological incorporation or hegemony". (1985: 6) 
Educational knowledge has the capacity to achieve results - beyond, say, the 
passing of examinations - in relation to the objects of knowledge which are under 
the control of the agents. The dominant structure of interests, or 'the dominant 
ideology', is thus under the cornol of the agents of power who both identify 
'appropriate' objects of power, and the specific educational knowledge that is to 
be employed in realising the objects. So the view that knowledge has certain 
powers, is synonymous in my view to the claim that it produces certain effects. It 
is in this regard that knowledge empowers people: so educational knowledge 
equips people with ideas, new possibilities, an enlarged awareness and so 
develops their potential. Thus it enables people to act or behave in ways which 
otherwise they would, indeed could not have done. Their social actions are the 
effects of causes: the beliefs vested in the pupils by the educational knowledge to 
which they have been exposed over the years. There is in this case, a direct 
cause-effect relationship between beliefs, judgements, etc and social actions. To 
hold, then. that educational knowledge has certain powers in terms of its 
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capacities and effects, is to propose a causal connection between beliefs and 
actions. 
The claim that certain powers inhere in education can be found in Nigeria's 
National Policy on Education. Section 1, sub-section 7 (1) states that, 
"Education will continue to be highly rated in the national 
development plans, because ..... any fundamental change in .... any 
society has to be preceded by an educational revolution." (1981: 8 -
my emphasis). 
It further states that, "efforts will be made to relate education to overall 
community needs" (ibid: 8), and that the teaching of certain subjects "will enable 
pupils to acquire knowledge and develop skills" (ibid: 17). Education, and 
specifically educational knowledge is here given a primary place in the attempt 
to achieve various social, political, economic, and other objectives. Such views 
are a concrete and political expression of the claim that educational knowledge 
possesses wide-ranging and impressive powers. 
5 ALLEGED POWERS OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 
5.1 MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THE CLAIM 
There are merits and demerits to the claim that educational knowledge has 
powers. If educational knowledge has the powers attributed to it, i.e., its 
possession is a cause of social action (of a type expressed in the subjects of 
power), then the truth of a fundamental thesis of much sociology of knowledge 
(that material conditions 'determine' thought) may have to be re-examined. This 
is because we have here a thesis that action is determined by thought, a position 
which seems to reverse a central main claim of the sociology of knowledge. 
Educational knowledge may be a double-edged sword. Educational knowledge 
may be put to a number of uses apart from the officially intended and sanctioned 
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ones. For example, it is open to uses that are either not in line with the interests 
of the state or are even opposed to them. In a dialectical sense it generates a 
negation of the official view of reality which is at its very foundation. (For 
example, colonial curricula were designed to produce elites who would, in their 
social actions support and indeed promote the basic interests of the colonising 
states. Although it can be argued that they indeed played such a role, 
nonetheless their education also led them into waging a struggle for 
decolonisation.) Furthermore, when pupils in Nigerian schools are taught 
Economic theory, at the secondary school level, the objective might be to make 
them disposed towards understanding the laws of the free market, the supremacy 
of market forces such as demand and supply. But the understanding of such 
forces does not mean that they are internalised to meet the stated educational 
objectives and the unstated but implicit state goals. The contrary might even be 
true: pupils may understand and question the concept of 'market forces' and 
their mechanisms in a way contrary to the intentions of the state's educational 
system. The pupils may begin to question the validity of the theory particularly 
when lived conditions do not support it. Thus the pupils might master this 
educational knowledge and employ it in the criticism of those dominant 
structures who were the agents of power in the first place. 
Educational knowledge thus allows for two contradictory outcomes at the same 
time. The disposition to act in a particular way coexists with a disposition to act 
in the contrary. In fact it sometimes generates its own anti-thesis. The actions 
which follows the teaching of educational knowledge, may well be the result of 
an inter-play of many factors (as an holistic theory of knowledge implies). There 
is no guarantee that one particular course of action will be the result of an 
exposure to educational knowledge. 
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Thus the powers of educational knowledge are not guaranteed i.e. thev may not 
. . 
yield what is intended. So such powers as the ones attributed to educational 
knowledge are unpredictable. If so, then a state may find them, for all practical 
purposes, more of a myth than a reality. Moreover, as I have emphasised, it is not 
clear that the beliefs acquired will bring about the desired effects. 
Educational knowledge therefore, in its overt form fetishises these crucial points 
about its essence. Whereas the immediate and apparent form of educational 
knowledge may appear as socially-disinterested (objective) knowledge divorced 
from politics and ideology, it is defined, selected and organized in such a way as 
to disguise the network of social relationships and contradictions in the civil 
society. It is presented as having some powers which in reality it lacks, or if it 
possesses them they are limited and are not sufficient to produce action for the 
realisation of the given objectives of the state. Thus the government selects a 
curriculum for certain purposes (believing that the educational knowledge has 
powers to achieve the preferred aims), but that knowledge is used by the pupils 
in such ways that these aims may be frustrated. 
It may be concluded that the following is entailed by these considerations. 
Educational knowledge, in reality, either lacks those powers ascribed to it, or it 
has a limited capacity which can only work in conjunction with other forces and 
phenomena in the society (such as those discussed under the epistemological 
structure in 4: 81 - 8), to pursue whatever goals are feasible for it, irrespective of 
their being in conformity to, or in contradiction with the state's interests. In an 
attempt to substantiate this point, I shall now examine the causal connections 
that are alleged to inhere in educational knowledge. In doing this, I shall refer to 
the epistemological structure, which I discussed earlier (4: 83 - 4). 
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5.2 DOES EDUCATIONAL lC~OWLEDGE CAUSE SOCIAL ACTION? 
Is there then a causal link between the beliefs held as a result of acquiring 
educational knowled~e and social conduct? The structure for recovering the 
educational objectives which are built into the production and presentation of 
educational knowledge suggests that educational knowledge is functional. By this 
I do not mean that the full explanation of the relationship between educational 
knowledge and social action, is given by 'functionalism' understood as a theory. 
The idea of 'recoverability' raises a crucial question as follows: is educational 
knowledge a necessary and sufficient condition for the realisation of the 
fundamental ideals of the state that in the first place generates it? I shall first 
discuss the question of whether the relationship between educational knowledge 
and social action is causal and then proceed to examine the view that the 
relationship is a functional one. 
Whilst thoughts and beliefs are essential precursors to action, they are just one 
set of epistemic factors involved in determining action or behaviour through the 
epistemological structure. That structure comprises other elements to which 
action stands in a holistic, complex and not unitary, one-way, relationship. Such 
elements include the following: beliefs, emotions, attitudes, values, desires, 
dispositions and motives. All these conjointly determine particular behaviours or 
actions, at given times. The prevailing social, political and economic conditions 
place a limitation on how these beliefs, motives, etc, mutually interact and 
together with ideologies, historical experiences, religious affiliations and so on 
provide the grounds for an understanding of social behaviour. The effects of the 
interaction of those epistemic elements must be shown to be clearly and directly 
related to educational knowledge - understood in an holistic context - if the 
modified claim of the powers of educational knowledge is to be established. 
Beliefs acquired as a result of teaching cannot relate to action, in the required 
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way, in isolation from motives, desires, etc, and from concrete social, political. 
economic and other conditions. 
It follows that there is no single, simple, casual connection between our social 
actions and what we have been taught in schools. No single item of knowledge 
considered in isolation is a necessary condition of a specific social action. Beliefs 
acquired through educational knowledge must be located within a particular 
holistic context. Their effects, as distinct from the effects of other 
epistemological factors and socio-political conditions, cannot be determined 
independently of that context. 
Specific beliefs alone are necessary to the explanation of particular social 
actions; they are not however sufficient and so cannot be said to be the cause of 
such actions. I conclude that educational knowledge, understood as the 
acquisition of beliefs is not a cause of social actions. It is however, a necessary 
component that causes social action. Educational knowledge is but one necessary 
condition which taken together with many others constitute the sufficient 
conditions or causes of social behaviours or actions. 
I use 'the necessary condition' for action in the strong sense to refer to those 
conditions without which a particular process or events, social action for 
example, will not happen. But a necessary condition is not here treated as a 
cause. By 'sufficient conditions' I mean the aggregate conditions that constitute 
the cause of a particular process or event. Sufficient condition is I claim, the 
totality of the necessary conditions. So a sufficient condition(s) is/are to be 
understood holistically. Educational knowledge is then a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition of social action. 
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6 THE ALLEGED POWERS CONDITIO:\: CONCLCSIO~S 
The claim that educational knowledge has powers to produce social action is 
central to the idea that it is fetish. 
I have centred in this discussion upon belief and taken educational knowledge to 
consist of such beliefs. Beliefs however, are but one class of elements within a 
complex structure, the several parts of which, in interaction are necessary to 
explain how people come to accept the objectives of a state educational system. 
There is no causal link between isolated beliefs and such acceptance or 
attainment. The causal link will be the sum of all the necessary conditions (which 
make up the sufficient conditions for social action). So if particular beliefs are 
necessary to such objectives they are not sufficient and so, in themselves are not 
causes of such achievements. The view that beliefs have the power to produce 
social action or more generally to meet the objectives of a state educational 
system, is fetish. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE THEORY OF THE FETISHISM OF EDUCATIONAL KNO\\''LEDGE I~ 
GENERAL 
1 THE THREE CONDITIONS OF THE FETISHISM THEORY 
The three conditions of the fetishism of educational knowledge just examined in the 
preceding three chapters (129 - 59) collectively produce the theory of the fetishism of 
educational knowledge. It is to be noted that each of the three respective conditions has 
been satisfied, in the case of educational knowledge. Educational knowledge is in 
respect of the first condition (i.e. the 'commodity condition'), likened to a Marxist 
commodity although it is not, of course, a physical commodity. It has been shown that 
the generative sense applies. In relation to its dissemination, educational knowledge as 
an object is offered for a specific kind of exchange (chapter 7: 129 - 37). The commodity 
condition therefore holds. 
The second condition ('the disguise condition') has also been shown to obtain. (8: 138 -
46). It has been argued that, educational knowledge has two contrasting dimensions: 
essence and appearance. The appearance disguises the essence. The social essence, and 
the network of social relationships which are indispensable to its production and 
dissemination have been shown to be transformed into a relationship between 
educational knowledge as one object, and other objects and processes. The distortion 
condition therefore is met. 
The 'powers condition' is also satisfied. Certain powers are assumed to inhere in such 
knowledge; it has been argued (9: 147 - 59) that these powers are hypothesised. They 
are not genuine attributes of such knowledge. The powers attributed to educational 
knowledge are illusory, though that students acquire in schools when appropriately 
related to their emotional attitudes, religious commitments, personal ideals and the 
overall historical realities of their society, especially the prevailing social, economic and 
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other conditions, are productive of, and hence also provide explanations of their social 
actions. 
So the three conditions for the fetishism of educational knowledge hold. The theory 
therefore offers an account of the sense in which such knowledge is ideological. The 
fetish qualities offer one explanation of the ideological nature of the official knowledge 
that is selected and transmitted in schools, is provided by its fetish qualities. 
2 THE UNITY OF THE THREE CONDITIONS OF THE FETISHISM OF 
EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Fetishism provides an explanation of the sense(s) in which educational knowledge is 
ideological. The first indication of the ideology of educational knowledge is found in the 
basic features of educational knowledge itself (see 2: 32 - 42). Educational knowledge 
has a clear link to the idea of an ideology; it is selected in the light of alternative views 
of the social world which are available to the education policy makers and planners, 
acting on behalf of the state. Plurality of cultures and hence understanding of reality 
and interpretations of the social world are important pre-requisites of the production of 
educational knowledge. The selection of subject matter will proceed according to 
criteria held to be important by the existing state, i.e. its legislative and executive arms. 
What follows then is that, the production of educational knowledge is itself inherently 
ideological. Educational knowledge is defined and selected by reference to the 
prevailing structures of collective interests (cultural, economic, political, spiritual, and 
so on) that serve to identify a particular society. Those interests (and the cultural 
actions that characterise them) are, it follows, necessarily linked to some functional 
(though not necessarily 'instrumental' or 'utilitarian') structure of purposes, goals and 
objectives. 
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The dominant interests structure and the political forces that give it public expression 
determine what shall be taught in schools. A link exists between the interest structures, 
power relations and the alleged powers of educational knowledge, which the state uses 
in order to realise its ultimate goals. It is within the terms of that linkage that knowledge 
is selected for transmission in schools. 
The fundamental social, economic, political commitments of the state determine the 
goals and objectives of the educational system in general and so of the curriculum in 
particular. These do not seem to allow educational knowledge an escape route from the 
influences of the social structure. In many states such principles are contestable 
especially as they relate to the selection of educational knowledge. This is further 
ground for judging educational knowledge to be fetish. 
A note of caution needs to be struck here: the connection between educational 
knowledge and the interest structures is not a straightforward one. The background 
ideals may, in some cases be inconsistent. I have argued elsewhere (Indabawa: 1988) 
that the five national ideals that inform the Nigerian educational policy are 
contradictory and so cannot stand to inform a consistent policy. For the present 
discussion this has the consequence that, some ideals must take priority over others. 
Those which do prevail are stressed and projected as being for the 'common, general 
good'. Such a 'good' has no status beyond the outcomes of such contests (or conflicts) -
or, indeed, the fact of consensus when it does exist. 
In effect, the arguments above make a place for the idea of a dominant ideology which 
is articulated and promoted by the dominant interest structure in line with its 
interpretations of the national interest. A state projects a range of value positions on 
which it is alleged there is consensus; these positions are those of the state and its 
interpretation of the national interest. In the light of this (supposed) consensus curricula 
are determined; some interests will not be represented. So some interests are relegated 
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in favour of the dominant interests which express themselves through the medium of 
national goals. 
Educational knowledge therefore transforms the numerous contrarieties and 
contradictions in citizens' understanding of the social world in which we have an 
(assumed) consensus. In all but the most 'closed' and 'isolated' societies such consensus 
does not exist. Thus fetishism occurs right at the beginning of the process of knowledge 
production. But the fetishism does not stop at the level of goal definition and selection 
of educational knowledge. It also features in the final product, whereby educational 
knowledge is made to fetishise its real social essence. 
The respective contents of the plurality of understandings and interpretations of the 
social world that are supposedly reconciled, are subject to the definitions given them by 
the structures of power relations both within and without each of the pluralities. 
Dominance and hegemony play a central role in the definition of educational 
knowledge. By their very nature both educational knowledge and its processes of 
production fetishise many social relationships and social contradictions. I shall 
elaborate this point in chapter 12 with particular reference to Nigeria. 
However some critics may criticise the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge 
on a number of grounds. Some of these possible criticisms will now be examined. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF THE FETISHISM OF EDUCATIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
There are possible criticisms of the theory of the fetishism of educational 
knowledge. There are problems concerning the relativist consequences of the 
theory, the relationship between educational knowledge and national interests, 
the identification of fetishism, and fetishism and the economics of education. In 
the light of these I shall re-examine, and attempt to develop, the theory. 
1 RELATMSM AND THE FETISHISM OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Relativism, in its various forms, raises well known problems of the scope and 
range (and so alleged universality) of both general and particular propositions. 
These problems have themselves raised issues of the claimed universality and 
validity of the beliefs, and the theories of which they form part, such as are 
taught in schools. Do these problems - and some at any rate, of their resolutions 
have consequences for the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge? I 
have understood fetishism as a holistic theory grounded in cultural relativist 
considerations. Is it the case that the theory itself has relativistic problems? 
As a specific account of the ideology of educational knowledge, the theory of the 
fetishism of educational knowledge presupposes social and philosophical 
contexts. The selection of items of knowledge for inclusion, in what is taught in 
schools is conducted within such a context. The context allows for the variability 
of beliefs as candidates for educational knowledge. As an explanatory theory, it 
is articulated on the basis of this over-riding philosophical commitment. 
As has been already argued, any specific selection of educational knowledge i~ 
given by an interest structure. The account of interests involved in the definition 
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and designing of educational knowledge is value-laden. As I have indicated there 
are often, especially in plural societies, many such interest structures. Each social 
collective has its own manifest interests (its set of judgements of what is in the 
interests of all members of the collective). Social collectives are thus centres of 
the articulation of interests. There is a difference between a unitary collective 
and a society. The latter contains, in some cases more than one collective. The 
structure of interests of any social collective comprises interests which are 
consistent with its own views of the world (weltanschaung). The interests 
generate certain objectives the attainment of which are deemed necessary to the 
collective's identity and survival. These interests thus function in the same way in 
relation to each social collective's preferences, priorities and basic goals. And 
this is certainly a sense in which the theory of fetishism is non-relativist. 
Nevertheless the variability of the interest structures and so of social collectives, 
raises the question of which of these is to take priority over which in the 
production of educational knowledge. This raises a problem of selection, and 
hence a problem for curriculum development; there can be conflict between the 
various social collectives within a state. So whilst the function of fetishism is 
unvarying there can be considerable variation between the (educational) forms it 
takes even within a particular state. 
Only one of the structures of interest can dominate at a particular time. The 
state is the site for the struggle between the social collectives, as well as for the 
promotion of the interests they respectively represent. They therefore struggle 
with each other for recognition in policy matters, including the definition and 
designing of educational knowledge for the whole society. Which becomes 
dominant depends on the prevailing form of society. Thus primordial structures 
of loyalty such as religion, ethnicity, regionalism or statism, and so on, may playa 
dominant role in policy matters, including education, in the traditional form of 
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society. The pre-capitalist forms of society define their goals and fundamental 
background ideals on the basis of which one religious collective or ethnic group 
or an alliance of some of the primordial forces, attains dominance. More 
sophisticated patterns of interests such as those of economically advanced states 
and their related cultural, political and other factors, take centre stage in the 
policy orientations of capitalist and socialist states. 
In theocratic forms of society, such as Iran, The Vatican, and to some measure 
Pakistan and Ireland of the early years of this century, the underlying ideals on 
the basis of which curriculum matters are defined and designed, are primarily 
religious and spiritual. Whereas in a hybrid form of society, such as the 
developing social formations of Africa, a combination of factors that accrue from 
the ascending and decaying forms of different social collectives, feature in the 
definition of the basic objectives within which educational knowledge is 
designed. Thus the concern for development, and some adherence to a certain 
form of decaying primordialism (i.e. the pre-capitalist values and value positions 
such as ethnicity, sectionalism, religion and so on), leads to a mixture of 
background interests for the educational system. 
Whichever fundamental objectives, of whatever social collective, are to dominate 
the state will depend on the level of development of the collectives' 
corresponding form of society. So social groups and! or classes and their interests 
constitute the focus for understanding the educational knowledge transmitted in 
a modern society. The interests of the social classes may not however be 
expressed, and in most cases they are more implicit than explicit. Educational 
objectives can, in one way or another, be explained by means of the class 
interests even if these are overt. In hybrid forms of society, such as many in 
Africa, the basic structuring of the social classes is different. both theoretically 
and empirically, from those in advanced capitalist societies. The class structure i~ 
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compounded, it is, in hybrid societies, complex owing to a residue of some pre-
capitalist values and practices. So the role of social groups and the numerous 
primordial interests they represent remains. In such a situation, the fundamental 
objectives which define educational knowledge, represent a marriage of the 
decaying and emergent forms of society. Educational knowledge therefore 
becomes, in its appearance, similarly hybrid. That is fully consistent with 
fetishism, since, on its premises, only one dominant interest structure can define 
and design a coherent educational programme to be pursued by the state in 
schools. 
Relativism then is a universal feature of curriculum planning. Relativism as a 
universal feature of educational knowledge production then, gives additional 
grounds for holding educational knowledge fetish. One conclusion that may be 
drawn here is that if relativism does not damage the argument that educational 
knowledge is fetish, it must at least give grounds for showing that whichever 
educational knowledge that has been produced relativistically has a limited 
legitimacy. This is because whichever collective interests prevail, that state's 
policies for educational knowledge are bound to have limited legitimacy viewed 
sub specie aetemitas. The point then is how the limited legitimacy is to be 
understood and explained in relation to the fetishism of educational knowledge; 
I now go on to claim that the limited legitimacy of educational knowledge 
provides an argument which can be used to confirm the theory of fetishism. 
2 THE LIMITED LEGITIMACY OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The critic of the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge now argues 
that the conclusion drawn from the analysis of his/her first criticism, i.e. limited 
legitimacy of educational knowledge, shows that educational knowledge is not 
fetish. Educational knowledge is not fetish on account of this criticism. because 
people can follow its relativism to understand its limited legitimacy. and hence 
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they may easily come to recognise that, it does not disguise anything, nor does it 
transform any other thing, nor is it presented as a commodity, qua fetishism. I 
now respond to the limited legitimacy criticism. 
Education, it has been argued, "is a matter of learning the ropes, not of untying 
them or discovering who is holding them" (Harris 1979: 81). The state is an 
ontological unit itself to be understood in terms of a dominant interest structure. 
In the production of educational knowledge, the varied interests within it may be 
consulted, but only the dominant ones are fully represented at the state level. 
The consequence of this is that those which are not represented, but to which an 
appeal is made, are less regarded, so that educational knowledge reduces their 
status. Thus the legitimacy of such knowledge is limited to those collectives 
which are represented at the expense of the others. So far as members of those 
collectives whose views of reality and interpretations of the social world are not 
carried or conveyed by educational knowledge are concerned, the official 
educational knowledge has, for them a very limited legitimacy. Educational 
knowledge endorses what is already dominant in virtue of which its framework is 
therefore basically reactionary (i.e. it preserves the status quo). 
There is an interesting paradox here: there is a disjunction between the 
framework of educational knowledge (one of the chief legitimising forces of the 
existing social order) and those educational objectives which emphasise 
education as an instrument for social change. In some contemporary societies, 
especially in the developing countries, the guiding educational objectives are 
themselves heavily weighted in favour of the promotion of social change. The 
paradox is interesting in the context of this study since, its very existence might 
suggest that there is something wrong with the theory of the fetishism of 
educational knowlege. I shall now attempt to show how the limited legitifnacy 
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argument affects the fetishism of educational knowledge in a constructive. rather 
than in a destructive way. 
How is 'legitimacy' to be understood here? Legitimacy is often seen in terms of 
political authority. It is not an epistemological notion, but a political one (it is 
not primarily a question of reason and truth). Accordingly educational 
knowledge will seem to be legitimate if it is sanctioned and authorised by some 
body which is entitled to do so: the entitlement will usually be that of a 
government or bodies delegated by it. A politically-legitimated curriculum policy 
is not only determined by, but also promoted by a state. To say educational 
knowledge is legitimate implies that it is so sanctioned. The national curriculum 
of England and Wales, for example is sanctioned by the 1988 'Education Reform 
Act', being an Act of Parliament, an authoritative political instrument of the 
state in Britain. Likewise the curriculum that flows from the National Policy of 
Education (1981) is legitimated by the Nigerian federal government. 
There is, however, another view. The alternative VIew being argued here 
understands legitimacy in terms of acceptability by the citizenry rather than in 
terms of political authority as it is often taken to be the case. Political authority is 
an aspect of the prevailing form of society and its power structure. Those who 
reject the dominant interest structure, are marginalised by the state's power 
relations; they are subordinated groups. Political authority however does not 
determine the acceptability (or understood worth) of what is taught; it only 
determines that it must be taught. The worth of any object - Marxist commodity 
or educational knowledge - must at least in part depend upon its value 
(functional or otherwise) for those who would use it, i.e. its acceptability. So for 
example, the study of Shakespeare cannot be legitimated by a politically quite 
properly - constituted enactment that it be studied. Those who reject such study 
may be marginalised in the sense that in not studying the plays. they recei\"e no 
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certificates. The exercise of political authority no more legitimates study of the 
plays than it legitimates the raising of taxes for the manufacture of biological 
weapons of war. A necessary condition of legitimation in both cases is the 
acceptability of the policy enactment by citizens. X's being decreed by a properly 
constituted authority is not synonymous with IX'S being legitimated, though there 
may in fact be a regular correspondence between the two. On the contrary such 
exercise of political authority raises and in fact legitimates, the desire to address 
its legitimacy by members of society. 
The legitimacy of educational knowledge therefore, does not rest uniquely on 
either political authority, or the plurality of alternative definitions of educational 
knowledge per se. It is, the intentional rather than the involuntary acceptance of 
the official version of knowledge that confers legitimacy upon it. For educational 
knowledge to be legitimate, for a state schooling system, it has to be willingly 
accepted by members of all the collectives in the society. Otherwise whatever 
legitimacy is claimed for it, is limited. The legitimacy of educational knowledge 
comes not from a political act but from the acceptance of the outcome of the 
political act. So the view that educational knowledge is (on many occasions at 
least) of legitimacy is justified by the fact of its acceptance. Then, we may say, 
that the curriculum has limited legitimacy - it is restricted to the members of the 
dominant interest group. It may be that, in some states, the legislative 
instruments that provide for private schooling (of for example, particular 
religious groups) are a recognition of that. 
As far as the members of subordinated interest groups are concerned, the state 
authorised educational knowledge is open to contest. It is contestable. Its 
legitimacy, sanctioned as it may be by the legal authorities is limited. for there 
are always some alternative views of reality that spring from conflicting 
structures of interests. 
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The limited legitimacy thesis adds support to, rather than challenges, the theory 
of the fetishism of educational knowledge. Educational knowledge is accepted by 
the various sections of the society as a result of the authority and power 
employed to disseminate only that which is in accord with the dominant interest 
structure. It is this that is hidden, and so its limited legitimacy. It is the 
presentation of the entire curriculum than can come to be seen as non-
contestable: though in pluralist society, that is a liberal democracy, that might be 
difficult. Making people aware of alternative views of the world through the 
curriculum, will jeopardise and threaten that which is taken for granted to be 
educational knowledge in the interests of all sections of the society. Moreover 
that so-called national interest is in fact not put to test by any principle of 
popular participation. Limited legitimacy provides then, a strong argument for 
the view that educational knowledge is fetish. It is a central case of what I have 
called the 'disguise' condition. 
Limited legitimacy supports rather than destroys the claims of the fetishism of 
educational knowledge despite its fundamentally relativistic shell. Accordingly 
the characteristic of limited legitimacy can indeed be taken as a quality of the 
fetishism of educational knowledge which supports rather than counts against the 
theory. 
The consequences of the limited legitimacy arguments and the failure of the 
critic's case against the theory, are both products of an understanding of societies 
(or at any rate most modern societies) in terms of conflicting social groups and 
classes. Fetishism is confirmed by the argument for limited legitimacy because 
educational knowledge, being an expression of the dominant interest structure, 
has to be presented as an aggregate of the interests of all sections of the society. 
Such knowledge is considered as an embodiment of the 'general good', wher~as 
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in reality it is not. Fetishism is thus a quality which educational knowledge has to 
possess if it is to secure and demonstrate any form of legitimacy with the 
subordinated interest groups. By so doing, it attempts to legitimate itself, bv 
means of fetishising its actual social essence. 
However, it is not the case that the legitimating process implies a deliberate 
deception or conspiracy (8: 140 - 42). Curriculum planners do not deliberately 
disguise the dominant interests by dressing them in a pretentious garb called the 
'general good'. They are professionally and educationally equipped to work with 
this limited perspective. Their consciousness is limited to the objective 
conditions. Such a limitation significantly increases the likelihood of a blinkered 
curriculum. The legitimacy arguments therefore strengthen rather than weaken 
the fetishism of educational knowledge or its claims. 
3 NATIONAL INTERESTS AND EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Another possible criticism of the theory that educational knowledge is fetish is 
that it cannot be sustained since there are, at all times and in every society, some 
minimum agreement about some basic or fundamental principles, i.e. national 
interests. The critic argues that, insofar as what is taught in schools is determined 
by such national interests (which are the common goals of the society 
presumably accepted by all members) educational knowledge cannot be fetish. 
In such a case, it is argued, educational objectives and educational knowledge do 
not disguise any dominant interests. 
However this criticism cannot refute the theory in question. On the contrary the 
points it raises are aspects which further confirm the claims made by the theory. 
National interests may be taken to entail those things, the accomplishment of 
which is deemed to be necessary for the survival of the society. To articulate a 
national interest is to assume a consensus over given and central issues. Although 
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there can be considerable agreement about certain basic conditions for the 
survival of a society, interpretations of the specific areas of agreement are open 
to contest. The legitimacy of what is to be taught in schools is thus based on 
claims to a consensus of interests, out of which national interests emerge. 
National interests, certainly those defined with any degree of particularity, can 
be contested. Even in the case of limited agreement about national interests such 
as the survival of the nation there will always be a degree of vagueness that 
creates a space for disputes. For example, there is more or less universal 
agreement about the need for justice and fair-play for all, the rule of law, and so 
on; there remain however some disputes about the interpretation of these 
principles and desired ends in the every day life of a society, and many other 
similar matters. The fact of such disputes is problematic for the notion of 
'national interests'. 
Consensus in the definition of the national interests, and the specification of 
educational knowledge that flows from them, fetishise the realities of social life. 
The actual interests that such definitions and specifications serve to promote are 
not those of the nation or the society at large. They are only assumed to be so, 
since the definitions and specifications are proposed as if they are the products 
of a national consensus. As a result, the interests of the dominant social 
collective(s) are made to appear as natural and in the interests of all sections of 
the society. If these national interests are genuine, the chances of their being 
theoretically inconsistent are always there. (I have argued for this elsewhere 
Indabawa: 1988 in regards to the defining national objectives of Nigeria's 
national curriculum.) 
Interests spnng from, and are centred around, social collectives. It is hardly 
plausible that a nation as distinct from a national group - to which national 
interests are attributed - can have an interest structure of its own. except in a 
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limited sense (which must be clearly spelt out), i.e. as distinct from the scattered 
and conflicting interest structures of the various social collectives that comprise 
it. This is clearly illustrated in many plural societies of the third world, such as 
Nigeria, where attempts are geared towards the production of a single national 
identity out of the various nation-states which comprise the so-called 'nation'. 
Nigeria is not a single nation. It is itself a nation-state. To claim the contrary in 
relation to curriculum matters is to further justify the view that educational 
knowledge is fetish because it disguises the various problems about the 
relationships between nations and nation-states. 
The case is not that national interests are shown to be non-existent by the fact of 
conflicting interests. National interests may indeed exist, but only in certain 
limited cases. For example, that policy which produces least conflicts or is likely 
to improve the lot of the least advantaged, or the majority, may be held to be in 
the national interest. However even if it is so held, such a value judgement 
cannot be protected from contestation by the other competing claims to policies 
alleged to be in the 'national interest'. The conception of 'national interests' thus 
essentially focuses upon one notion that of a social collective's values. Such a 
conception does not allow for, although it thrives in the name of, all sections of 
the society, all those social units which comprise the nation. 
These arguments point to the fetish nature of that educational knowledge which 
has been designed, selected and disseminated on the basis of assumptions about 
non-conflicting national interests. The consensus, on the basis of which the 
national interests are defined, is a consensus that is largely assumed. It either 
does not exist or if does it is subject to interpretation. Either way the idea of a 
national interest employed for the purpose of drawing up a national curriculum 
is contestable due to the plurality of candidates from different social collectives. 
as well as the contradictions between them. So national interests or national 
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ideals or objectives (from which educational knowledge is defined, designed, and 
selected) disguise the actual interests that they promote. They do not reoresent 
the aggregate interests of all sections of the society, but those given by the 
dominant collective's structure of interest. 
The problem of false consciousness in relation to the fetishism of educational 
knowledge also enters at this point. Since collective interests are prior to 
educational knowledge, it is important to consider the issue of perceived, versus 
real interests and the role they play in the fetishism of educational knowledge. 
The claim that interests exist prior to the production of educational knowledge 
conceals some difficulties. The first difficulty resides in the distinction between 
real and perceived interests, what in the Marxist tradition is referred to as the 
problem of 'false consciousness'. For instance, if educational knowledge is to 
assist in the development of the potentials, and talents of the individual, then it is 
odd to suppose that, one can know his/her own interests before he/she is 
educated. But if, as I argued, his interests are revealed to him through the 
process of education, then interests are the products rather than the causes of 
educational knowledge. Wherever false consciousness occurs it would seem to be 
inappropriate to talk about the fetishism of educational knowledge. Unless we 
can be clear of the position of the defining interests of the production of 
educational knowledge, in terms of their being effects or causes, the question of 
the fetishism of educational knowledge cannot even be raised, let alone settled. 
Moreover, the claims of the theory will seem to have little relevance in a 
situation where social actors possess interests as a function of their membership 
of a given social collective, since paradoxically they may be then in no posi tion to 
determine their own interests unless they have first been educated. 
The above argument no doubt involves a paradox: interests are both causes and 
products of the acquisition of educational knowledge. But that is not a paradox 
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which can invalidate the claims to the fetishism of educational knowledge. For in 
the first place, the argument derives its plausibility from a consideration of 
individual rather than collective interests. All the claims to the fetishism of 
educational knowledge are in regard to the latter (collective) not the former 
(individual) features of interests. Individual interests, though important in that 
they do much to shape the form a human life takes, are nonetheless, less relevant 
to the definition and designing of educational knowledge. A social collective is, 
in the first place, defined partly by reference to its views of the world, its own 
place within it, and hence its objective wants and preferences in relation to its 
own definition of the current situation. So whilst the paradox does seem to arise 
in the case of individuals it fails to occur in the case of social collectives. 
It is not, moreover, plausible to attribute truth or falsity to interests. Claims that 
something is in someone's interests can indeed be false, but hardly is it the case 
that those interests themselves are true or false. This however does not mean 
that the explicit interests of a collective cannot be mistaken, nor that they are 
fixed, nor that they are true. What is the case in relationship to the selection of 
educational knowledge, is that, the truth or falsity of the claims to what is/are in 
a collective's interests are secondary to the collective's perceived interests. False 
claims (that 'X' is in C's interests) can function for the collective as can the true 
ones: false or mistaken claims to interests can be productive of educational 
knowledge. The fact of mistaken interests: perceived as against real ones, IS 
germane to the case for the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge. 
All this implies that a distinction has to be made between genuine and perceived 
interests (3: 66 - 8). If the perceived or expressed interests are valid for the 
collective (i.e. they are genuine) then the usefulness of educational knowledge as 
an instrument for achieving some results cannot be sustained. There is a danger 
here of an infinite regress: i.e. we have to know those real interests of a collective 
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as dinstinct from mistaken or false ones pnor to designing an educational 
programme. However this infinite regress promotes, rather than denies or 
challenges the view that educational knowledge is fetish. Since interests are 
determinable ahead of education, we must be clear about what they are. But in 
order to do this, we have to be clear about the actual distinction between the 
perceived and the real interests. Achieving such clarity requires the identification 
of both the correct and the objective perspective (i.e. the strategy to employ). It 
will also demand identifying the disinterested party or persons who are entitled 
to say which of the perceived or real interests are to be employed in the 
production of educational knowledge. But there is no Archimedian position from 
which to determine the distinction between the real and the perceived interests. 
The regression continues, i.e. we have got to resolve certain problems (for 
example, whether our assumed interests are real or just perceived) before we 
come to a view about the question of the nature (Le. real or perceived) of the 
interests involved in the production of educational knowledge. Claims regarding 
real and perceived interests depend to a large extent, on subjective factors, but 
not objective factors such as power relations in the society. It follows that the 
claim that 'X' is in our interests may be mistaken. If so, 'the alleged powers 
condition' for the fetishism of educational knowledge, works effectively in this 
case. The infinite regress can be stopped, by a procedure which is rational, but 
does not depend on, an epistemological realism. F or example, among other 
strategies, this can be achieved by a democratic convention which allows for a 
popular participation in the determination of the real interests of the social 
collective and the society. Nevertheless the fetishism of educational knowledge 
finds additional support, in the occurrence of such an infinite regress so long as it 
is not stopped by such a political procedure. 
What happens to the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge if it can 
be shown that there are no grounds for believing that what is assumed to be in 
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our interests is groundless? It seems that it makes little or no difference whether 
or not the underlying interests that produce educational knowledge are real or 
perceived. Either case provides a ground for accepting the theory of the fetishism 
of educational knowledge. If the expressed interests used in designing 
educational knowledge are false in the sense of not being a true representation 
of the real interests of the collective, then there is a problem of false 
consciousness. Such a possibility strengthens the case for the theory of the 
fetishism of educational knowledge. This is because, there must be sub-divisions 
or sub-cultures within the overall structure of a society's interests. Such sub-
cultures may be engaged in a struggle for hegemony within the larger society. A 
section of the dominant collective will necessarily dominate all other sub-
cultures. Hence its perceived interests are presented as the interests of the whole 
dominant collective. The argument for fetishism is even stronger in such a case 
since the interests of both the subordinated sub-cultures within the ruling 
collective as well as those of the subordinated collectives are disguised. 
Educational knowledge in such a case is clearly fetish. 
4 THE IDENTIFICATION OF FETISHISM 
The critic now argues that there are problems about identifying the fetishism of 
educational knowledge, problems that are potentially damaging to the theory. 
The critic argues against the theory of fetishism that, it is important to address 
the issue of whether and how the fetishism of educational knowledge may be 
identified by the students and their parents i.e. the recipients of educational 
knowledge. There are, the critic argues, some meta-theoretical points here. It 
seems following the arguments in the previous section, that a fetish object 
cancels itself. If the fetish object conceals its essence, then the theory of fetishism 
of educational knowledge disguises its fetish nature. To understand this theory 
therefore, one needs to be located outside it. In other words if the theory (the 
fetishism of educational knowledge) is a good one, then those who are its victims 
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are In no position to corroborate it. This means that. the recIpIents of 
educational knowledge cannot, given the theory, identify what is. and what is not 
fetish about the knowledge that has been transmitted to them. By extension 
therefore, no one who happens to be part of the context for the production and 
dissemination of educational knowledge can identify that fetishism either. Since 
we are all in one class or the other, today, then we cannot identify it. 
A response to this criticism is here put forward. The curriculum planners who 
employ their 'expertise' to design educational knowledge which is appropriate to 
the given objectives will believe that that particular curriculum knowledge best 
serves the general good. The perception of Nigeria's educational policy makers 
who genuinely think that the national policy on education is there to promote the 
general interests of all Nigerians is an example. Likewise the teachers who are 
just agents in the transmission of educational knowledge hardly are in the 
position to identify the fetishism in educational knowledge. It will be inconsistent 
for them to promote what they know has the chance of serving interests counter 
to their own. On the one hand the teacher, as with the curriculum planner, is 
incapacitated politically, as they are reduced to passive agents, rather than active 
beings. This imposed passivity deprives them of the capacity for identifying the 
fetishism in educational knowledge. On the other hand, however, in their 
position as specialists, knowledgeable authorities, they possess critical powers, 
which they may indirectly exhibit in the course of the dissemination, the delivery 
of educational knowledge. Their practical, active life in the society is bound to 
lead them to generate alternative claims to the world. Unconsciously the latter 
may feature in the dissemination process. 
The pupils whose interests are assumed throughout the process, are III no 
position to make the fetish/non-fetish distinction. They are in no position to 
judge that the appearance of educational knowledge disguises its essence. The 
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question then, is whether the force of the theory is reduced, or even negated. b\' 
'- . 
the fact that its credentials are systematically, and not just adventitiously, hidden 
from the majority of the population. 
Identifying the fetish nature of educational knowledge, can only be achieved 
from without the context of the production and transmission of educational 
knowledge. Since these are the contexts which feature in the production of 
knowledge in general, it follows that, nobody who is involved in educational 
knowledge production or dissemination can escape from the grips of the 
fetishism. This leads to the thought that, no one, at least in the society in 
question, can discover or identify the fetishism of the educational knowledge. So 
the theory is unverifiable in fact because it cannot be established by anyone. The 
theory can only be verified solely by means of relativism and this seems to 
contribute to the case against it. 
These arguments can be met as follows. In the first place, the form of 
consciousness that is transmitted to the pupils, is less important for the 
development of a critical mind than their daily lived experiences within their 
objective social condition. It may be suggested that the fetish nature of 
educational knowledge can be identified, both theoretically through an 
examination of the social forces that explain it, and empirically by means of 
assessing its practical effects. Both are possible only by reference to an holistic 
structure of cognition and action. The strategy of a democratic convention within 
the ambit of a just state can be considered as another response to the present 
argument. 
Secondly an inability to determine the truth of a claim is not necessarily the same 
thing as showing it to be false. On the contrary this inability can be taken as 
evidence in favour of the theory since it is consistent with the view that people 
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(especially curriculum planners, teachers, pupils and parents) have to rely on the 
appearance rather than the essence of educational knowledge. When they 
commit themselves to producing, transmitting or pursuing educational 
knowledge, they do so because of the overt superficial goals associated with the 
acquisition of educational knowledge. They hope it will result in the achievement 
of those expressed goals. They do not take it upon themselves to untie the ropes. 
They insist on learning the ropes. But all this tends to confirm rather than deny 
the fetishism of educational knowledge. 
The difficulties in identifying real, as distinct from, perceived interests is of no 
explanatory significance for the fetishism of educational knowledge. It is indeed 
a difficulty for the theory of collective interests, but it does not affect the theory 
in question, particularly because what are alleged to be the real interests can 
always be challenged. There are, in the claims about a collective's real interests, 
good grounds for accepting the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge 
as a valid one. The regression which I argued bedevils any attempt at identifying 
what the actual, real, interests are, for the purposes of educational knowledge 
production, helps to strengthen the claim of the theory of the fetishism of 
educational knowledge that the perceived interests are presented as real ones. 
Thus fetishism is identified not uniquely by the force of what people learn in 
schools, which is itself fetish, but by a combination of the effects of both what 
they learn in school and their practical lives. It is that which partly explains the 
usual description of certain abstract and theoretical knowledge acquired in 
school as being 'merely academic'; such knowledge is either completely on a par 
with actual lived experiences, or is at least supported by the latter. 
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5 FETISHISM AND ECOl'OMICS OF EDUCATIO~ 
Another criticism may be that the fetishism of educational knowledge amounts 
to no more than a re-interpretation of the Economics of Education. The critic 
argues that such a criticism is because the theory here developed is predicated on 
the Marxist theory of fetishism of the commodity. One of the three conditions of 
such fetishism makes use of some important aspects of Marxist economic theory: 
exchange-value, use-value, surplus-value, commodity production, the market, and 
exchange mechanisms. Attempts have been made to show that, educational 
knowledge has structural similarities to a Marxist commodity (see 7: 130 - 37). 
Understanding educational knowledge as a Marxist commodity is supported by 
Cohen's reading of the Marxist economic theory, as applied to education. 
Knowledge for Cohen, is a productive power, a commodity that enables the 
achievement of certain ends, for example manpower training for more efficient 
and productive labour. However, it is not clear for a critic, whether (educational) 
knowledge as a productive power can be regarded as fetish, since those 
associated with the educational enterprise do not understand knowledge in this 
way; they see it as a means to such ends as occupational efficiency. So if 
educational knowledge is fetish it is not recognised as being such. The pupils and 
the parents, the community, educational planners, and the government, have the 
goal of occupational efficiency clearly in view. So educational knowledge in this 
regard fails to meet the Marxist criteria of fetishism. On the whole then, the 
theory adds up to no more than a reinterpretation of the economics of education. 
In that regard it can only be persuasive if backed up by some empirical data. In 
the absence of any such data the critic concludes that theory is unsuccessful. The 
question, then, is to what extent can this criticism and reinterpretation affect the 
theory. 
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I argue in response to these arguments that, the use of certain aspects of the 
.\1arxist economic theory does not itself entail that fetishism must be seen as an 
aspect of the economics of education. The labels attached to the theory do not 
. 
matter if its basic claims can be shown to hold, as I have argued they do. 
Certainly one of the conditions for the theory relies on those aspects of the 
Marxist economic theory cited. But one should not lose sight of why that is so. I 
have argued that those theories that seek to understand the ideology of 
educational knowledge as rooted in 'crude' social determinism are unacceptable; 
consequently I have argued that fetishism provides a much stronger account and 
richer understanding of ideology in its educational setting. The original 
anthropological account of fetishism is, as I argued earlier, (6: 116 - 19), on a par 
with social holism, the method I use throughout this study. Hence the use of 
Marx's theory of fetishism, which I have argued is consistent with the present 
study's basic methodology of social holism. The Marxist view of fetishism, as 
opposed to the original anthropological view of fetishism, is holistic since it has 
been situated in the light of his economic, political theory, as well as his theory of 
history. Of course Marx was trying to de-mystify the notion of capitalist 
commodity, just as this work attempts to de-mystify the nature of educational 
knowledge as an ideological object which is accordingly to be seen as a fetish. 
The aspects of the Marxist econOffilC theory that have been employed in 
developing the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge, are necessary 
as tools for a better understanding of the theory's claims. It cannot be read in 
isolation from the rest of the theory, so it does not constitute a reinterpretation 
of the economics of education. The use of those aspects of the Marxist economic 
theory, is therefore to be seen in that light. Moreover the Marxist claims cannot 
be appreciated if they are treated in isolation from the whole interest structure 
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of a social group. The holistic shell of the theory insists that its claims are to be 
assessed in their full complexity. 
The argument that the theory of fetishism is a reinterpretation of the Economics 
of Education can be used to strengthen (and not undermine) the claim that 
educational knowledge is fetish. It is true that the goal of skills development 
through training is clear to and accepted by all engaged in education. That is to 
say, the pupils, the teachers, the parents, the community, and the government. 
are clear right at the beginning of the process about this basic goal. But they 
(teachers, parents, etc) are also clear about self-enhancement and personal 
development as basic goals. It is, in other words, widely believed that skill 
acquisition through training is a basic goal of education as is self-enhancement. 
These widely held beliefs are generative of fetishism of educational knowledge. 
That much I have just argued. So the instrumental goals of educational 
knowledge (acquisition of skills, manpower training for an efficient work force, 
and provisions of opportunities for self-enhancement) take priority, for those in 
the business of education, over the central goals of submitting to and supporting, 
the prevailing form of society. This prioritising occurs in such a way that, the 
latter is hidden, fetishised as a result of the forceful presentation of the former. 
To assert or even argue for the position that the main aim of teaching 
educational knowledge is for the provision of skills and technical knowledge, is 
itself to confirm its fetishism. This is because these are never ends in themselves. 
They are means to some other more fundamental aims relevant to the promotion 
of the prevailing form of society, from which educational knowledge is generated 
in the first place. It this fundamental end which constitutes the essence of 
educational knowledge. But the emphasis on the conscious and intended goals 
tend to disguise this end, and so fetishise educational knowledge. The actual 
essence of educational knowledge is therefore much more fundamental than the 
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instrumentalist belief allows. That essence is not merely the production of an 
efficient work-force, for such is only relevant to society insofar as it plays a role 
in the reproduction of the economy, the culture, the politics, etc, of the prevailing 
society. So long as only the instrumental goals of educational knowledge are 
visible at the expense of those fundamental ones, it is a fetish. 
Moreover, even if the production of manpower resources and the provision of 
opportunities can be considered ends in themselves, with no further goals 
hidden, educational knowledge still remains fetish. This is because the 
attribution of such powers to educational knowledge works on the false 
assumption that the acquisition of skills through years of exposure to educational 
knowledge, as evidenced by a diploma, amounts to efficient performance. This 
assumption fetishises the conditions for efficient performance in the economy 
and society. It sees educational knowledge as the sole or even the main causal 
factor in that regard. But it isolates other political, social, economic and even 
psychological factors that contribute to the development of such 
instrumentalities. All these are hidden, and so educational knowledge becomes 
fetish on that score. 
Educational knowledge exhibits its fetish qualities through another assumption 
with which it works: that it produces opportunities for self-enhancement (the 
development of individual potentials) through a diploma, the mark of success in 
the process of schooling. Ronald Dore (1976) and Ivar Berg (1970) among others 
have convincingly argued that this assumption to be false. This further confirms 
the fetishism of educational knowledge; there are no causal connections between 
opportunities for self-enhancement and certification. At best a diploma may 
serve to improve one's chances of a lucrative job, among other individual 
opportunities. This, however, is never automatic. At least not in a rece~~eJ 
economy, or even in the economies where the number of the certified is higher 
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than the capacity of the economy to absorb them into the work force. At any rate 
such a failure, as far as the capitalist form of society is concerned, is functional to 
the prevailing social order to which educational knowledge fundamentally owes 
its existence. The intention to attain high levels of employment is not the only 
use of educational knowledge. Another such use is the relationship, implied in, 
for example, Nigeria's Social Studies programme, between educational 
knowledge and the production of good citizens in a democratic society. As Isyaku 
(1987) discovered, in a study of political consciousness and education in Kana, 
Nigeria, there is no significant causal connection between being a good citizen 
and what one learns in the school. Exposure to educational knowledge does not 
ensure the performance of one's civic duties, just as lack of it does not prevent 
one from being a good citizen. Educational knowledge is at best a catalyst. It 
does not therefore take a primary explanatory status in relation to civic duties 
and political functions in a society. To assume the opposite is to further fetishise 
educational knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 1WEL VE 
FETISHISM OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE NIGERIk'" 
EDUCATION 
1 THE NIGERIAN STATE, SOCIElY AND ECONOMY 
Nigeria, a west African country, is, as a geo-political entity, a British colonial 
creation of the opening years of the twentieth century. The very foundation of 
Nigeria was itself ideological in at least two regards: firstly, with regard to 
cultural or primordial forces such as ethnicity, religion, regionalism and statism, 
and secondly in relation to the values of capitalism. These two ideological forces 
tend to make social phenomena in Nigeria, holistic and complex. Consideration 
of both of these ideological forces is essential in policy formulation, including the 
production of educational knowledge. I shall explore both of them and their 
relations to the fetishism of educational knowledge in Nigeria. 
1.1 'PRE-CAPITALIST IDEOLOGICAL FORCES 
The first of Nigeria's ideological foundations relates to its diverse historical, 
religious, ethnic and linguistic, and cultural factors. The British state had 
designated for its merchants, places such as Lagos, the southern and northern 
areas as its protectorates, in 1861, 1885 and 1886 respectively. Prior to 1914 when 
the Southern and Northern Protectorates were merged and named Nigeria, there 
were only scattered, pre-colonial states and societies, around the rivers Niger and 
Benue. The multiplicity of pre-colonial states is an important point in 
understanding the background to the inter-play between ideological forces in 
contemporary Nigeria. 
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i Muslim Northern Nigeria 
Prominent among the pre-colonial centralised states and societies which 
constituted Nigeria was the Muslim 'Sakata caliphate' in the north west which 
made up about two thirds of what was to become northern Nigeria. The Sakata 
Caliphate was itself a replacement in 1804 of the Hausa States which flourished 
from the 10th century (see Last: 1967, Adeleye: 1971). The Sokoto caliphate was 
established by the Fulani (one of Nigeria's ethnic groups), as a result of an 
Islamic Jihad (holy crusade) led against Hausa pagan and semi-pagan practices 
in government, economy and society, particularly those of the Hausa aristocracy, 
in the opening years of the 19th century. The Hausa States were a more or less 
loose confederation of fourteen semi-autonomous states. There was in the north 
east the 'Kanem-Bornu' empire, another Muslim state. Its inhabitants were the 
Kanuris and a few other ethnic groups. The two states comprised much of what 
was to be called the Northern region. 
What united these two pre-colonial states was, chiefly, the Islamic faith, which 
characterised the Kanem-Bornu empire by the 11th century, and Hausaland by 
the 15th century. An Islamic treatise on government was produced for use in 
Kano, one of the leading Hausa States in the 15th century (Fika: 1978). Islam 
was the state religion and was taken as an Aqeedah or ideology and Shari'a or 
code of fundamental laws. Both states had, in the pre-colonial era, forms of 
administrative and judicial systems. The people of both kingdoms were mainly 
merchants and farmers, whose trading escapades brought them into contact with 
the Muslim Arabs. Thus commerce and industry were firmly rooted in those 
states and were the basis of trading links with the outside world. European 
commerce and later colonialism thus found conditions ripe for external trade. 
They had no difficulty building on the business and enterprise cultures and 
structures already on the ground. 
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ii Non-Muslim Northern Nigeria 
There were in the lower north or middle-belt, a number of many small minority 
groups such as Jukuns, Kadara, Angas, Igala, the Kingdoms of Gongola: 
Bura/Pabir, Kilba and Marghi. These were stateless societies, and were run on 
various forms of communal arrangements. Most of these societies were scattered 
around the middle belt (sandwiched between northern and southern Nigeria) 
and they remained independent until colonialism was established in the Nigerian 
areas. The members of these societies were mainly pagans, who practiced various 
traditional religions. Although they spoke different languages, these communities 
were united by the absence, in most cases, of a centralised authority. These 
societies were at the heart of the intense search for a separate 'middle-belt' 
identity, as distinct from the dominant culture in both the north and the south, 
which dates back to the late 1950s when demands for a Middle-Belt region were 
studied by 'Wilinks Commission'. 
iii The South and Mid-Western Nigeria 
The 'Yoruba Kingdoms' (Oyo, and Ife in particular) in the south west and the 
'Benin empire' in the southern mid-west were other centralised states that 
colonialism merged with the non-Muslim societies referred to above. Both of 
these groups of states bordered the Atlantic ocean. The Y oruba Kingdoms, 
particularly Oyo, flourished from the mid-ages in the least up to the 1830s (Law: 
1977). The 'Benin Kingdom' was a further multicultural society in which the 
Bini people dominated, but in which there were other groups such as the Ijaw 
and the Urhobo. Both Yoruba and Benin Kingdoms maintained some quasi-
democratic systems of government with clear demarcations between its various 
arms. The Y oruba kingdom of Oyo in particular was reputed for the 'checks and 
balances' in its system of government. In religious terms the Yorubas were split 
between Islam and Christianity, and had a sizeable number of adherents to 
traditional religious beliefs and practices. (Ayandale: 1979). The Yorubas 
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"shared a common history and such cultural bonds as belief in a 
common origion, : .... widespread intermarriage within the tribe, 
and the possessIon of Pan-Yoruba Orish as , tribal deities" 
(Coleman: 1958: 25). 
But they are split into different clans, such as the 'Ijebus', and the 'Egbas', 
iv The Igbo and other Communities of the South Eastern Nigeria 
In the south east were the Igbos together with a host of minority ethnic groups 
such as Ibibio, Efik, Ogoja and Ijo. The ethnic groups in the south eastern 
Nigerian areas lived in stateless societies in the sense that they lacked centralised 
authorities (Ikime: 1980, Afigbo: 1972). The Igbos however remain politically the 
most significant of the groups in the south. They were united in religion, culture 
and in economic and political organisation. As Anene argued "the pervasive 
reality of the supernatural world" was so crucial to the Igbos that "religion, law, 
justice, and politics were inextricably bound up" (1966: 12). They were run on an 
'age grade system', which allowed for mass participation in decision and policy 
making in the community. Each of the age grades had some political, economic 
and moral responsibilities. The elders occupied the highest place in decision 
making and monitored implementation. The idea of a single ruler for the entire 
community was thus alien to the Igbos. The minority communities in the south 
east were ( with a few exceptions) similarly governed. 
Nigeria was therefore founded on the basis of diverse cultural, linguistic, 
religious, political and economic groupings. Hence the emphasis, in public policy. 
the economy and social life, on 'unity in diversity', and the search for a united 
pan-Nigerian national identity. This point is crucial to matters of the production 
of educational knowledge (Denga: 1980: 123). 
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1.2 CAPITALISM AND NIGERIA 
Colonial imperialism created many new states in Africa. Colonialism itself can 
be represented as an attempt to overcome contradictions in the capitalist mode 
of production. As a colonial assemblage, Nigeria was erected on the pillars of 
attempts to resolve some contradictions in 19th century industrial capitalism in 
Europe. European industry was producing at its optimum level courtesy of the 
growth in technology. But the internal European market was not expanding to 
support the huge increase in productive capacities. This was because the 
consumers lacked the purchasing powers to acquire the abundant goods and 
services made possible by capitalism's ability to release, more than ever before, 
the productive capacities of man (Nabudere: 1977). These contradictions led the 
European powers to scramble for colonies (Rodney: 1972). European explorers, 
missionaries and traders, since at least the 15th century, had paved the way for 
formal colonialism which was to start the process of integrating Africa in general 
into the world capitalist system. Hence new states like Nigeria emerged as a 
conglomeration of nations; the sole purpose of such grouping by capitalist 
powers was the promotion of free trade. It was important to bring together 
smaller societies into a conglomeration of single states so as to create larger 
markets that could be relatively easily managed, and to ward off competition 
from the other European powers who were also scrambling for colonies. 
So the motive force behind the establishment of Nigeria, as the first colonial 
Governor General of Nigeria, Lugard (1923) confirmed was, economic necessity. 
Nigeria, like other colonies, was to serve as a source for raw materials to meet 
the needs of the industrialised nations of Europe, and a market for the finished 
(material, cultural, and other) goods from those industries (Williams: 1980, 
Shenton: 1986). Lugard stressed this when he stated that the colonies were 
acquired on behalf of 
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"the congested populations of Europe whose lives and industries 
depend on a share of the bounties with which nature has so 
abundantly endowed the tropics" (1923: 58). 
Accordingly European interest in possessing colonies "remained basicallv 
economic" (ibid). Britain unilaterally declared the Nigerian areas of trading 
influence as its "protectorates" in order 
"to safeguard the fut~r.e of trade and to exclude potential French 
and German cOmpetItIon from an area where British merchants 
had for many years enjoyed dominance." (Hirshfield: 1979: 18) 
Thus "the underlying motive of colonialism was to ensure the effective 
exploitation of the colony to the benefit of the British finance and industry ... " 
(Graf: 1988: 7). This servicing of European capitalist states therefore provided 
one crucial ideological pillar on which Nigeria was erected. But its relevance to 
education can best be appreciated by looking at the development of the capitalist 
values and agenda in Nigeria. 
i Development of Capitalist Values in Nigeria 
Mrican 'social formations' (societies, polities, cultures and economies) were 
transformed and integrated into the world capitalist system through a number of 
gradual but effective processes. The integration is a continuing one (Gutkind and 
Waterman: 1977). The processes included changes in the consumption patterns 
of the colonised peoples, so that the higher quality European finished goods 
registered an edge over locally-produced goods. This led to de-industn'alisation, 
i.e., the destruction of the local industries, because they could not withstand 
competition with technology-intensive European industries, and international 
capital. The monetization of the economy, a situation in which money is used as 
the sole instrument of exchange and economic transactions, meant that the pre-
capitalist motive behind production had to change as well. Production was no 
more for subsistence but for profit and ~eneration of surplus-value. 
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'Urbanisation' was another important process in the absorption of Africa into the 
world capitalist system. A distinction emerged between the urban and rural 
areas. The urban areas were, for logistic and economic reasons constituted into 
commercial, administrative and political centres, while the rural economy 
remained the producer of basic agricultural raw materials, cash crops that were 
processed for export in the few factories in the cities (Hopkins: 1973). These 
changes involved the gradual creation of an urban poor, the reserve army of 
cheap labour; they also were the occasion of problems of migration. Thus de-
peasantization and proletarianisation, or the transformation of the peasantry and 
rural dwellers into labourers and wage earners especially in the cities, promoted 
a struggle between people as members of distinctive socio-economic classes. At 
the same time, the local power elites and prominent merchants were being 
transformed into an embryo bourgeoisie. 
ii Social Classes and the State 
The embryo bourgeoisie had a limited capacity to raIse its own capital 
independently of the multi-national corporations for which they served as middle 
men in a colonial state. The nation-state therefore assumed a very powerful role 
because it controlled the colony's resources. Through 'marketing and produce 
boards' for example, the state became, for the petit bourgeoisie, the main source 
of capital generation (Shenton: op cit). This role of the state became even more 
crucial in Nigeria, with the discovery of oil in 1958, two years before 
independence. Governing involves the exercising of control over the allocation of 
scarce resources among the competing social and economic collectives. The 
development of such control provides the essential background to understanding 
the various crises in the politics, economy and society of both the colonial and 
post-colonial Nigeria. For example the Biafran war can be seen as an outcome of 
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the attempt to control the machinery of state and the allocation of some scarce 
resources. 
iii The State and the Developing Capitalist Agenda 
The capitalist ideology continues to occupy a primary place in the state, society 
and economy of Nigeria (Beckman: 1982, 1985, 1987). So government policies, 
programmes and processes, are mainly projections of the need to 'modernise', or 
'develop', both understood as synonyms for capitalist growth. The attendant 
liberal agenda of the capitalist ideology is expressed in the major legal and 
political documents and policy papers of the Nigerian state. For example, 
'egalitarianism' is a value prescribed for the Nigerian society, in the National 
Policy on Education (1981) as well as the 1989 constitution. Equally prominent 
in the Nigerian constitution is the commitment to a 'democratic society' and 'a 
land of full and equal opportunity'. The social relationships among people in 
contemporary Nigeria, irrespective of their cultural backgrounds, are largely 
defined within this dominant ideological framework. 
The present regime's agenda for Nigeria, appears to be no less than the 
completion of the process of integration into the world capitalist system, - a 
process which started over 500 years ago. Its 'Structural Adjustment Programme' 
is the most open capitalist agenda for Nigeria ever. That programme contains 
some monetarist policies such as the privatization and commercialization of most 
public services, devaluation of the national currency (the Naira), liberalisation of 
trade, and so on. The commitment to the capitalist agenda coupled with the 
transformation of the economy and society along such lines, ensures that 
capitalist ideology, informs many policy matters and considerations. These 
include education: the distribution of educational benefits (schooling facilitie~. 
scholarships, etc) and the production of knowledge to support and promote the 
capitalist ideology. 
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As Nigeria is a non-industrial, but developing, capitalist state. the rural economy 
i.e. agriculture, still predominates economic activities for most Nigerians. Even 
though capitalist, large-scale mechanised farming is being introduced with 
vigour, the peasantry as a class survives as a significant force in politics, economy, 
and society of Nigeria (Filson: 1991). There are, relative to the agrarian sector 
and the peasantry, even fewer industries and industrial workers. The state is the 
largest employer of labour. So the class structure is not just an African equivalent 
of that which obtains in the advanced capitalist settings. The structure, coupled 
with the inter-play of the complex cultural forces in the state and civil society, 
makes Nigerian capitalism of a different order to that of western Europe and 
North American capitalism. This means that it allows for an inter-play with other 
ideological forces - those of the primordial structures - within the context of 
Nigerian society. 
These dual ideological foundations of the country render Nigeria complex and 
the analysis of social phenomena, in that context, complicated. It is now 
important to examine briefly some basic aspects of the primordial structure, i.e. 
the structure of loyalties and identities of significance to traditions rather than 
that form of identities occasioned by developing capitalism. Due regard must 
therefore be given to these in analysing the processes of designing educational 
knowledge in Nigeria. 
2 THE MAIN CULTURAL FORCES IN NIGERIA 
Three cultural or primordial forces stand out among the contending ideological 
forces in Nigeria. These are: ethnicity, religion, and political identity (for 
example, the forces of regionalism and stati3m). Each of these constitutes a focu~ 
of division and identity in the body politic of Nigeria. 
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As a result of the early contacts with the west, most of the people in the coastal 
areas were Christians, and more westernised than those in the hinterland. :\ duka 
(1977) and Taiwo (1980) for example, have shown that there were man\ 
Portuguese schools in the coastal areas teaching the Christian scriptures and 
some western cultural practices by the 15th century. Proximity to the sea and 
logistic factors such as the ability to communicate in English and read and write 
in the roman style, encouraged more trade and commerce with the west than was 
the case in the north. In the north on the other hand, with the exception of the 
non-Muslim middle-belt, earlier contacts with Arabs fostered the spread of 
Islamic literacy, and a system of administration patterned along Arabian and 
Islamic lines. So while the south was more economically advanced and more 
educated, in the western sense, the north has consistently enjoyed greater 
political advantages because of its political history and population. 
The north accounts for about two-thirds of the land mass of Nigeria, and more 
than 60 per cent of Nigerians live there; numerically it became dominant. 
Educationally, the north resisted western education, which its Muslim peoples 
equated with the Christian crusade. So, on educational grounds, the north lagged 
behind the south. Economically, the north had a less developed economy 
(understood in western, capitalistic, terms) than that which obtained in the south. 
Owing to the colonial pattern of administration which allowed such divisions, 
each of the regions was dominated by one of the three main ethnic groups and 
the primordial forces exhibited themselves in a peculiar way. Islam, which is in 
many of its aspects contrary to and in conflict with western civilization, is much 
the most significant cultural force in northern Nigeria. Christianity and 
westernization on the other hand, are more significant in the south. However, the 
vast majority of the northern minority ethnic groups are Christians and more 
western in outlook than the average (Muslim) northerner. This is partly due to 
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more Christain missionary activities (especially education) in the lower north. 
where a number of these minority groups are mainly found. 
2.1 RELIGION 
Religion, as a highly significant ideological expression is very strong amongst the 
Nigerian peoples. The majority of Nigerians take religion very seriously indeed. 
There are however, different sects and sub-divisions within the two main 
religions followed by Nigerians, - Islam and Christianity. There are philosophical 
contradictions and contarieties between the two. In Islam, for example, there is 
no distinction between the state and religion. The exact opposite holds true for 
Christianity, according to which, people should 'give unto Caesar that which is 
Caesar's, and give to God that which is God's'. Such a precept would be 
unintelligible in Islam. This accounts for tensions among Muslims and Christians 
in Nigeria. The latter insist on a secular state, which the former consider a 
dogma of Christianity (Yahya: 1980), and a denial of their basic religious 
identity. For the muslims, sovereignty belongs to Allah (God), and all laws must 
descend directly from Him. Allegiance to any law which contradicts this basic 
political and legal claim is to be refused. In the Nigerian case, that means rule by 
Shari'a (Islamic law). All political authority is derived from Islamic law. It also 
means pan-Nigerian identity outside the Islamic faith is a secondary issue, so 
that, one is first, a Muslim, then a Nigerian. This fundamental commitment cuts 
the grounds from under the principles of secularism, which the liberal Nigerians 
particularly seek to promote. The religious tension therefore, implies that. either 
the rights and responsibilities of each religious group are respected or at the 
least appreciated, or they are not. In the former case, there is a contradiction. in 
the sense that the secular state, by granting such rights independently of the 
political structure, is in a contradictory position. This is so because separate 
primary identities apart from pan-Nigerian identity are sanctioned. 
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Consequently, attempts have been made over the years to make certain 
compromises. These include the right to an appropriate religious curriculum for 
followers of each religion, and the right of Muslims (and by extension Christians) 
to set up their own religious schools. The Muslim state system resolves this 
problem by allowing for religious differences, so long as the Muslims' right to 
discharge their religious responsibilities are granted. Hence the deliberate 
attempts by the Nigerian state to take this volatile situation into active 
consideration in policy and decision making at all levels, and in all sectors of the 
society. Precisely how far such attempts go in resolving the social contradiction is 
an open question, but of relevance to the fetishism of educational knowledge. 
This complexity is compounded by the predominance of the two main religions 
in the two respective geographical divides; Islam in the north, and Christianity in 
the south. The western states of the Y orubas, are neatly divided between the two 
main belief systems. The religious issue is further complicated by its connection 
with the ethnic factor. The Hausa-Fulani in the north, are overwhelmingly 
Muslim, and Islam is central to their cultural, political and other practices. The 
Ibos and other ethnic groups in the south east as well as the mid-west are 
overwhelmingly Christians, though there are a few Muslims among the people of 
the mid-west. Similarly a majority of the ethnic groups in the lower northern 
Nigeria are Christians, but there is a significant number of practitioners of 
traditional religions. All these religious groupings and their interrelationships are 
of significance in the production of educational knowledge in Nigeria. 
2.2 ETHNICITY 
There are in Nigeria more than 250 ethnic groups which are further defined by 
their language and culture. These ethnic differences make space for conflicts 
between members of the diverse ethnic groups within Nigerian society. politics, 
economy and education. The ethnic factor is further complicated bv the 
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dominance of the three main ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani. Ibo and Yoruba). 
These three ethnic groups enjoy relative predominance in the north. east and 
west respectively. The Hausa language enjoys relative advantages because it is 
international, in the sense that it has been, for centuries, a market language 
especially in the west African sub-region. So it is spoken either as a first or 
second language, or at least used for transactions by most people, in a number of 
the ethnic communities in northern Nigeria and beyond. This linguistic and 
cultural advantage puts Hausa in sharp contrast to the other two main languages 
- Y oruba and Ibo. But Y oruba like Hausa is spoken in some west African 
countries although not in such extended geographical area as the Hausa. So the 
Ibo language does not enjoy similar advantages. 
There is distrust rooted in ethnic differences, between the members of these 
three main groups. Each fears cultural and political domination by the others, a 
point which accounts for the federal arrangement in place in Nigeria; so that, 
each enjoys within its own geographical limits, some form of relative autonomy. 
Such complex relationships between the groups are strengthened by historical 
accidents. The Hausa/Fulani, and the muslim population of the north, tend to 
take pride in their earlier contact with the Arabs and Islamic civilization as a 
result of which they acquired some form of literacy and its accruing advantages, 
prior to colonialism. The ethnic groups in the south, particularly those in the 
south east tend to take pride in their earlier contacts with western civilization, a 
factor which gives them a competitive edge in modem society i.e. developing 
trade and commerce over the people of the north. 
In general the southern ethnic groups had educational advantages over those of 
the north, particularly the Hausa-Fulani. In addition the Yorubas. have had the 
'advantage' of having the seat of government and colonial commerce: L1go~. in 
their domains. The ethnic mistrust, was accentuated by the ~1cPher"on 
199 
Constitution of 1951 that introduced effective but divisive federalism, and made 
the regions the centres of power and control and allocation of state resources. 
The consequence was that, the northern people, particularly the Hausa-Fulani 
and their allies (Nupe, Kanuri, and so on) opposed the southerners' having any 
influence on their government and economy. A similar case obtained in other 
regions i.e. a measure of political and economic emasculation of peoples who 
'belonged' elsewhere. One reason for this was that northern peoples came to fear 
the aggressive and enterprising, as well as 'educated', southerners particularly the 
Ibos and the Yorubas. They mistrusted the Yorubas whom, it was argued, had 
enjoyed commercial, financial and other advantages accruing from their nearness 
to the federal power base, since the colonial days. Similar mistrusts were to be 
found between the Y o rub as and the Ibos. 
The creation of a mid-west region encouraged the development of a minority 
factor: members of the minority groups strived to counter the domination of the 
Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba in the Nigerian society and economy. Northern 
minorities found ready allies in the southern minorities. But the instrument of 
state creation, which tends to diversify power bases, led to the emergence of an 
additional pattern of division and identity. In sum: ethnic and political divisions 
have similar ideological forces. 
2.3 POLITICAL INDENTITY 
i Protectorates, Re&ions and Provinces 
The political structures of Nigeria evolved over time through political decisions 
made on the basis of considerations given to the diverse cultural forces discussed 
above. Protectorates or areas, carved out by the British as their spheres of 
trading influence to be protected against the incursions of Germans, French and 
other European competitors, were the first political structures established in 
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Nigeria prior to formal colonialism. The protectorate system marked a transition 
to formal colonialism. 
The Lagos Protectorate was the first to be set up. Then the whole of southern 
Nigeria was declared a Protectorate in 1903. Consequently northern Nigeria 
became the third Protectorate. The three were, from the beginning, administered 
simultaneously but in different political fashion on the basis of their religious and 
ethnic peculiarities. The Lagos Protectorate was later fused into the southern 
Protectorate. The Sokoto Caliphate, its Bornu counterpart as well as the 
numerous communities in the middle belt were incorporated and administered 
by the British as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. The protectorate system 
contributed to future ideological struggles between the diverse peoples of 
Nigeria. 
The two protectorates of the north and the south were formally merged, as the 
colony of Nigeria, in 1914. Their names were changed to 'regions'. The regions 
were, in line with the recognition of diversities throughout the country, made up 
of Provinces: administrative sub-units, patterned in most cases along the lines of 
the pre-colonial administrative structures or closely-common historical and 
cultural ties. Each of the regions comprised a number of provinces which 
provided structures for local government, and 'indirect-rule' through the local 
chiefs and traditional political institutions; especially was this the case in the 
north and the west. Each region was administered differently in order to allow 
for its peculiarities. A federal structure of government was formally established 
by the McPherson Constitution of 1951. It created three regions: north, east and 
west. The southern region was split into the 'eastern' and the western regions. 
So the geopolitics of Nigeria, reflected the three dominant ethnic groups and 
cultures of the peoples of the respective regions, i.e.. the Hausa-Fulani 
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dominated the northern region, together with the Kanuris of the defunct Bornu 
empire, because of their Islamic solidarity. Other minority ethnic groups and 
communities, owing to, among other factors, numerical disadvantage, took a 
northern identity. This movement was strengthened by the fact that Hausa 
language was widely spoken as a language of commerce. The Hausa language 
and culture became, for these scattered groups, the focus of the northern 
identity. Middle belt consciousness was to develop much later. The western 
region comprised the Y oruba and Benin Kingdoms. A 'mid-west' region, the 
former Benin kingdom, was carved out of the region in 1963. The eastern region 
was made up of the Igbos and the other relatively minority groups of the south 
east. The creation of the mid-west region in 1963 brought an additional 
dimension to the struggle between the primordial ideological forces in Nigeria: 
the minorities factor. 
ii States and National Autonomy 
The federal agenda, including the creation of more states, became even more 
relevant to every aspect of Nigerian life as a result of the Nigerian civil war (1967 
- 70). The discovery of oil in the minority areas of the mid-west and eastern 
Nigeria, and the politics of power sharing between the central and regional 
governments, were some of the factors that led to the seccession of eastern 
Nigeria, which in 1967 declared itself as the Republic of Biafra. The Ibos were the 
dominant group in Biafra. The federal government then abolished the four 
regions and replaced them with new structures of power and administration, 
called 'States' following the American arrangement. Twelve states were created 
out of the defunct regions: three from the east, with the Igbos having only one, 
and the minorities two. The Mid-west became a state instead of a region, and the 
west was divided into two states, while six states were created from the northern 
region. The civil war led to further agitation for autonomy by more groups and 
combinations of groups, in order to obtain greater share of the national 
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resources. The politics of struggle for autonomy within a united federation of 
Nigeria, was further stimulated by the politics of federal revenue generation and 
the arguments of particular groups that they have been marginalised from power 
at the centre or that they suffer from relative regional, educational, and other 
forms of disadvantages. Some states, especially those in which oil is produced. 
felt that they deserved more of the national resources than other states. Others 
felt they were educationally under-resourced and, given their high population, 
needed more revenue in order to bridge educational and other developmental 
gaps. So it came to be believed that more states were needed. Hence seven more 
states were carved out of the twelve in 1976. Other state creation exercises 
followed in 1987 when two more states were created, and in 1991 when nine 
more states were formed to make a total of thirty states. 
The states were meant to replace the regions as the focii of power-sharing and 
sub-national autonomy. Even though most of the 30 states are either dominated 
by, or overwhelmingly made up of, a single ethnic group, they were not created 
on the basis of ethnic or religious identity. A relatively new political phenomena 
is emerging, especially with the recent state creation exercise viz: statism 
whereby people identify themselves with their state, as the focus of solidarity. 
2.4 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CULTURAL GROUPS 
Nigeria emerged as a single political unit as the outcome of an attempt by British 
colonialists to reconcile the volatile ideological differences and fuse them into a 
single state and society. These differences, nonetheless, playa significant role in 
the educational system, particularly the production of educational knowledge. 
In the discussion of the relationships between the cultural groups in Nigeria., it is 
sometimes said that these are essentially antagonistic to each other. I shall argue 
that this view cannot be sustained and that its significance is heavily exaggerated 
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when such supposedly antagonistic relationships are made to appear primary. 
But the appearance or presentation of those cultural relationships as 
fundamental aspects of social antagonisms among Nigerians tends to cover up 
the real focus of social conflicts. Fetishism is both explained and expressed by the 
presentation of social antagonism, primarily in terms of primordial sentiments. in 
public, including educational, policies. 
It should be emphasised here that, despite the different cultural groupings in 
Nigeria, Nigerian peoples and societies were and are not simply strange bed 
fellows who were brought together in a marriage of convenience by the British 
colonialists. They had, for centuries, contacts among themselves at the 
commercial, cultural and political levels. For example, the Rausa state of Kano 
had assimilated the non-Rausa communities and co-existed in harmony and 
prosperity with them (Naniya: 1987). Rence one finds, within Kano, Yoruba, 
Nupe, Kanuri, numerous communities variously assimilated into the dominant 
Rausa-Fulani society. The Rausa traders were also settled in what they termed 
the prosperous Kurmi or the coastal regions. They traded in kola-nuts and a host 
of other articles (Usman: 1979). Crowther (1970) had also indicated that, by the 
middle of the 19th century, Rausa language was the second language in the 
Y oruba Kingdoms. 
The history of Nigeria is not only one of ethnic and cultural antagonisms. 
Relationships between them have not traditionally been those of conflict. There 
were differences and tensions between the cultures, and these remain, but 
cultural differences are only (politically and educationally) relevant as a result of 
the new system of governance: that of the single state and society. In particular, 
the relationship between the state and the ethnic groups assumes a special form 
in Nigeria only because of its role in fostering unity and identity on the one hand, 
and exclusion on the other, in the struggle for the accumulation of material and 
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other advantages. So in so far as there are cultural variations in :\,igeria, these 
are in themselves, and taken independently, of little significance. They are 
important mainly by reference to the attempts made by individual states and 
power groups to gain advantages from the overaching, national state. The 
relationships between the various cultural groups thus take on a conflicting 
dimension mainly because of the role which such conflicts, in the primordial 
structures, play in the attempt to gain advantages from the common state. It is in 
this respect that the relationship between the cultural groups become 
antagonistic; such antagonism covers up a more fundamental social conflict, 
namely that of antagonism between Nigerians as members of social classes 
irrespective of their religious, ethnic, state or regional backgrounds. So 
understood, the struggle between the various sections of contemporary Nigerian 
society within the common state, generates contradictions and conflicts between 
the varied elements of the primordial structure. The content and distribution of 
education playa prominent part in such conflicts. 
3 BASIC IDEOLOGICAL CONTRADICTIONS IN NIGERIA 
The idea of ideology in the context of a developing capitalist and culturally plural 
society, yields conflicts and contradictions of different types. As I argued earlier, 
the relationship between the cultural groups and ideological varieties, are not 
essentially characterised by such conflicts. The relationships become 
contradictory and conflicting through the struggle to obtain common benefits 
from the common state. I here use 'contradiction' in the sense of a conflicting 
relationship between two or more opposing groups. (There are notorious 
problems to the Marxist theory of contradiction when it is transferred from the 
realm of logic to that of politics and history; I shall not examine these here). My 
interest in the idea of contradiction is strictly speaking that of contrariety; it is 
located within the framework of social theory rather than logic. So I am not 
concerned with the 'p/not p' relationship, but rather with the relationship 
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between 'p and q' when both 'p' and 'q' can be true, i.e. some groups prefer or 
want 'X' - some groups do not prefer, want, 'X' (they want or prefer 'Y' instead). 
These groups are in conflict but they do not literally (or logically) contradict each 
other. Of particular importance in this case are inconsistent forms of identity 
among Nigerians on the basis of which specific ideological leanings they then 
come to have beliefs concerning what will best promote their 'perceived 
interests' at given times. It is in this respect that certain areas of contradiction in 
the relationships between Nigerian peoples with regard to public policy may be 
identified as follows. 
Firstly there is a contradiction between the pan-Nigerian identity and different 
cultural or primordial identities. The pan-Nigerian identity gives primacy to 
Nigeria, rather than any cultural group. But the primordial identities place 
pnmacy on ethnic, regional, and/or religious identities. For example, the 
northern, eastern and western regional identities can and do come into sharp 
conflict with the pan-Nigerian national identity, as do those of the Hausa, lbo, 
Yoruba and other ethnically-based forms of identity. The contradiction comes 
into play when the ethnic, regional or religious identities take priority over the 
Nigerian national identity. In the struggle to gain one benefit or the other from 
the federal, state or local governments, Nigerians are made to give priority to 
their cultural group identities, i.e. as Tivs, Muslims, northerners, and so on. Yet 
they are also primarily Nigerians when they are made to believe that such an 
identity best promotes their interests. Thus in the struggle for a share of 
federally-generated revenue, contracts and public appointments, Nigerians are 
made to believe that, they are first and foremost, citizens of their respective 
states, or they are northerners, or they are Muslims or Christians, or they are 
Yorubas or Kanuris. But in times of national crises, such as in the civil war or in 
times of economic crises, they are mobilised solely as Nigerians, who must make 
sacrifices in order to save the country. 
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Secondly there is a contradiction between ethnic identity on the one hand. and 
regional identity on the other hand. Some ethnic groups are spread out in a 
number of adjoining states, and so some states contain a number of distinct 
ethnic groups within them. For example, the Yorubas are scattered in a number 
of states (Oyo, Osun, Ogun, Lagos, Ondo, Kwara), as are the Hausa (Kano. 
Katsina, Jigawa, Sokoto, Bauchi, Kaduna, etc), and the Igbos (Enugu, Abia. 
Anambra, Imo). States like Edo, Plateau, Taraba, Niger, are made up of 
numerous ethnic minority groups. In both cases, the question of inconsistent 
identities arise. There are, for instance, contradictory identities for the Yoruba 
or the Hausa or Ibo who are scattered in different states. As citizens of their 
respective administrative units, their focus of identity is political, i.e. they are 
citizens of Oyo or Ondo States. But as members of an ethnic group their political 
status becomes irrelevant; they see themselves as Hausas or Ibos or Yorubas 
across the board. Within the multi-ethnic states (as in Kaduna), they may be 
made to believe that their interests are best served by presenting themselves as 
Hausa or Kaje. But they are Kaduna state citizens as far as their relationships 
with other Nigerians are concerned. 
There is thirdly, a contradiction between religious and all other forms of 
identities. For Islam in particular, Islamic Ikhwaniya (brotherhood and 
solidarity) have absolute precedence over national, ethnic, regional or state 
identity. Fourthly, contradictions exist between religions: Islam as against 
Christianity, and the two versus Paganism. Related to these are contradictions 
within the distinctive religious groups, i.e. contradictions between sects and 
persuasions within the same religion. For example, the Muslim Sunni and SIzi'a. 
Some exist within sects such as The Qadiriyya order as opposed to the TiJi'aniya 
(Anwar: 1988). For Christianity in Nigeria, there are contradictions between 
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Catholicism and Anglicanism, and both on the one hand, and the Africanised 
church, for example the Aladura, on the other. 
Fifthly contradictions pertain between all the primordial (cultural) ideological 
forces on the one hand, and social class identity on the other. I have claimed that 
ideological orientation of the Nigerian state is that of emergent capitalism. In 
this case we have a contradiction between, on the one hand, the state's and 
economy's form of identity, and on the other hand primordialism in the civil 
society. Developing capitalism, as I have argued earlier (see section 1.2: 252 - 7), 
transforms the traditional society into a class society. New social classes 
appropriate to capitalism have emerged and are taking shape. While capitalist 
society is based on social classes, traditional society rests on a primordial ism that 
is not, in this sense, class-based. One implication of this situation is that 
developing capitalism is dominant over the traditional society, which is 
consequently decaying. So appeals are made, from time to time to both forms of 
identities. In times of intra-class squabbles, conflicts over accumulation of private 
property, the ruling class, as in scenario one above (i.e. the contradiction 
between pan-Nigerian identity and primordialism), resorts to the appeal to 
ethnic, regional or religious identities, in order to heighten the recognition of 
existing disadvantages so that they acquire more advantages over others engaged 
in the competition. 
Of all the contradictions, this latter one is that which most clearly requires an 
explanation in terms of the fetishism of educational knowledge. Here, the state 
policies, including the production of educational knowledge, are to be 
understood in terms of all the other contradictions, between the state and the 
economy on one hand, and the state and civil society on the other. Educational 
objectives which in the first place dictate the designing and selection of 
educational knowledge, appear subsequently to be grounded in an attempt to 
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address the vanous CrIses, conflicts and inconsistencies in identities among 
'-' 
Nigerians. But upon careful assessment, the fundamental national and 
educational objectives which inform educational knowledge promote for the 
most part the dominant developing capitalist society and its tacit liberal 
democratic agenda. Thus a distinction is found in educational knowledge 
between its appearance and its essence. The fetishism of educational knowledge 
entailed in these contradictions will be examined by reference to the production 
of knowledge in Nigeria. 
4 PRODUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN NIGERIA 
4.1 FEDRALISM AND EDUCATIONAL PROVISIONS 
Military regimes are the central feature of Nigeria's post-independence political 
history. Nigerian federalism runs a three-tier system of government: a strong 
federal government at the centre, the states as sub-autonomous political and 
administrative units, and local government councils within each state. The 
federal government operates an 'exclusive legislative list'. It is empowered by the 
Constitution to run economic and monetary policy, defence, foreign policy, to 
have control of mineral and other resources, revenue allocation, etc. The states 
have a separate legislative list, as do the local councils. But there is a 'concurrent 
legislative list' which includes matters such as education, in which both the 
federal and state governments partake. 
The federal government runs, for the whole country, a national policy on 
education, which was designed and adopted in 1977 and improved in 1981 and 
1985. The federal government, acting on behalf of the whole federation, co-
ordinates the implementation of educational policy. It does this mainly through 
the federal ministry of education and its parastatal bodies. It is charged with the 
business of selecting the knowledge deemed appropriate to the declared national 
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and educational objectives and principles particularly at the secondary ~chool 
levels. 
In so planning and acting, as I shall show later, it permits an input from the 
diverse cultural backgrounds of the peoples in the thirty states. The states are 
allowed, in the process, areas of choice in which to take account of their specific 
peculiarities, whilst yet working collectively for 'unity in diversity', economic. 
scientific, and technological development, ideals of social justice and 
egalitarianism, and so on. The specific national ideals and the educational 
objectives, are predicated on certain fundamental ideological assumptions: the 
promotion of a liberal democratic order entailed by the need for economic 
development within the context of a free-market philosophy and the recognition 
of the diverse cultural backgrounds of the Nigerian peoples. These provide the 
twin ideological forces that prominently feature in the production, and 
distribution of educational knowledge in Nigeria. They provide the basic criteria 
for looking at the ideology of educational knowledge in Nigeria. They also give 
some indications of an emerging fetishing of educational knowledge. 
4.2 THE PROCEDURES 
The Federal Cabinet in Nigeria, on the basis of its commitment to certain 
fundamental ideals, identifies the specific objectives it intends to be achieved 
through the educational system. The Federal Ministry of Education then 
de constructs those objectives into specific educational goals and broad 
educational programmes, while the Nigerian Educational Research and 
Development Council (NERDC) is delegated, on the basis of the guide-lines 
provided by government, to work out the specific items of knowledge or. more 
broadly, areas of knowledge appropriate to the designed programmes and th~ir 
objectives. 
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The Federal Ministry of Education is an organ of central government: all states 
have their own ministries of education. The ministries of education are 
responsible for the management and administration of the educational svstem. 
The administration of all levels and all aspects of the educational system, 
involves determining what is to be taught at all levels of the Nigerian school 
system with the exception of the universities. The Federal Ministry of Education 
has the major responsibility for co-ordinating the overall implementation of the 
educational policy throughout the country. The ministry has a number of units 
and specialised bodies to which it delegates some of its powers of management, 
of the implementation of educational programmes. For all intents and purposes 
the ministry is the official educational wing of the government of Nigeria. 
Matters such as curriculum development are conducted, on the authority of the 
government of Nigeria, by the ministry and or its specialised parastatal bodies, 
such as the NERDC. 
I interviewed, in the summer of 1990, some officials of the Federal Ministry of 
Education, of selected states, and some officials of the NERDC (the body that is 
officially empowered to carry out the task of curriculum development) who are 
directly involved in the process of educational knowledge production. 
Subsequent quotations are taken from these interviews. Those officials included 
Mr. Okoro (Federal Ministry of Education), Evangelist Fadeyi and Dr. Adeniyi, 
(NERDC), A. Idris (Kano State Ministry of Education), and Mrs. Bello (West 
African Examinations Council). The selection of educational knowledge and the 
determination of curricula (syllabii) involve a number of processes. 
The Nigerian state, represented by either the federal cabinet, (in civilian 
regimes), or the ruling military council (in military regimes), usually determines 
the specific programmes and the respective objectives it wants to see achie\ed. 
"These are then passed to the Federal Minstry of Education, to be broken down 
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into achievable educational programmes" (Okoro: 1990). An education body, the 
National Council on Education (N. C. E.) is the highest educational decision-
making organ in Nigeria. It is empowered to examine, and take decisions on, any 
aspect of the educational system that is subject to legislation. The council 
comprises all political heads of the education ministries of the federation, at both 
the federal and state levels. It also includes representatives from faculties of 
education of Nigerian universities, research institutes, and other bodies. It 
deliberates on the proposed progranune(s) as submitted by the federal or state 
governments, or by any of their advisory sub-commitees. 
A sub-committee of the NCE, the Joint Consultative Committee on Education, 
(JCC) is then asked to deliberate, at a professional level, on the implications, 
requirements and other necessary factors pertaining to the proposed programme. 
The JCC is made up of the federal Director of Education, and his counterparts 
in all the States of the federation. These are the professional heads of their 
respective ministries of education. One of the functions of the JCC is curriculum 
development. The lCC has to ensure that there is uniformity of standards in the 
preparation of standardised and quality curricula for all levels of education 
before that of the universities. Uniformity of curriculum provision entails that 
the offerings in each subject of study should not be radically different throughout 
the states, although some minimum choices, on the basis of special factors in 
each state, are allowed. This means that Social Studies, History and Religious 
Studies (Islamic or Christian) should be basically the same throughout Nigeria. 
provided that a particular section of the course offering is earmarked to cater for 
the cultural and other ideological features in the respective states. The JCC 
employs its relevant Reference Committees when critically assessing all the 
possible options before it. It then makes its own recommendations to the [\;CE. 
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The NCE takes stock of the lCC's proposals and subsequently amend,. 
improves, alters or rejects them as the case may be. ~CE's decisions are 
submitted to the relevant curriculum bodies of the Federal Ministry of Education 
including the NERDC. The council has a number of sub-units for example, the 
Comparative Education Study and Adapatation centre (CESAC), the Book 
Development Centre (BDC) and so on. After the NERDC board has deliberated 
on the submission from the NCE, the particular requirements in terms of the 
specific educational input that is required to meet the programme's overall 
objectives, are then constructed (Adeniyi: 1990). 
The Book Development Centre, or any unit charged with a particular 
responsibility, then assembles, a number of experts and subject specialists to 
constitute a panel, that will, on the basis of the guidelines worked out at the 
successive stages, draw up appropriate items for inclusion into the new 
programme (interview, with Father Fadeyi: 1990). These experts and subject 
specialists include representatives from each of the states in the federation, 
usually a Director of Education or his representative (interview with Idris: 1990). 
The rationale of this procedure is to ensure uniformity in the provision of 
educational knowledge throughout the federation, as well as to allow for input 
from the various cultural diversities within the country. The experts also include 
academics and experienced secondary school subject teachers (interview with 
Abba a subject teacher at Federal Government Girls College, Bauchi: 1990), and 
representatives of subject associations. So, for example, when drawing up an 
educational programme on the national economy, the 'Economic Society of 
Nigeria' was invited to participate. In the development of political programmes. 
the 'Political Science Association of Nigeria' is invited. The examination boards. 
who ultimately will test pupils in the programme and award them certificates 
accordingly, also participate at this stage. 
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The panel meets under the auspices of the ~ERDC in order to draft the bodie~ 
of knowledge appropriate to the given objectives, and the operational guidelines 
for teaching and assessment (Evangelist Fadeyi: 1990). The draft programme is 
then examined by a different panel of specialists, and representatives of the state 
governments, religious groups, and different interest organisations such as the 
labour movement, chambers of commerce and industry, and so on, as the 
programme may warrant. Only those organisations which are deemed to have an 
interest, whether direct or indirect, in the proposed programme are given the 
opportunity to participate in the process. These meet in a conference organised 
by the NERDC. The conference critiques the draft and make suggestions for 
improvements. It is basically a professional and advisory conference. Provisions 
are always made for each state of the federation, to provide as far as possible for 
their respective singularities. There is much emphasis on local cultural, religious, 
political and other ideological features in the final draft (Idris: 1990). 
The conference's recommendations are synthesised by the Book Development 
Centre of the NERDC, and then the draft programme is submitted to the 
Federal Ministry of Education, which in turn tables it before the NCE. The draft 
syllabus will, at a later stage, be tabled before the main JCC through the 
appropriate reference committee, before the NCE is advised on whether to 
adopt or reject it as the national syllabus for Nigeria. As an authoritative 
political body the NCE takes decisions on the draft programme, and then 
submits it, through the Minister of Education, to the Federal Executive Council, 
i.e. the federal cabinet, which approves or rejects it. Whatever the federal 
cabinet approves becomes the official curriculum (i.e. educational knowledge) 
and hence the official view of knowledge sanctioned for transmission in the 
schools throughout the federation of Nigeria. 
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Appropriate textbooks and relevant teaching materials are then either 
commissioned, designed or recommended by the BDC. In terms of the 
implementation of the programmes, a considerable emphasis is placed upon 
local peculiarities. The lCC monitors the implementation of the official 
programme. 
Examination bodies such as the West African Examinations Council (W AEC) 
then use the approved syllabii to draw up the examination syllabus (interview 
with Mrs. Bello: 1990). However the examination syllabus, in most cases, 
especially at the senior secondary school level, is given priority by the education 
authorities, the teachers, the parents and the pupils. "It often determines the 
actual teaching and learning especially at the senior secondary school level" 
Abba: 1990). Preparations for the public examinations, take priority over every 
other aspect of the teaching of the curriculum. However, in most cases, there is 
little distinction between the two syllabii, except perhaps for different points of 
emphasis. Certain issues which relate to the fetishism of educational knowledge 
in Nigeria may be raised by reference to some concrete examples of the issues I 
have described above, so I now turn to the question of the senses in, and the 
extent to which, educational knowledge in Nigeria is fetish. 
4.3 BACKGROUND IDEALS IN THE PRODUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE IN NIGERIA 
The production of educational knowledge in Nigeria is a federal responsibilty, 
although the states are involved in many of its stages. The dual ideological 
orientations, and particularly the contradictions within these (see this chapter 
section 3: 205 - 9), presuppose that all sectors of the state, the economy, and civil 
society are catered for in designing the fundamental objectives of the state, which 
in turn define the general and educational goals to be pursued in schools. The 
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officially-defined goals are supposed to be invested in, and recovered from the 
educational knowledge. 
The federal government of Nigeria, operates with certain social, political. and 
economic objectives. These are referred to as 'the fundamental and directive 
principles of state policy', and are contained in the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (1979, as amended in 1989). The constitution is the supreme 
law of the land from which governments, federal, state and local draw their 
powers, and authority on behalf of the Nigerian people. So those fundamental 
objectives are supposed to embody the general good of all the Nigerian people 
irrespective of their social, political, economic or other positions. 
The fundamental objectives, were adopted from the second National 
Development Plan 1970-1974. Of interest to the ideological question is that this 
was a plan based on the experiences of the then just-concluded 'civil war', won by 
the federal side in the crisis. The fundamental national objectives to be attained 
through education, are stated in the National Policy on Education, (1981), as 
follows: 
"(1) a free and democratic society; (2) a just and egalitarian 
society; (3) a united, strong and self-reliant nation; (4) ~ ~reat and 
d~amic economy; (5) a land of bright and full opporturutIes for all 
CItizens" (section 1.1: 7). 
The general philosophy of the Nigerian education system flows from these 
directive principles of state policy. They serve as the foundation for the 'National 
Policy on Education (1981),. They are the background ideals for the definition, 
selection and dissemination of educational knowledge in Nigeria. 
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The National Policy on Education then states that, "in consequence. the quality 
of instruction at all levels has to be oriented towards inculcating certain values" 
(1981: 1.3: 7). But specifically the policy provides that, 
"TI:e natio~al. educational aims and objectives to which the 
phIlosophy IS hnked are therefore: (1) the inculcation of national 
co~sciousness; (2) th~ inculcatio.n ~f. the right type of values and 
attItudes for. the sUfV1val ?f. the lndlVldu.al a.nd the Nigerian society 
(my emphasIs); (3) the tra1rung.o~ ~he rrund In understanding of the 
world around; and (4) the acqUISItion of appropriate skills, abilities 
?-n~ ~ompete~ces both me~tal and physical as equipments for the 
IndIvIdual to hve and contnbute to the development of the society" 
(1.5: 8) 
5 THE FETISHISM OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN NIGERIA 
5.1 GENERAL CONDITIONS 
I argued in chapters 8 and 9 of this study that the fetishism of educational 
knowledge is to be assessed in the light of three basic conditions: One, that 
"educational knowledge is in two respects - the generative and the dissemination 
senses - an object which is similar to a commodity". I elaborated how this 
condition is met (7: 129 - 37). The satisfaction of this condition has universal 
application, i.e. it does not require any detailed account about what makes the 
claim valid or othetwise in regards to Nigerian education and society. This is so 
because, as I argued earlier, social conditions and social relationships are 
fundamental and indispensable in the course of the production of educational 
knowledge. The nature of those social conditions will depend on the nature of 
the society in question. But in respect to the commodity condition of the 
fetishism of educational knowledge, as such these are secondary, for analytical 
purposes. I shall therefore not address the application of this first condition 
within the context of the present study. In addition to the reasons cited above. 
this task is indirectly accomplished through the descriptions of the social 
conditions that I have already provided in this chapter. 
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The distortion condition of the fetishism of educational knowledge, specifies that 
its appearance distorts its actual social essence in such a way that the former 
disguises the latter. I argued what this condition for the fetishism of educational 
knowledge implies, the means by which its validity is verified and established (8: 
138 - 59). The 'alleged powers' condition for the fetishism of educational 
knowledge suggests that, certain powers are attributed to educational knowledge. 
But in reality educational knowledge either lacks these powers, or if it possesses 
them, they are limited, and cannot alone or independently account for the 
actions of those who acquired it. This claim has been assessed theoretically. The 
question now is the extent to which these two latter claims of the fetishism of 
educational knowledge hold, in Nigerian education and society. 
5.2 ESSENCE AND APPEARANCE OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN 
NIGERIA 
The provisions of section 1.1, 1.5 of the National Policy on Education (1981) 
cited earlier, provide some of the grounds for claiming that fetishism condition of 
educational knowledge holds in Nigeria. The ideals which inform the production 
of educational knowledge over-determine the proposal. They articulate some 
lofty demands based on the requirements of the the changes taking place in the 
Nigerian society. In these ideals are contained some indications as to the 
dominant form of society; for instance the apparent primacy of individuality over 
community. This primacy itself provides a reason for holding educational 
knowledge in Nigeria to be fetish. Assumptions are made in sections 1.5, 3 and 4 
about the power of instruction and educational knowledge. The issue of national 
unity also appears in the section and is directly relevant to the fetish condition of 
educational knowledge, particularly as it relates to the dominant form of society 
which thrives on classes as different patterns of social stratification. 
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Aspects of both the traditional and modern i.e. capitalist forms of society are 
both appealed to in the design and selection of educational knowledge. 
Objectives numbers two and five, appear to be based on the premise of the 
Nigerian cultural plurality. But at the same time, all the five national objectives 
are clear articulations of the liberal capitalist agenda. The priority which the 
capitalist form takes over the decaying traditional forms of society, ensures that 
its specific expressions and requirements are dominant in the production of 
educational knowledge and also that, when any other set of values are projected 
so that they appear as the real essence of the educational knowledge, it is likely 
that the former goals are disguised by the latter. This gives educational 
knowledge a fetish quality (see 8: 138 - 46). 
Educational knowledge in Nigeria disguises the central contradictions that in the 
first place, lead to claims about national unity and the achievement of values of 
tolerance. Its actual social essence is mainly in line with the dominant form of 
society and the interpretations of the world proposed and promoted by the ruling 
class, and those who act on its behalf. But these are disguised by reference to the 
emphasis on the national question. The plurality of values, belief systems and 
traditions in Nigeria suggests an absence of a single Nigerian culture. To assume 
there is one is to impose that one at the expense of others. The emphasis on 
balancing the interests of the three dominant ethnic and cultural groups in the 
educational system in Nigeria, promotes one form of fetishism in educational 
knowledge. That arrangement disguises the contradictions between the 250 
groups. A false consensus is assumed. 
It is to be noted that, the more the 'beautiful' ideals of the Nigerian state are 
invested in educational knowledge, the more its actual essence is relegated to the 
background. The more it is made to appear to work for the so-called 'national 
interests', the more it disguises the antagonistic social relations between 
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Nigerians as members of different social classes. This approach to knowledae 
b 
production depicts the society as a unitary organism, a harmonious unity of 
interests collectively pursued in co-operation, thereby under-playing the conflicts 
between the social collectives. By so depicting society, educational knowledge, as 
currently taught in Nigeria, is made to fetishise the conflicting social antagonisms 
and interests; this knowledge in fact constitutes but a possible form of 
understanding. In essence what educational knowledge does is to take sides in 
those conflicting social relations, by promoting in its own ways, the dominant 
interests and interpretations of the current Nigerian socio-political 
establishment. 
The language policy of the educational system is another aspect which tends to 
disguise the contradictions between language groups, by promoting some at the 
expense of others. This is contradictory in itself in the sense that, the policy arises 
out of the desire to address the problems of language as an instrument for 
communication in the educational system. The NPE states that, 
"In addition to appreciating the importance of language in the 
educational process, and as a means of preserving the people's 
culture, the Government considers it to be in the interest of 
national unity that each child should be encouraged to learn one of 
the three major languages other than his mother tongue" (1981: 
1.8: 9). 
Educational knowledge in Nigeria is fetishised by its being focused around 
examinations. Teaching and learning in Nigeria are shackled to this basic 
concern. The subject matter in every subject of study is taught by the teachers. 
learned by the pupils, and supported by the state chiefly for the immediate goal 
of passing the necessary examinations. What the pupils are taught, in their 
schools, about Nigerian cultures, values of tolerance, and the advantages of unity 
and peace among the nationalities within the country, may well be mastered but 
are so basically for examination purposes. 
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Thus, the social issues and problems, as well as social and allied goals deposited 
in educational knowledge, are here transformed by the appearance of 
educational knowledge into, a relationship between two objects or processes: 
mastery of the educational knowledge on one hand, and examination and 
certification on the other. The contradictions that are of relevance to the claim 
that educational knowledge is fetish are so serious that, the mass failure in public 
examinations throughout Nigeria in 1987, led the Federal Ministry of Education 
to assume that, because of this, the whole educational system was breaking down. 
Here is disguised so much that is essential for educational knowledge. The social 
relations behind educational decisions, are hidden. The social essence of the 
whole educational endeavour is transformed into an asocial relationship between 
abstract knowledge and its mastery, and the passing or failing the school 
certificates: G. C. E, Teachers' Grade Two Certificate, City and Guilds, and so 
on. These transformations of the essence of educational knowledge take place, as 
I have argued, in the light of the assumptions about the unsubstantiated causal 
links between beliefs and social actions. 
There are other examples of fetishism in the whole process. Crucial among these 
are reliance by the state and the official organs on experts, and specialists. So are 
the numerous claims to the powers of educational knowledge, as evidenced in 
the National Policy on Education, and the emphasis on realising every 
conceivable national objective through education, and specifically educational 
knowledge. There is also the problem of the connection between the two main 
ideological frameworks at play in Nigeria, capitalism and the primordial cultural 
forces. The differences between them cannot be unified through the process of a 
single educational programme. Either of the two will have to take a primary 
position and so provide the essential objectives to be met by educational 
knowledge. Fetishism in terms of the contradiction between the essence and the 
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appearance of educational knowledge and its main objectives is clearly built in to 
the school system and the educational knowledge it provides. 
5.3 THE POWERS OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN NIGERIA 
The National Policy on Education started off by stating that, " ... the Federal 
Government of Nigeria has adopted education par excellence for effecting 
national development" (1981: 5). This seems to attribute to education the power 
to effect national development, as a social goal. The NPE (1981) makes 
education, and so the acquisition of educational knowledge, the primary and 
crucial factor for national development. It states, that, 
"Education will continue to be highly rated in national 
development plans, because education is the most important 
instrument for (social and economic) change as any fundamental 
change .... has to be preceded by an educational revolution" (my 
emphasis, 1.7.1: 9). 
This is self-explanatory as far as the claims to the powers of educational 
knowledge in relation to social power and social action of those who acquire it 
are concerned. 
Furthermore, and based on its convictions about the primacy and powers of 
educational knowledge, it deposits some specified social objectives which the 
Nigerian state wants to see realized through educational knowledge. The aim is 
that these aims and objectives will be recovered from the products of the 
schooling system, who will be expected to playa functional role in the society. 
The NPE (1981) clearly attributes such powers of attaining favoured social 
effects to educational knowledge. The policy makes the following judgements 
about secondary education: 
"In specific terms, the seco~dary sch~ol s.hould (among other 
things): (c) equip students to hve effectIVel~ In 0l!r ~odem age of 
science and technology; (d) develop and project N Ige.nan culture .... 
; raise a generation of people who can .... appreczate the values 
222 
specified ur:der. our broa~, national aims, and live as good citizens; (f) foster Nigenan unIty .. (my emhasis, section 4.17: 16) 
The attribution of certain social powers to educational knowledge does not stop 
there. It envisaged that, 
"th~ ju~or secondal)' school ... will teach all the basic subjects 
whlch wzll enable pupzls to acquire further knowledge and develop 
skills" (19.4: 17). 
Furthermore it was also provided that 
"the senior secondary school... will have a core curriculum 
designed to broaden pupils' knowledge and outlook. The core 
curnculum is the group of subjects which every pupil must take in 
addition to his or her specialities" (19.6: 17). 
Educational knowledge in Nigeria is given the primary status of realising certain 
social ends. It is held by the National Policy on Education (1981) that, 
"not only is education the greatest force that can be used to bring 
about progress, but it is also the greatest investment in that the 
nation can make for the quick development of its economic, 
political, sociological and human resources" (my emphases, section 
6: 7). 
A further claim to such 'magical' powers of educational knowledge is made in 
section 7 of the same policy document. Some of the officials, involved in 
educational knowledge production, that I interviewed in the summer of 1990, 
spoke on the relevance of this assumption. According to Evangelist Fadeyi 
( 1990), 
"there is no better way of workin~ towards ~chieving so~e 
acceptable ideals among our up-connng generatIons, than USIng 
the instruments provided by the schooling context. We try to shape 
their moral attitudes, and their outlooks in the course of what IS 
taught to them. That is why, from time to time gove~ent ask the 
ministry to tailor educational programmes that Will promote 
specific national needs". 
More specifically, but along the same line Okaro (1990) stated that, 
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"educ<:ttional ~fferin~s in the ~chools, if correctly taught. ha\"e the 
~apacity for ~Isa.busing .the ~nds of the young pupils about such 
Ills. ~f th~ Nigenan socIety hke the ideas of North and South, or 
re}lgl?US Intoleran~~ among Mu.sli~s .an~ C~ristians, or things like 
tnballsm and the nSIng wave of Indisciphne In the society". 
It is in regards to these and similar claims to the powers of educational 
knowledge by governments and education policy makers, that almost all the 
political regimes from 1960, when Nigeria became independent, have had one 
programme or the other based on the Nigeria's state's definition of the 
fundamental ideals and principles as a guide to policy. The Tafawa Balewa 
(1960-1966), and the Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) regimes, were both 
preoccupied with forging 'national unity' through the instruments of education. 
Educational programmes, in terms of stipulated subjects of study, were designed 
to promote this goal. The Social Studies programme at the primary and Uunior) 
secondary school levels, was designed to equip pupils with the values of tolerance 
and unity in diversity. Topics that dwell on these concerns received the greatest 
emphasis. Textbooks were commissioned to lend support to the attainment of 
these ends. Towards the end of the Gowon regime, the teaching of History and 
Geography as separate subjects of study was abandoned in primary and 
secondary schools. Instead, Social Studies were heavily concentrated on the 
Nigerian cultures, identities, geographical features, patriotism, and allied 
persuasions. 
All these were promoted in the hope that the minds of young pupils would be 
detribalised in favour of 'One Nigeria'. The jingles: "to keep Nigeria one is a task 
that must be done" and "go on with one Nigeria". were supplementary 
invocations during school assemblies and before and after lessons, especially 
during and after the civil war. The belief was that the Nigerianised Social Studies 
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programme and associated jingles these would develop the minds of the young 
ones in such a way as, in the long run, to produce 'new ~igerians'. 
The Murtala/Obasanjo regIme (1975-1979), motivated by the desire for 
discipline in national life, and for patriotism to counter the 'corruption' of the 
Gowon days, resorted to the production of appropriate educational knowledge 
for this task. Emphasis was placed on national symbols: the flag, the anthem and 
national pledge, were invested as daily rituals to be respected by the teachers 
and their pupils. The Shehu Shagari regime's (1971-1983), 'Ethical Revolution 
and National Guidance' was in the same vein. A similar trend re-emerged with 
Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985) regime's 'War Against Indiscipline'. The 
present regime of Ibrahim Babangida actually re-formed the educational unit 
which is charged with the task of producing curricula, syllabuses and instructional 
items. That was in preparation for making the demand that the knowledge that is 
taught in schools, promote the regime's own favoured agenda of a 'structural 
adjustment programme' for the economy, and its supplementary political 
programme of creating a new political culture in Nigeria. The regime believes 
that the contents of the instruction, particularly in the humanities, should reflect 
these concerns. It is hoped that the long term effect will be a new economic and 
political orientation of Nigerians, so that, all tendencies of 'extremism' (in 
political and economic behaviour) will cease. 
All these programmes are grounded on the basic premise that the acquisition of 
educational knowledge will be bound to bring about the desired effects in the 
pupils qua citizens. The production of knowledge for transmission in schools was 
initially tailored to support the colonial state. That explained the emphasis on 
the three-Rs: reading, writing and arithmetic. Commercial goals were then 
presented as national developmental goals. The post-independence system was 
designed on the basis of the attainment, of some futuristic economic. political 
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and social goals following Lord Ashby's (1960) study on the future of education 
in Nigeria, as was Harbison's study on the manpower needs of ~igeria in the 
early 1960s. A recent study on the same topic commissioned by the 'Nigeria 
Institute of Social and Economic Research' and conducted by 1. Akinpelu and 
others (induding the present researcher), is expected to play the same role as 
Ashby's report i.e. to set socio-political goals to be attained. 
Such an approach to curriculum policies invests educational knowledge with 
powers it does not have. It also fetishises the lived, conflicting forms of social 
relationships among Nigerians by presupposing a consensus in the areas of 
culture, economy, politics and society. It tends to disguise the contradictions 
which it is designed to resolve. In such a process, these contradictions continue in 
real life, even though they are replaced in educational institutions by an assumed 
unanimity. One further contradiction is that the whole arrangement arises out of 
the need to address and redress the same social contradictions which disappear 
under assumed consensus, even before it is achieved. The use of educational 
knowledge towards that end is, in the first place, otiose; if the consensus exists 
there seems little point in working towards it. On the other hand, working 
towards a cultural and national consensus suggests it does not exist. Fetishism 
becomes an item on that agenda because educational knowledge is used to 
disguise certain lived experiences. 
The selection, design and teaching of the values of tolerance between diverse 
cultures in Nigeria within educational programmes, such as Social Studies and 
History, may be contingently necessary but not sufficient for overcoming the 
problems of attaining national unity. To be sufficient such teaching must be 
related to other essential factors in Nigerian social. political and economic life. 
Even so the attainment of the desired attitudes towards, and beliefs about, 
tolerance as outcomes of the educational encounter cannot be assured. Apart 
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from the theoretical constraints, already discussed, which show that the causal 
link must not only be assumed but be clearly established, there are some 
practical issues in the cultural, political and economic sphere which may 
coun)(ter the hold of whatever beliefs have been invested in the pupils through 
their exposure to educational knowledge. Community orientation in a culturally-
plural Nigeria can either confirm or abuse whatever gains (the pupils have 
acquired) in terms of the effects of the curricular knowledge. Toleration might 
emerge as a result of factors outside the educational system, such as the growth 
of distributive justice between the competing national groupings. In this regard 
the political structure and the economic and social relationships between 
Nigerians, are some of the essential factors which, in conjunction with 
educational knowledge, make or mar the emergence of these values into the 
lived experience of Nigerians. The socio-political goal of national unity 
contained in the educational objectives, can only be achieved at a practical, not 
theoretical level. The theoretical dimension (as educational knowledge allows) is 
indeed crucial to providing, and articulating, some justifications for the goal. This 
is contingently necessary for the achievement of national unity; it is not sufficient 
for the internalisation of these beliefs and attitudes necessary for tolerance, and 
their sustained expression in behaviour. 
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CONCLUSION 
The theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge, as argued in this study, i5 a 
theory that seeks to explain the ideological nature of educational knowledge. 
What makes educational knowledge ideological, why and how it is so, need to be 
clearly shown. The usual justification offered for the belief that educational 
knowledge is ideological is to be found in a favoured interpretation of the 
relationship between knowledge and the social structure. But this is a 
relationship which, I hope to have shown, is not sufficiently clear as to disallow 
any other possible re-interpretation or account of the ideology of educational 
knowledge. 
I have started from the position that all educational knowledge is ideological: the 
claim is to be understood and explained in terms of a social setting. The 
understanding of such a social setting must involve the interests of the social 
collectives in that setting. So all beliefs, theories, doctrines, and dogmas, are to 
be understood in terms other than the truth and falsity of the beliefs that make 
up these theories, etc. In this sense the acquisition of such knowledge has a pay 
off: learning or acquiring the knowledge promotes the interests of people as 
members of a social collective. 
The theories of ideology with which I started stress the ideas of class struggles 
and the dialectics of history. What I sought to do is to show that educational 
knowledge is never to be understood or explained as innocuous. Such is a 
requirement of all knowledge produced and disseminated within an educational 
system, which serves societies that exhibit a pluralism of values and 
understandings of the world. Such a society is one in which there are contending 
classes and social groups. All seek to exercise influence in the production of 
educational knowledge, since its teaching in schools will serve their interest~. 
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The curriculum cannot be understood independently of the power structures 
within a society. My task has been to centre that thought on quite specific aspects 
of educational knowledge: in particular the commodity aspect. Educational 
knowledge is here understood as meeting all the conditions of a Marxist 
commodity as Marx set them out in 'Das Capital'. I have shown how central this 
interpretation of educational knowledge that children acquire in schools is to the 
basic social objectives and purposes. 
An understanding of the relationships between the conflicting educational 
objectives of different groups within a society is basic to the theory of the 
fetishism of educational knowledge. The fetishism arises mainly because of such 
relationships. It is within these relationships that the stated aims are made to 
appear to be promoting a consensus in society, politics, economy and culture. But 
the appearance is false: the relationships between the various interests in the 
society are marked by conflict. By presenting the conficting relationships under 
the guise of an assumed consensus, the statement of the aims of a curriculum 
expresses the dominant form of society and its corresponding interest structures, 
at the expense of the very consensus they purport to promote. 
Where capitalism (irrespective of its variety) is the dominant form of society, the 
statement of curriculum aims and the educational knowledge to which they give 
rise, fetishise the subordinated views of the world. Fetishism is always 
unavoidable in any context where two conflicting forms of societies (or sub-
cultures) obtain. That is because, if the statement of aims does not contain 
internal contradictions, one or more of the parties to the underlying conflict will 
have its views represented by statements that are in conflict with them. 
229 
So one of the basic requirements of the theory of the fetishism of educational 
knowledge is the presence, at the same time and in the same place, of t"',o 
essentially conflicting forms of society. So the theory may not completely obtain 
in the context of the 1988 National Curriculum of England and Wales. One 
reason for its partial applicability to social formations such as that of the United 
Kingdom, is that the ideological basis of the educational system and whatever 
goes on within it, is not in doubt in the first place. The demands of advanced 
capitalism in the educational system are not in question. There is no other 
competing form of society which can be said to be in contest with advanced 
capitalism in 20th century Britain. It is the case that curriculum developers, 
through their formulation of curricula objectives make implicit claims to 
liberalism, but those may be taken as an aspect which expresses the 
sophistication of the advanced capitalist form of society. Liberal values are not, 
in essence, expressions of the conflicts that arise within and between conflicting 
forms of society; they are rather functional to the maintenance of advanced 
capitalist societies. Liberal democrats within capitalism are not a rival social 
group. They are critics of the conscience of the capitalist order. Although this 
role of liberalism raises some interesting problems, these problems are beyond 
the scope of the present study. I only suggest that the liberal claims in the 
statement of curriculum aims (within the context of capitalism) do not disguise 
values and interpretations of the world of another form of society with which 
capitalism is in contest. 
So the theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge does not fully obtain in 
advanced capitalism, such as Britain, Germany or France, although it may have 
limited applicability to capitalist societies such as the U. S. A. owing to the 
latter's cultural pluralism. Whilst there are clearly cultural divisions within the 
European states just mentioned, such divisions arise in the development of 
capitalism rather than fundamental social conflicts. In effect the hybrid society. 
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notwithstanding its being developing or advanced, is a fertile ground for the 
fetishism of educational knowledge. The theory is of central application to the 
contexts of developing hybrid societies since they are constituted by socio-
cultural groups which are in contest with each other, and which are appealed to 
by the state when formulating educational objectives and the corresponding 
educational knowledge to which they give rise. The theory of the fetishism of 
educational knowledge therefore, is more of an explanatory theory for the 
ideology of educational knowledge in societies in transition from the traditional 
to the purely capitalist form of society. That is why the theory has a strong 
explanatory value for education in hybrid societies. So it works particularly in the 
developing world mainly because of the presence, in most of them, of dual and 
contradictory forms of society. 
The theory of the fetishism of educational knowledge shows that one way in 
which to understand the ideology of educational knowledge, is by means of the 
thought that, the relationship between social forms in conflict must be 
considered. One will be in a dominant whilst the other(s) is (are) in subordinated 
position. But that which is subordinated (the traditional society) is not 
completely neglected in the course of educational knowledge production and 
dissemination. In both processes, educational knowledge is presented in such a 
way that it appears to promote the general good of both the traditional 
(subordinated form of society and its ideals), and the dominant form of society. 
But in actual fact, it does not do that. On the contrary the dominant order is 
disguised by the way educational knowledge is presented. 
Is it then the case that fetishism of educational knowledge, where it is to be 
found, may be overcome? One possible strategy for attempting such a task is a 
liberal political scheme such as a democratic convention which i~ fully 
representative of the various conflicting idoleogies and cultures in a particular 
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society (ies). The liberal democratic strategy offers an agenda for determining 
what should be taught in schools, in the form of popular participation of various 
sections of the society in the selection of educational knowledge. Through such a 
strategy, a consensus appears, an operative convention which is an attempt to 
lead to full agreement concerning what should be taught. Societies can, if they 
educate one generation in the values and procedures of liberal democracy 
., 
pursue this option. Here then might be a logical space for overcoming or at least 
reducing, the fetishism of educational knowledge. However there are problems 
for the possibility of filling that logical space. There is, for example, the difficulty 
of representing the interests of the various and conflicting groups and the varied 
capacities that members of such groups have in representing their interests with 
force. There are here more fundamental problems of showing how the existence 
of a liberal democratic convention of its nature, allows members of groups to 
appreciate and take account of the fundamental and wider significance of the 
interests of all parties. The idea of such a representative body itself allows a 
space for fetishism. Such a liberal democratic strategy has a serious ideological 
problem which strengthens rather than reduces or overcomes the fetishism of 
educational knowledge; if that theory is well grounded fetishism will persist and 
the dominant group will merely use the existence of the convention to legitimate 
its own values and commitments. The existence of such a convention would 
merely perpetuate the fetishim. The philosophy of liberal democracy is itself a 
truimph of one view of social reality over others. 
The end of fetishism of educational knowledge awaits the end of ideology. 
Regretably, the discussion of such an eventuality is beyond the scope of the 
present study. The end of ideological conflicts is not yet in sight. 
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